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Abstract 
 
There is a growing field of literature concerning the staging, management and 
planning for large scale sports events; the evaluation of these events and the reasons 
why nations, but more recently cities, attempt to host these events, but few studies 
have attempted to provide a theoretically informed analysis of the processes by which 
these decisions are made. This study builds upon those existing studies in this area 
which outlined a method for exploring decisions to host, but furthers the analysis 
through the consideration of policy models, most notably the Multiple Streams 
Framework (Kingdon, 1984), in order to provide a sophisticated understanding of how 
such policy decisions are taken at the local level.  Within the context of a critical 
realist epistemology, case studies of three United Kingdom bids (Sheffield’s bid for 
the 1991 Universiade; Manchester’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games and Glasgow’s 
bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games) were undertaken. Content analysis of 
documents, triangulated with semi-structured interviews with the majority of key 
actors involved in, and excluded from, the processes were carried out in order for 
geographical, methodological and theoretical triangulation to be undertaken. The 
three bids were taken from across a twenty year period in order to examine the theory 
that the decision-making process for events would have become more and centrally-
led over time. The results indicate that, while no analytical framework provides a 
perfect ‘fit’, the Multiple Streams Framework and its focus on policy 
entrepreneurialism is highly useful in explaining the elevation of these events onto 
local political agendas. Despite the increased centralisation of United Kingdom sport 
policy, local/regional actors were able to operate with surprising freedom and take 
advantage of apparent coincidences in order to achieve their objectives. The wider 
implications of these results include providing a stimulus for researchers to build upon 
the limited body of literature that applies policy theory to sports policy issues and also 
to stimulate research in the international contex
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 The Study 
 
The aims and objectives of this study centre around the scrutiny of the decisions made 
by three cities to bid to host large scale sporting events in light of recent increases in 
government enthusiasm for such projects, despite vastly increased costs and 
complexity. Examination of these decisions is aided by a series of analytic 
frameworks. The aim and objectives of the study are as follows:  
 
Aim:  
 to assess the changing role of government, both local and central, in bidding 
policy. 
 
Objectives:  
 to examine three bids selected over a period of twenty-three years as the basis 
for the analysis of policy-making; 
 to identify and explain the relationship between policy actors in the policy-
making processes; 
 to assess the utility of selected analytic frameworks.  
 
There is a growing field of literature that concerns the staging, management and 
planning for such events; the evaluation of these events; and the reasons why nations, 
but more recently cities, attempt to host these events, but few academics, for example 
Roche (1994), have attempted to describe and explain the processes through which 
these decisions are made and subjected these findings to scrutiny through the 
application of policy frameworks. Indeed, Houlihan et al. (2009: 4) note that: 
 
Theory is ... under-utilised at the meso-level where the aim is to better 
understand the processes of sport policymaking and explain policy 
stability and change. This lacuna in the analysis of sport policy exists 
despite the rich variety of meso-level analytical frameworks available and 
the current vigorous academic debate between the proponents of the 
competing frameworks. 
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An initial foray into this area of study was provided by Roche (1994) in his coverage 
of the 1991 World Student Games in Sheffield. Here, he acknowledged that in order 
to research large scale sports events there is a need for researchers to consider two 
issues. Firstly, a detailed account must be provided concerning the situational 
rationality of the policy decisions. From a practical perspective, this entails 
consideration of the mechanics of the policy-making process which means accounting 
for the decisions that were made, when and how they were made and by whom. 
Roche continued that further research in this area should consider this set of questions 
and also the mediation between contextual forces and urban policy. The latter 
approach has already been adopted by some scholars in general works on local sport 
policy (see for example King, 2009) and to an extent by Horne and Manzenreiter 
(2006) with regards to large scale events. However, to date, no studies have attempted 
to use meso-level policy frameworks in order to explain how the mediation of these 
contextual frameworks results in the situational rationality of policy decisions in the 
field of large scale sporting events.  
 
This study follows the suggestion given by Roche, which outlined a method for 
exploring decisions to host, augments analysis through the application policy theory, 
including the Multiple Streams Framework, policy networks and urban regimes, in 
order to provide a more sophisticated understanding of how policy decisions are 
made.  
 
1.2 Hosting Large Scale Sporting Events 
 
1.2.1 Context 
 
The desire to host large scale sporting events is today manifested in the vast number 
of bids (Whitson, 1998) and the sophisticated event strategies of nations around the 
world. Both the scarcity and potentially lucrative nature of these events (Andranovich 
et al., 2001) has meant that bidding processes are now highly competitive and attract 
large numbers of candidate cities and nations. The competitiveness of the bidding 
process can be illustrated when considering bids for the two ‘mega’ events, the 
Olympic Games and Football World Cup, which Table 1.1 outlines below. 
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Table 1.1 Olympic Games and Football World Cup Bids: 1980-2022 
Olympic Games (Summer) Football World Cup 
Year Successful 
City 
Failed Bid 
Cities 
Year Successful 
nation(s) 
Failed bids 
1976 Montreal Los Angeles, 
Moscow 
1982 Spain None 
1980 Moscow Los Angeles 1986 Mexico
1 
Canada, USA  
1984 Los 
Angeles 
None
2 
1990 Italy USSR 
1988 Seoul Nagoya 1994 USA Morocco, Brazil.  
1992 Barcelona Amsterdam, 
Belgrade. 
Birmingham, 
Brisbane, 
Paris. 
1998 France Morocco 
1996 Atlanta Athens, 
Belgrade, 
Manchester, 
Melbourne, 
Toronto. 
2002 Japan/South 
Korea 
Mexico 
2000 Sydney Beijing, 
Berlin, 
Istanbul, 
Manchester. 
2006 Germany South Africa, 
England, Morocco.  
2004 Athens Buenos 
Aires, Cape 
Town, 
Istanbul, 
Lille, Rio de 
Janeiro, 
Rome, San 
Juan, 
Seville, 
Stockholm, 
St. 
Petersburg.  
2010 South 
Africa
3 
Egypt, Libya/Tunisia, 
Morocco 
2008 Beijing Istanbul, 
Osaka, Paris, 
Toronto. 
2014 Rio de 
Janeiro
4 
None  
2012 London Madrid, 
Moscow, 
New York, 
Paris.  
2018 Russia Belgium/Netherlands, 
England, 
Portugal/Spain.  
2016 Rio de 
Janeiro 
Madrid, 
Tokyo, 
Chicago. 
2022 Qatar USA, South Korea, 
Japan, Australia.  
1. Originally awarded to Colombia, but they later withdrew. 
2. Official and academic sources indicate that there was only one bid, but Tehran also 
submitted a bid which was rejected early in the process. 
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3. The 2010 and 2014 World Cups were contested under FIFA’s continental rotation 
policy, whereby the preferred continent was announced prior to bids being submitted. 
4. Colombia also submitted a bid, but withdrew later in the process.  
 
The shaded area in Table 1.1 highlights those events for which the bidding process 
occurred prior to the Los Angeles Olympic Games of 1984 and the table shows a 
general trend of increased bids following these Games, a pattern that is also replicated 
in bidding for the Winter Olympics and several other large scale sporting events.  
 
Broadly, the growth of enthusiasm to bid for large scale sporting events can be 
attributed to a general feeling amongst policy makers that they represent ‘an extended 
extravaganza of promotional opportunities’ (Whitson and Horne, 2006: 74) for both 
cities and nations and, more specifically, Whitson and Horne (2006) and Gratton et al. 
(2005) attribute this growth to three related reasons. Firstly, developments in 
technology have opened up new audiences, which relates to their second reason: the 
opportunity to vastly increase television revenue. As an example, the Montreal Games 
of 1976 attracted approximately US$30 million, compared to $1 billion in Sydney in 
2000. Thirdly, the developments in technology and increased television revenue 
provided increased commercial opportunities, particularly in the field of advertising, a 
process that overtly commenced in Los Angeles in 1984. 
 
While the proliferation of bids post 1984 can be attributed to the immediate financial 
success of Los Angeles (Chalip, 2006), indeed many candidate cities present 
‘profitability’ abundantly in their bidding rhetoric, the circumstances surrounding the 
1984 Games were unique. Due to recent mass boycotts and the financial disaster of 
Montreal in 1976, the Los Angeles bidding committee were able to hold a strong 
negotiating position with the IOC (Horne, 2007). The negotiating strength of the 
bidding committee allowed them to make a profit and, in a way, has prevented other 
host cities from doing so due to the subsequent increase in the number of bidding 
cities. The profit made by Los Angeles appears to have directly resulted in increased 
bids, for the Olympic Games at least which, in turn, has resulted in the strengthening 
of the IOC’s negotiating position in the bidding process and has subsequently meant 
that host costs have increased considerably, as noted in Table 1.2, and the scope for 
profit has diminished. In short, the more competitive the bidding process, the more 
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likely it is that candidate cities’ budgets will increase, thus reducing the potential for a 
profit.   
 
Aside from the direct and immediate commercial opportunities presented in Los 
Angeles, the growth of interest in hosting can also be attributed to a recognition, in 
theory at least, that sports events can provide opportunities for what can broadly be 
referred to as ‘city boosterism’ (Black, 2007), a concept that refers to several 
perceived benefits, including urban development or redevelopment, place marketing 
and resultant increases in tourism and civic boosterism.  
 
A theme that is pursued in this study is that some cities now use events to strategically 
assist areas that have suffered disproportionately from the effects of 
deindustrialisation (Smith and Fox, 2007). Those cities that take the event-led 
approach to regeneration are likely to achieve the other outcomes listed above 
(Toohey and Veal, 2007) and use sports events to justify their projects of urban 
renewal and advertise their status and ‘personality’ and attract inward investment 
(Essex and Chalkley, 2004). Much of this inward investment is expected in the area of 
tourism (Bohlin, 2000) and results directly from improved ‘brand’ recognition or 
place marketing, arising from the transformation to global capitalism and the 
emergence of an economy centred upon consumption (Waitt, 2001). From the 
perspective of tourism, sports events are considered to promote nations and cities on 
the global stage (Nauright, 2004; Whitson and Horne, 2006).  
 
Nauright (2004) also notes that while a proliferation of bids was experienced post 
1984, these bids have been limited to those nations with the resources to bid and thus 
the events remain in the control of a minority of rich nations. Critics also contend that 
many of the economic formulae and indicators used to provide evidence of the 
financial rewards on offer to hosts are unsophisticated (Matheson, 2009) and that 
economic gains can be fleeting (Whitson and Horne, 2006). Further critiques have 
highlighted that much of the civic boosterism and ‘sense of pride’ rhetoric that 
accompanies most bids could also be interpreted as urban propaganda (Waitt, 2001).  
Even with increasing scepticism towards the perceived benefits of hosting (Horne and 
Manzenreiter, 2006) there is little evidence that this has dampened the enthusiasm of 
cities and nations to bid for large scale sporting events (Black, 2007).  
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Table 1.2 The Cost of Hosting Large Scale Sports Events (not adjusted for inflation 
and figures in US Dollars). 
Olympic Games Commonwealth Games 
1984 Los Angeles    $546m 1986 Edinburgh      $22m 
1988 Seoul                $4bn 1990 Auckland        >$160m
1 
1992 Barcelona        $11.4bn 1994 Victoria          $160m 
1996 Atlanta             $2bn 1998 Kuala Lumpur
2 
2000 Sydney             $6.8bn 2002 Manchester     $450m 
2004 Athens              $11.2bn 2006 Melbourne       $1.1bn 
2008 Beijing              $40bn 2010 Delhi                $2.1bn 
2012 London             $11bn 2014 Glasgow           $813m
3 
(Adapted from Toohey and Veal, 2007) 
1. No data available, but the following Games in Victoria were celebrated as 
operating on a much lower budget than Auckland. 
2. No data available 
3. This is the projected cost. In most previous cases the actual cost was much higher. 
 
 
Table 1.2 indicates the costs that host cities have been prepared to meet to host both 
the Olympic Games and Commonwealth Games. The figures provide further evidence 
of the clear demand for these types of events. Ideally, in order to tailor the table to this 
study, a third column outlining the costs of the Universiade (World Student Games) 
should also be included. The sole justification for its exclusion is a lack of data with 
several host cities not publishing their costs. However, the limited data available do 
indicate a similar trend. For instance the 1991 Universiade in Sheffield operated on a 
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budget of $250m compared to an estimated $3.1bn spent by Shenzhen in hosting the 
2011 edition (China Whisper, 2011).  
 
The growing costs of these events reflect the clear politicisation, in terms of an 
increasing role for governments, of the Olympic Games and other events from the 
perspective of their hosts, but this has also been accompanied by a general 
politicisation of events from their IFs, notably the IOC. Originating from concerns 
over the financial debacle of Montreal, but not until the IOC had strengthened its 
position after the success of Los Angeles, the IOC now demands that host organising 
committees (OCOGs) underwrite the full cost of the event. As Theodoraki (2007) 
identifies, given that OCOGs are more likely to be comprised of local government 
representatives, this suggests a requirement that the costs are required to be 
underwritten by public funds. The expectation of public funding has been furthered in 
recent bidding procedures to the extent that governments are required to ‘guarantee 
that it will take all the necessary measures in order that the city fulfils its obligations 
completely’ (IOC, 2011: 97).  
 
In addition to the opportunities for urban renewal and increased competition, costs 
have also risen due to increasing security concerns. Houlihan and Guilianotti (2012) 
provide a useful summary of recent security spending by host Olympic cities (Athens 
US$1.5bn; Beijing $6.5bn; London $2bn) and they attribute these costs to an 
environment of hyper-insecurity. A significant increase in spending on security, 
especially since 2001, represents a distinct alteration in the thinking of event 
organisers from insuring against the probability of a security incident to the possibility 
of one (Houlihan and Guilianotti, 2012). 
 
Despite both the increasing costs and contractual obligations required of hosts, some 
nations have embarked upon extensive sports event strategies. For instance, China’s 
hosting policy that reached its zenith with the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and shows no 
sign of abating, has been deeply embedded the politics of national identity of that 
country since the late 1980s (Xu, 2006). Similarly, Japan and South Korea have used 
relatively long-term hosting strategies for similar ends (Dolles and Söderman, 2008; 
Matheson, 2006). In these cases, hosting events is not primarily motivated by urban 
regeneration, but certainly involves place marketing, albeit on a national stage (Xu, 
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2006). While several nations have developed these deliberate hosting strategies that 
are centrally driven and linked closely to existing sports policies, both in terms of 
participation and elite success, the same cannot be said of the United Kingdom, a 
nation which has struggled to find a place for sport in the national policy arena, which 
is explored further in Chapter Two.  
 
1.2.2 Defining Large Scale Sporting Events 
 
Since research into mega-events has been a relatively recent development, extracting 
a precise definition can be problematic. While some authors (Roche, 1994 & 2000; 
Horne, 2007; Matheson, 2009; Walters, 2008; Roberts, 2004) offer a definition, others 
(Kellett et al, 2008; O’Brien and Gardner, 2006) conduct research on mega-events 
without defining them. However, despite the absence of a universally accepted 
definition, Kellett et al (2008) and O’Brien and Gardiner (2006) use the Olympic 
Games and Soccer World Cup as their examples.  
 
It is felt that, for the purpose of this research, a working definition of ‘large scale’ 
sporting events must be established.  According to Horne (2007), the most prominent 
and authoritative definition of mega-events is provided by Roche (1994: 1), who 
describes them as: 
  
large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events which 
have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international 
significance. They are typically organised by variable combinations of 
national governmental and international non-governmental organisations 
and thus can be said to be important elements in “official” versions of 
public culture. 
 
Roche’s work is not confined to the domain of sport and he uses the Olympic Games 
and World’s Fairs as his case studies. He does, however, provide a more detailed 
breakdown of the nature of global cultural events and classifies them accordingly. 
Primarily, he focuses on the ‘mega’ events which are limited to the Olympic Games, 
soccer World Cup, World’s Fairs and expos. He then identifies a secondary group of 
World Level Sports ‘Competitions’ including Grands Prix, World Cups (in all sports 
except soccer) and World Championships. Below the secondary level is a tertiary 
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group, including World ‘Regional’ Events such as the Commonwealth Games, 
European Championships and Pan-Pacific Games (Roche 1994: 3).  
 
Walters (2008) identifies an alternative three groups. He divides sporting events into: 
Mega Events (Olympics, Soccer World Cup and Commonwealth Games), Major 
Events (Cricket, Rugby World Cups, the Ryder Cup and ‘mainstream’ World 
Championships) and major Showcase events (Minority sport World Championships – 
squash, hockey, pentathlon etc.). Similarly to Roche, Walters accepts that these 
classifications are fluid and allow sports to move between classifications. 
 
Others (Matheson, 2009; Kellett et al 2008) share Roche’s view that in sport, there 
exist only two events that can be described as ‘mega’, which are the Olympic Games 
and Soccer World Cup. In all cases the rationale applied to mega events is the degree 
to which they can become ‘media events’ (Roche 1994). However, the media-centric 
view does seem to have two significant flaws. Firstly, it ignores events such as the 
Rugby World Cup and Superbowl, both of which attract significant media attention 
within specific nations or groups of nations. O’Brien and Gardiner (2006) analyse the 
Rugby World Cup alongside the Olympic games in their research, suggesting that in 
certain nations (in this case Australia) some events can move between Roche’s three 
divisions.  Secondly, the extent to which an event can impact upon its host city or 
region is not recognised. This study will devote a chapter to the 1991 World Student 
Games; a competition that acted as a catalyst for urban renewal in Sheffield, which is 
identified by Horne (2007: 2), who states that ‘mega events have two distinct features: 
media coverage and significant consequences for the host city/region/nation.’ He 
continues that these features need not be equal and events can be heavily media-
saturated or have significant impacts on their hosts, provided there is some element of 
both processes occurring.  
 
It is evident that authors often determine the criteria for defining a mega-event by 
reflecting on their areas of interest and usually they include the Olympic Games and 
Soccer World Cup as the basis for their definition, thus justifying them on the basis of 
media coverage. However, often they then incorporate some element of the 
consequences for the host city/region in order to justify the inclusion of another set of 
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events, such as O’Brien and Gardiner’s (2006) use of the Rugby World Cup in 
Australia.  
 
For the purpose of this study, Roche’s upper tier events will be accepted (Olympic 
Games and Soccer World Cups) as these events are universally accepted as mega-
events. However, in defining large scale sporting events from a UK perspective, it is 
felt that the impact made by the event in terms of the host city/region needs 
necessarily to be considered. Hence, large scale sporting events are defined here as: 
 
 global, in terms of a combination of both media coverage and the involvement 
of multiple nations; and  
 regular, but not annual, sporting occurrences that attract significant public 
sector support and funding and deliver a tangible local or national impact, 
which can be expressed culturally, financially or politically.   
 
1.3 Chapter-by-Chapter Outline 
 
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter Two provides the historical context 
and the emergence of a UK hosting strategy. The initial sections of this chapter 
explore the nature of UK bids and more broadly the manner in which UK and 
international sports administrators perceived the United Kingdom’s role in the global 
sport movement. Events explored here are primarily the 1908 and 1948 Olympic 
Games, with some reference also to the 1966 Football World Cup. Following this 
initial contextual coverage, the chapter explores three strands: the extent to which 
government actions changed, especially in the sport policy era from 1960; the 
changing perceptions of sport in the 1980s and 1990s; and the changing 
expectations/requirements of International Sports Federations (IFs) over time. 
Government action in relation to sports events is broadly categorised into three stages, 
namely a minimalist approach that encouraged ad-hoc, independent bids; a sport-led 
approach that had quasi government involvement through arm’s length sports 
agencies; and finally a government/non-government led bidding environment. The 
chapter uses the concept of periodisation to mark the moments at which the approach 
of government shifted.  
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Chapter Three sets out the theoretical underpinning of the study. The chapter 
commences with a discussion of relevant macro level theory along with consideration 
of each one’s possible relevance to the study. This is followed by a similar summary 
of meso-level policy theory which, with the opening section, forms the basis for a 
detailed account of the location of power within local policy systems. The final 
section in this chapter draws upon the discussion of power and outlines two 
theoretical manifestations of power within local authority domains: the dual state 
thesis and regime theory.  
 
In Chapter Four a description and justification of the research design are provided. 
The chapter explores at length the adopted ontological and epistemological positions 
and, following on from this, the methodological considerations. Together, the 
ontological, epistemological and methodological considerations inform the primary 
methods of data collection (documentary research and interviews) that take place 
within a case study approach. Throughout this latter section, attention is paid to the 
implications and limitations of the study and also the reliability and validity of the 
data collected. The chapter concludes with a detailed timeline indicating the research 
protocol. 
 
The following three chapters (Five, Six and Seven) present and discuss the empirical 
data. Each chapter begins with an outline of the political context of each city, 
including any evidence of a pre-existing hosting strategy. The introductory outline 
precedes a short section which describes the event that was bid for, the bidding 
process, as specified by the relevant ISO. Next, a detailed narrative of the decision to 
bid is provided and this is sub-divided into four sections: agenda setting, decision-
making, the relationship with ‘other’ organisations and the legacy of the bid in terms 
of policy making in the city. Throughout these chapters, the meso-level frameworks 
identified in Chapter Three are assessed in terms of their usefulness in illuminating 
the policy making process and also reflecting the location of power within the local 
policy settings. The analysis is then aided by a detailed discussion of the relevance of 
regime theory in articulating in more detail the articulation of power in each case. 
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The final chapter (Eight) provides the conclusions of the study and broadly adheres to 
three themes. Firstly, it provides a summary of the key similarities and differences in 
each case study, noting that despite an increased interest from central government in 
hosting large scale events and also in the management of events, this increased 
interest is not necessarily reflected in more sophisticated processes involving the 
origins of bids. Secondly, the chapter reflects upon the usefulness of theory in 
explaining the development of bids and identifies the Multiple Streams Framework 
(MSF) as the most useful tool in understanding policy creation; although in most 
cases this is far from a perfect fit. Finally, the chapter provides a brief reflective 
account of the methods used in this study, noting specifically the problems 
experienced when interviewing ‘elites’.  
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Chapter Two: The development of a bidding strategy within UK 
sport policy: 1908 - 2013 
2.1 Introduction 
 
According to a media release by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 
January 1st, 2009 represented the first day of a ‘Golden Decade’ of sport in the United 
Kingdom (BBC 2009). The stated aim of this decade was to align a succession of 
major and mega international sporting events with existing priorities in sport policy.  
 
There are three key elements to achieving sporting success. These are 
getting the grassroots in shape, international elite success and hosting 
major events (Burnham, 2009). 
 
The above quote, taken from a speech by former UK Sports Minister Andy Burnham, 
indicated the sport policy priorities of the UK Labour government, which have been 
further strengthened by the current coalition government’s assertions that, post-
London 2012, the hosting of sporting events will play a central role in their long term 
sports strategy (UK Sport, 2012). There is little surprise in the inclusion of ‘elites’ and 
‘grassroots participation’ as these have been consistently emphasized in government 
rhetoric and policy since the early 1990s. However, the placing of bidding to host 
events alongside these and the absence of community sport is notable, especially since 
hosting has only been a stated area of government interest since the publication of 
Game Plan in 2002.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it provides a history of sport policy in 
the UK, specifically locating the emergence of a bidding strategy within the broader 
policy context. Second, it takes an analytical stance and suggests that the emergence 
of the bidding strategy can be attributed to four seemingly independent phenomena: 
(i) the restructuring and re-alignment of local authorities in the 1980s and contextual 
economic changes; (ii) a recognition of the economic and political value of hosting in 
the 1980s and 1990s; (iii) the sudden financial empowerment of sports organisations 
upon the advent of the National Lottery in 1994 and (iv) the ‘pull’ of international 
sports organisations involved in promoting the attractiveness of their events. 
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In essence, the chapter also provides the rationale for the selection of the case studies 
in that it contends that there are three distinctly identifiable eras in UK bidding 
strategy. It is argued below that there initially existed a city-led era, followed by one 
with more intervention and leadership by sports organisations and then one in which 
government and non-government actors took the lead in matters associated with 
bidding. Indeed, the chapter further argues that these eras were as much a result of 
top-down changes reflecting evolving ideological approaches to sport more generally, 
but also that the experiences of the cities identified later in the thesis contributed to 
the policy learning at the central governmental level. For example, it is argued that the 
Sheffield and Manchester cases respectively and directly influenced national bidding 
policy.  
 
2.2 Periodisation and Path Dependency 
2.2.1 Periodisation 
 
In order to identify distinct eras in approaches to bidding policy, the concept of 
periodisation will be utilised. Periodisation is a concept that underpins historical 
research, yet its application in sporting studies (Holt and Mason 2000; Polley 1998a; 
Holt 1990; Tranter 1998) has focussed on the descriptive method, aligning periods to 
key dates and events, rather than a more analytical approach which associates periods 
with meanings and beliefs. For instance, Tranter’s (1998) work is based upon the 
period from the Industrial Revolution to the end of the First World War, while Holt 
and Mason (2000) and Polley (1998a) focus on periodising history as pre and post-
World War Two.  
 
Katznelson states that ‘macrohistorical scholarship tilts in the direction of 
periodisation’ and that  
 
[researchers] attempting to analyse long-term processes marked by 
significant transformations cannot be achieved without a project of 
periodisation that rests on (implicit or explicit) assumptions about broad, 
structurally inscribed, historical dynamics (2003: 271).  
 
In order to understand policy shifts with regards to bidding for large scale sports 
events, it is first important to note these large structural changes, which include 
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changes of government, the establishment of new bodies (Sports Councils, National 
and International Governing Bodies) and the impact of ‘events’. However, while a 
macrohistorical analysis can be achieved through a structurally orientated approach to 
periodisation, the results are often too heavily focussed on a predilection for structure 
and an almost total neglect of agency. 
 
Katznelson (2003) suggests that periodisation, while essential as the starting point for 
understanding change, must be accompanied by some focus on agency and that an 
accurate process of periodisation should consider both the ‘origins’ and ‘character’ of 
policy change. A good example of periodisation is provided by Anderson (1974) in 
his work on ‘the passage to capitalism.’ Here, he argues that the failings of the 
antiquous feudalist states were the primary reason for the embrace of capitalism with 
no mention of the broader social world and decisions taken by actors. The remainder 
of this chapter, and the subsequent thesis, outlines these larger structural 
transformations associated with economic and political change whilst also 
acknowledging that agents with their own agendas necessarily impact these 
transformations. 
 
Struna (cited in Booth, 2005) suggests that historical research can be identified as 
being descriptive or analytical. Descriptive histories can be identified by dates and 
distinct time periods and generally attempt to identify ‘a person, a trend, an event, or 
an organisation’ (Booth 2005: 8) in the past.  Alternatively, an analytical approach 
will still commence with descriptive research, but use the findings in order to make 
sense of detail. Of paramount importance in this research are not just the mega 
sporting events and key actors behind their organisation, but the place that these 
events held within the broader realm of UK sports policy. Hence, the analytical 
approach is more suited to this chapter as it ‘begins with the map (or description) of 
experiences, breaks apart and relates the constituents of those experiences, and ends 
with “making sense” of the entire scene (Struna, cited in Booth 2005: 6).’ According 
to Schrodt (1990:65), in her work on periodising Canadian sport history, she suggests 
that:  
 
in the construction of a narrative, the historian searches for a pattern 
to events that correlate in time, so that historical facts can be given 
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meaning through their location in the overall pattern of existing 
events. 
 
Necessarily, the result of a process of periodisation should a range of ‘periods’ that 
convey or adhere to a ‘cluster of meanings.’ In this chapter, the identification of these 
meanings will permit the identification of varying justifications to bidding for mega 
sporting events.  
 
Periodisation can serve some important purposes, ranging from managing the 
narrative, situating the subject of the narrative within a broader context or assisting 
with answers to questions proposed within the research objectives. Here, correct 
periodisation is essential in order to allow for the accurate selection of case studies. 
Periods, implicitly or explicitly, introduce certain assumptions to the search for 
answers in historical problems and it is these assumptions, which are similar to 
Katznelson’s ‘preferences’ that must be defined in order to avoid false periodisation.  
 
False periodisation can occur, according to Fischer (1970), for several reasons. One 
which is less obvious, but widely encountered in historical research occurs when a 
time scheme/periodisation which is valid and functional in problem ‘A’ is transferred 
to problem ‘B’, where it is invalid and dysfunctional, which is particularly evident 
when political periods are used as markers for social history. Whilst important for 
political histories, this does not necessarily equate to importance for all forms of 
history.  A good example of false periodisation is the abundance of sports history 
texts that revolve around the two World Wars. Several studies suggest there are three 
clear periods in sport history: pre-war (see Lowerson, 1993; Mangan, 1987; McCrone, 
1988; Tranter, 1998), inter-war (see Birley, 1995; Williams, 1999; Jones, 1988) and 
post-war (see Holt and Mason, 2000; Polley, 1998a; Smith and Porter, 2000).  
 
However, in terms of identifying periods in approaches to sport policy, basing 
discussion around significant global events do not seem suitable. The primary reason 
for this is that, in terms of changing government approaches to sport, not enough 
actually changed until after the publication of the Wolfenden Report in 1960 and even 
then there was a lengthy ‘lag-time’ between the publication of this report and the 
delivery of an inclusive sports initiative. Under the specific focus of large scale 
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sporting event policy, there is even further cause to reject these traditional sports 
history periods given that the approach to bidding did not significantly shift until the 
mid-1980s. 
 
Struna (1985:7) sounds a cautionary note in the process of periodisation in which she 
states that too often ‘traditional time periods and explanations are imposed upon 
rather than deemed from the material, and questions which might have resulted in new 
insights are unasked.’ However, it does appear that a pragmatic approach to 
periodisation can be adopted given that some academic work (see Howell and Howell, 
1985) identify a time period without even providing a rationale, simply linking their 
work to mega-events.  
 
There are competing views over the application of periodisation in historical research. 
Postmodernists such as Foucault argue that the notion of a historic or cultural period 
may be potentially rewarding, but it gives an impression of a ‘facile totalisation, a 
seamless web of phenomena, each of which... “expresses” some unified inner truth’ 
(Besserman, 1996: 1). However, Besserman (1996) goes on to argue that the 
postmodernist view is ambiguous as it does concede some utility in the approach and 
that there is value in the notion of a historical or cultural period. 
 
In the context of this research, periods will be identified not as finite eras which are 
clearly distinguished from each other, but instead as time spans where policy 
approaches have similar features, hence avoiding the strict pigeon-holing that 
postmodernists reject.  
 
2.2.2 Path Dependency  
 
Theoretically, this chapter is informed by the notion of historical institutionalism, a 
concept Peters et al (2005: 1276) describe as: 
 
[conceiving] of public policymaking and political change as a discrete 
process, characterized by extended time periods of considerable 
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stability – referred to as “path dependency” – interrupted by turbulent 
“formative moments”. 
 
These ‘formative moments’ are those in which public policy is assigned new 
objectives and new priorities are established. North (1995) suggests that these 
moments also involve the creation of new administrative coalitions to sustain these 
new policies.  Hence, formative moments can be seen as the end of one period and the 
beginning of another, or the incidents that drive changes in strategies, such as 
bidding.  
 
The concept of path dependency, highlighted by Peters et al. above, fits within this 
theoretical realm of historical institutionalism. It suggests that self-reinforcing 
processes in institutions make institutional configurations and their policies difficult 
to change, especially once a pattern, or series of precedents, has been established. 
Path dependency would seem to explain the significantly non-internationalist 
approach by government towards sport (and specifically bidding for mega sporting 
events) in the early to mid-twentieth century.  Houlihan (2009) provides further 
sensitisation between path dependency in sport by linking the concept of path-
dependency to that of ‘policy learning’ in which policy is seen as a cycle and is 
regularly energised by feedback on existing policy. Greener (2002: 162, cited in 
Houlihan, 2009) states that policy learning ‘considers policy legacies to be one of the 
most significant elements in determining present and future policy.’ 
 
Path dependency, then, would seem to suggest that initial policy decisions can 
determine, or at least strongly influence, future policy choices as institutions, whether 
these are cultural or political, can leave their own imprint on a policy which 
necessarily constrains future policy choices. Houlihan (2009) continues that several 
authors (Houlihan and White, 2002; Green and Houlihan, 2005; Pickup, 1996; Roche, 
2003; Henry, 2001) suggest that the organisation and structure of UK sport has played 
a significant role in shaping policy.  
 
According to path dependency theory, past policy decisions also need to be seen as 
‘institutions’ in relation to current policy choices as the accumulation of these 
decisions over time can restrict future polices. Houlihan (2009: 63) identifies that 
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path dependency can have a ‘hard’ application where a policy direction becomes 
‘locked in’ to a certain path or become ‘locked on’ to a policy trajectory. He cites the 
example of a governmental decision to value and target elite sporting success, a 
policy trajectory that will lock the government on to a ‘predictable policy path usually 
involving the investment in specialist training facilities, cash payments to athletes and 
the development of sports science’ (Houlihan, 2009: 63). He continues that the case 
for path dependency is further endorsed by the lack of nations attempting to switch 
away from such a trajectory, which is considered in greater detail below when the 
focus of this chapter moves towards suggesting that the development of a UK bidding 
strategy can be attributed to an extension of the path dependent elite sport policy. 
 
Peters (2005) does suggest that a limitation of the historical institutionalist approach it 
that does not give credence to political conflict nor the dynamic relationships between 
institutions. He continues that while the path-dependent period may appear stable, 
conflict and dissensus under the surface may have been overlooked. Despite this 
critique, within the framework of this chapter an historical institutionalist approach 
that recognises some element of Katznelson’s ‘preferences’ and Peter’s ‘conflicts’ is 
deemed most suitable in providing a rationale for case-study selection. The concept of 
path dependency does appear to have some validity in analysing the broader realm of 
UK sports policy and also the more intimate history of approaches to bidding.  In the 
case of the United Kingdom, it does seem that the agency traits of preferences and 
path dependency have been influential, largely due to the long-term absence of any 
clear central sports strategy.   
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Table 2.1 A Chronology of the United Kingdom’s Bids for Large Scale Sports Events 
Key: Italics – failed bids. 
1. The UK was successful in winning the right to host this event, but then it was 
forfeited due to concerns over the building of the stadium. 
 
2.3 Historical Context: bidding in the pre-sport policy era 
 
From the nineteenth and into the first half of the twentieth century, the UK 
government’s role in the development of sport can be characterised as haphazard and 
ad-hoc (Houlihan, 1997). This piecemeal and reactive approach continued until the 
1908  Olympic Games, London 
1934 British Empire Games, London 
1948  Olympic Games, London 
1958 British Empire and Commonwealth Games, Cardiff 
1966  Football World Cup, England 
1970 British Commonwealth Games, Edinburgh 
1984 Commonwealth Games, Edinburgh 
1991 Rugby Union World Cup, UK, France and Ireland 
1991 World Student Games, Sheffield 
1992 Olympic Games, Birmingham 
1996 European Football Championships, England 
1996 Olympic Games, Manchester  
1999 Rugby Union World Cup, Wales 
2000 Olympic Games, Manchester 
2002  Commonwealth Games, Manchester 
2005 Athletics World Championships, London
1
 
2006 Football World Cup, England 
2012 Olympic Games, London 
2015 Rugby Union World Cup, England 
2017 World Athletics Championships, London 
2018 Football World Cup, England 
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1960s when intervention became more consistent. Green and Houlihan (2005) 
attribute this new found interventionism to three influences. Firstly, sport was 
identified as having a role in tackling youth disorder. Secondly, there was public 
sympathy towards, or at least no opposition to, the building of new facilities and 
thirdly, it was considered that the state could help combat the success of East 
Germany and the Soviet Union on the international sports field. This section, and 
those that follow it, attempt to detail the broad changing attitudes in UK sport and also 
the emergence of a more centralised bidding strategy. A summary of key events 
hosted (and significant failed bids) is provided in Table 2.1 above.  
 
It would seem that the logical starting point of this analysis would be the 1908 
Olympic Games, given that it was the first recognised large scale sporting event to be 
held in the United Kingdom. However, justifying its inclusion (and to a lesser extent 
the 1948 Olympic Games) in this chapter is problematic, mostly because these Games 
do not fit into the definition of ‘large scale sporting events’ identified in Chapter One. 
However, while the Games were still in their infancy, there is considerable evidence 
that, not unlike more modern events, the government’s perception of their role within 
these events was unclear.  Both the absence of any central position on sports events 
and the United Kingdom’s prominent role in the international Olympic movement 
provides a useful contrast to the contemporary position.  
 
The UK’s involvement in the Olympic movement was solidified in 1904 at the IOC 
Congress held in London. Whilst not overtly political, members of parliament were in 
attendance and patronage was granted by the King (Cook 1908). The Congress led to 
the establishment of the British Olympic Association (BOA) which was formalised at 
a meeting in the House of Commons in May 1905. Despite the presence of politicians 
in the establishment of the BOA (its first chairman was Lord Desborough, a former 
MP), there was no evidence of a government sports policy.  
 
In keeping with the non-interventionist stance regarding sport and the Olympic 
Games there was no direct funding and no intrusion by any government representative 
in the lead up to the 1908 Games, although Lord Desborough had served as both a 
Liberal and Conservative MP and as Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman’s official 
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representative at the 1906 Athenian Games. The official report into these Games 
asserted: 
 
it is a well-known and generally accepted maxim of English life that 
undertakings such as these shall be carried out by private enterprise, 
and without help of any sort from the government, a distinction 
which other nations do not share. The British Olympic Council, 
therefore, had to depend absolutely upon its own efforts and upon 
support of the friends of the Olympic movement, for means to fulfil 
its responsibilities (Cook, 1908: 19). 
 
Fortunately for the BOA, the Franco-British Exhibition was prepared to foot the 
significant infrastructural costs with hosting the Games, most significantly through 
the provision of the main stadium. Fortune appears the operative word here as the 
Official Report goes on to note that the timings of both events were as a result of a 
‘wholly undesigned and unforeseen coincidence’ (Cook, 1908). Beacom (2003) 
continues that the organisers of the Exhibition were strong advocates of the Olympic 
movement and recognised an opportunity to proactively help the fledgling concept.  
 
The bidding process for the 1908 Games was a largely arbitrary process, with 
discussion in the International Olympic Committee (IOC) focussing on the merits of a 
permanent Athenian Olympics, rather than on deciding future hosts for the event. 
Hence, the award of the 1908 Games was not due to a formal vote, but instead heavily 
influenced by the United Kingdom’s support for the Athenian Games of 1906. Cook 
(1908) suggests that the presence of the King, Queen, Prince and Princess of Wales in 
Athens, along with the positive reputation of the British Olympic Association (BOA) 
chairman Lord Desborough within the Olympic Movement, was enough to influence 
the IOC to award the Games to London following the withdrawal of the original hosts 
Rome. 
 
The highly ad-hoc nature of awarding the Games clearly sits in contrast to modern 
procedures, but it does not necessarily follow that there was an absence of a UK 
strategy, more a lack of ‘official’ policy. Indeed, the lack of a formal bidding process 
allowed interested parties, such as the UK Royal Family and Lord Desborough, to 
exert their influence over the IOC. Holt (1990) offers an alternative explanation to the 
one above and suggests that there was a political motive for hosting the 1908 Games. 
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He points to the challenge placed upon UK nationalism and racial virility by the Boer 
War and identifies the Olympic Games as an opportunity to showcase physical 
superiority and reject undercurrent claims of racial deterioration, reflecting a general 
opportunistic attitude to mega events. 
 
Academic literature concerning the next large scale event to be hosted in the United 
Kingdom, the 1934 British Empire Games is sparse, especially when compared to the 
thorough coverage of the 1908 Olympics (Polley 2006, Holt 1990), specific, detailed 
studies on the 1948 Games (Beck 2008, Baker 1994) and more general works on 
‘inter-war’ sport in the UK (for example Jones, 1988). Much writing about these early 
Empire Games surrounds the first instance of the competition in 1930. It is evident 
that, while still in an era of an absence of a bidding policy, or more importantly a 
sport policy, governments recognised the value of mega sporting events to achieve 
foreign policy goals. The paucity of literature is particularly interesting as the 1930s 
were recognised as the decade when sport, especially international sport, became 
highly politicised (Huggins and Williams, 2006). 
 
British governments for most of the inter-war period were indifferent and 
even hostile to international sport, lacked a coherent approach took 
minimal interest in the Olympics, avoided unwelcome fiscal 
commitments and tried to signal the separation of sport and politics 
(Beck, cited in Huggins and Williams 2006). 
 
Similarly to the 1908 Olympic Games, the 1948 Games were awarded to London two 
years prior to the event taking place, which represented the second time that the IOC 
had looked to the UK to ‘save’ the Olympic Movement in extraordinary 
circumstances. The first being when the fledgling movement was faltering after two 
fairly unsuccessful instalments (and the volcanic eruption in Italy) and this time after 
the Second World War. The bidding process highlights important distinctions 
between mega sporting event organisation in this period, compared to the 
contemporary period. Unlike modern Games, hosting of the event was allocated to the 
National Olympic Committee (NOC), in this case the BOA. The BOA then decided 
which city was to host the Games (although in reality, the decision was already 
made). As early as 1948 it was recognised that government support was necessary in 
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winning the right to host and this was deemed as the main reason for the failure of the 
1944 bid. 
 
Unlike previous attitudes to bidding, the government’s stance towards the 1948 
Games differed significantly, suggesting a change in the policy position towards mega 
sporting events. Specifically, there was a distinctly increased activist approach 
towards sport, especially international sport. Traditionally, and represented in all 
aspects of sports policy until this point, the view was that government should be non-
interventionist in a voluntary activity, respect the autonomy of sports governing 
bodies and encourage sport to be privately financed (Beck 2008). Non-
interventionism was adhered to in order to distance UK policy from that of Germany 
and Russia, where state interventionism was key and partially explains the apparent 
lack of government involvement into the 1934 British Empire Games. 
 
The attitude of successive early twentieth century governments towards sport can be 
effectively summarised in the response to the invitation to attend the 1936 Berlin 
Olympics below: 
 
For years we have carefully refrained from any action which might give 
rise to a suggestion of official support for our connexion with these 
Games. We have therefore studiously avoided communication with the 
British Committee [BOA]. This attitude we wish to maintain. 
       (Foreign Office, 1935) 
 
Overtly, at least, it appeared that little had changed since 1908 and this was certainly 
the case until at least 1939. Beck (2008) and Polley (1997, 1996, 1992) both 
acknowledge that the National Archives offer very little on government’s role in the 
bid for the 1944 Games and this stance was again backed-up by an official source 
which stated ‘reaffirmation of our consistent policy of refraining from official 
intervention in all matters connected with the Olympic Games’ (Foreign Office, 
1938). 
 
However, this public rhetoric did not always reflect official realities. Beck (2008: 
624) states that government in fact adopted a rather interventionist interpretation of 
non-interventionism, especially regarding the instrumental use of sport in national 
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advertisement. Behind the scenes government exerted varying degrees of official 
pressure on sporting authorities to secure foreign policy objectives. A good example 
of non-overt steering of sport policy was government’s ‘encouragement’ for the BOA 
to withdraw their bid for the 1940 Games in favour of preserving diplomatic relations 
with Japan (as Tokyo was also bidding).  
 
Despite the apparent increase in government interventionism, this still did not 
represent a coherent and systematic policy strategy for sport, rather just a recognition 
that sport could play a role in foreign diplomacy. Coalter (2007:9) indicates that prior 
to the 1960s there was little ‘systematic central government interest in sport’. Attlee’s 
government supported the 1948 Olympic Bid but did not lead it. While this can be 
seen as a marked shift in policy direction, Beck (2008) argues that Attlee’s actions in 
sport resulted from his personal interest in it, not a recognition that sport can create 
politically usable resources. Indeed, as will be detailed below, ‘governments were yet 
to accept sport as a legitimate area of public policy’ (Bloyce and Smith, 2010: 29).  
 
2.4 Sport Policy in the 1960s and 1970s 
 
The 1960s can be seen as an important milestone for sports policy at the domestic 
level, with the publication of the Wolfenden Report (CCPR, 1960) and ‘a new deal’ 
for sport. The decade also witnessed increasing governmental involvement in sport 
through the creation of an advisory sports council in 1965. However, Holt and Mason 
(2002) suggest that even these forward steps were ‘hamstrung’ by the past. They 
argue that the ownership of facilities remained largely private and administrative 
procedures remained unchanged, leaving an ‘old fashioned feel’ to the Wolfenden 
Report, in particular with regards to its views on international sport. This critique 
seems simplistic, though, and in reality the Wolfenden Report provided an effective 
mix of conservatism and innovation. The evidence would suggest that, while on the 
surface government’s approach to sport endured a formative moment, the historical 
conventions associated with bidding remained largely unchanged.  
 
King (2009: 52) argues that interest in sport from a central government perspective 
can be traced back to the period from 1960-1965, although he goes on to suggest that 
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‘it is from the early 1970s that a distinct area of public policy emerged around sport’. 
The newly adopted focus emerged from concerns about the performance of UK teams 
and individuals in international sport, youth disorder and pressure from the electorate 
to expand sport and leisure facilities (Houlihan, 1991). Indeed, these were the main 
policy priorities of the newly established Advisory Sports Council (Houlihan, 1997). 
 
These initial attempts by government to create a rationale for intervention in policy 
matters relating to sport were set in the context of a general consensus in UK politics 
that followed the Second World War. Just as economic, health and social policy were 
largely devoid of ideological disputes, the principal political parties and various 
national governing bodies of sport (NGBs) agreed that sports policy should focus 
mostly upon the building of new facilities. There was very little evidence at this time 
of overt dispute between those who favoured elite sport and those interested in mass 
participation (Houlihan, 1991; Green, 2004; King, 2009; Bloyce and Smith, 2010). 
Coghlan (1990) acknowledges that this consensus was hardly surprising given the 
paucity of existing sport and leisure facilities. However, it must be acknowledged that 
in the immediate aftermath of the Wolfenden Report and creation of the Sports 
Council that this debate did emerge. While there was a broad, tentative consensus 
surrounding the immediate priorities of sports policy, this period represented the 
beginnings of the debate between provision for the masses and provision for elite 
performers; a debate that has been a consistent feature of the sports policy agenda 
since (Bloyce and Smith, 2010). 
 
In order to fully understand the significance and legacy of the Wolfenden Report, it is 
first important to set out its context. Prior to its publication, there existed a dispute 
between the BOA and the Central Council of Physical Recreation (CCPR) over which 
body was best suited to set the UK sporting agenda. Until 1935, this responsibility had 
rested with the BOA, but with the creation of the CCPR commenced the first of the 
organisational tensions that have arguably impeded the development of UK sport to 
this day. Hence, the fact that the Wolfenden Report was published by the CCPR led to 
resentment from the BOA as it saw the report as a ‘vehicle of the CCPR to increase its 
influence’ (Bloyce and Smith, 2010: 30). Even within the CCPR, the regional 
branches (particularly in Wales and Scotland) felt that they were not adequately 
represented.  
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Perhaps the two key outcomes of the publication of the Wolfenden Report, in terms of 
developing a bidding strategy, where the establishment of the GB Sports Council in 
1972 and, indirectly, the localisation of sports development. The Conservative 
Government initially rejected the creation of a Sports Development Council, although 
they did follow-up their facility investment with the appointment of Lord Hailsham as 
minister with special responsibility for sport. The theme of Conservative sport in this 
period, though, was firmly rooted in the advocacy of an arms-length relationship 
between sport and government (Bloyce and Smith, 2010, a relationship that began to 
erode with the election of a Labour Government in 1964. Within a year an Advisory 
Sports Council had been established with Denis Howell as its chair. Howell was also 
appointed Minister for Sport and Recreation, albeit a junior position within 
government. 
 
The establishment of the Sports Council resulted from, and reinforced, the general 
shift towards a culture of intervention (Green, 2004) and away from the previous 
‘voluntarist’ approach (Coalter et al., 1988). Among the stated aims of the Sports 
Council was the desire to ‘raise standards of performance in sport and physical 
recreation’ (Green, 2004: 367), however, as stated above, the consensus among the 
sporting community was that the immediate priority should be the development of 
facilities. Even those more interested in the raising of elite sporting standards 
recognised that a pre-requisite for this was the building of facilities to attract more 
participants to sport, which was later articulated in the underpinning principles of the 
Sports Development Continuum (see Houlihan 1991; Bramham and Hylton 2008). 
The participatory sentiment was endorsed by the 1973 Cobham Report entitled ‘Sport 
and Leisure’, leading to the expression ‘Sport for All’ which was used to categorise 
sports policy during the 1970s and into the 1980s.  
 
To account for the evolution of UK sports policy, it is important to consider the 
general political, economic and social context of the specific time period. In the 
1970s, government viewed sport as an extension of the welfare state and justified its 
involvement in sport on the basis that citizens had a right to take part in sport and 
leisure activities and hence policy was largely driven towards the provision of new 
facilities. This was endorsed by the 1975 White Paper on Sport and Recreation, which 
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placed an emphasis on the universality of access to facilities (King, 2009). However, 
Houlihan (1997: 93) notes that despite sport being presented as a ‘right’ and ‘need’ 
for citizens, the White Paper ‘reiterated a conventional rationale for intervention [...] 
social order, international prestige and individual wellbeing’. Generally, it advocated 
increasing government intervention and a reduction in voluntarist administration, yet 
despite its ambitions the specifics of the White Paper were never delivered due to 
subsequent cutbacks in public expenditure (King, 2009).  
 
Of potential importance in charting the emergence of a bidding policy, the 1975 
White Paper also introduced the concept of regional sports councils which were 
designed to aid the delivery of sport and recreation. This process of devolving policy-
making power to regions, local authorities and cities, it is suggested below, could 
account for the rise in the city-led, ad-hoc attempts to host mega and major sporting 
events.  
 
In addition to the White Paper, this period also witnessed a major programme of 
reform in local government. Henry and Bramham (1993: 116) suggest that these 
reforms were ‘the measure which most significantly influenced the provision of 
leisure [including sport] opportunities through the public sector’. Many local 
authorities, partly due to the impending reorganisation of local government possessed 
significant capital budgets to provide leisure facilities, leading to the number of 
municipal sports centres to increase tenfold, the number of swimming pools increased 
by approximately 70% and jobs were created within local authorities for sport and 
welfare professionals (King, 2009). This restructuring made clear that local authorities 
should become specialised in the delivery of sporting opportunities and made sure 
they were placed at the heart of local sport policy and, in effect, become principal 
delivery vehicles for national policy objectives. 
 
The main facility-building aims of the Sports Council were hindered by a general lack 
of funds and also a continuing belief that facility development, despite being 
championed by the Sports Council, should be dealt with locally, through regional 
Sports Councils (Bloyce and Smith, 2010). These Councils were eventually 
established and along with the employment of local sports development officers 
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(SDOs), gave further impetus to local policy-makers to become even more specialised 
in the delivery of sport.  
 
Local authorities were not only empowered to recruit SDOs to implement their sports 
strategies, but also became to be seen as the most significant providers of sporting 
opportunities and facilities. The re-organisation of local government in the 1970s 
enabled the new authorities to spend bigger budgets on sport and also created a 
competitive corporate culture whereby authorities were encouraged to compete with 
private providers for contracts to build facilities, thus developing a specialism in sport 
in addition to a corporate approach to bidding. It seems of little coincidence that 
shortly after these powers were devolved to local authorities that several instances 
emerged of cities independently bidding to host mega and major sporting events.  
 
Generally, the 1960s and 1970s can be seen as a period in which sport became located 
within the context of the broad political consensus surrounding the role of the welfare 
state. The period also witnessed the steady professionalisation of the public policy 
area for sport and the slow decline of voluntary sector influence over sport policy 
(King, 2009). In addition, there was also a rapid growth of interventionism, an 
increased bureaucratisation of sport and the emergence of local authority specialism 
in sport, a development that could explain the emergence of ad-hoc bidding.  
Specifically, the priority in sports policy was to increase the volume of sports 
facilities and increase opportunities to participate.  
 
In slight contrast to previous administrations, the Labour Government elected in 1964 
pledged in its manifesto to support sport as a ‘constructive leisure pursuit’ (Polley, 
1998b: 2). They committed to the establishment of an Advisory Sports Council, as 
previously mentioned, and Denis Howell was appointed as Minister for Sport and 
Recreation, which was accompanied by a pledge of £500,000 towards the hosting of 
the Football World Cup in 1966. 
 
In his memoirs Howell provides a detailed account of his dealings with Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson in securing this grant. He notes that Wilson was not even 
aware of the event until at least 1964, despite it being awarded to England in 1960. 
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The £500,000 figure was one which Howell suggested without discussion and it was 
agreed upon instantly (Howell, 1990).  
 
The hosting of the 1966 football World Cup followed a similar pattern to the mega 
sporting events that preceded it. A relatively non-competitive bidding process (West 
Germany were England’s only opponents) was led by the Football Association and 
there was an initial lack of government support. There was, however, an increasing 
prioritisation by government of international sport in terms of achieving diplomatic 
and foreign policy goals and a recognition that sports events provided a useful source 
of tourism (Holt and Mason, 2000). Despite this slight evolution in the attitude of 
government towards sport and an acceptance that government should ‘support’ 
international sport, there was no evidence of any central desire to take the lead in 
attracting events to the UK.  
 
In his research on the 1966 World Cup, Polley (1998b) suggests, while the role of 
government in relation to sport was changing, the focus in 1966 was still on 
diplomatic issues arising from more immediate events, specifically those arising from 
the surprise qualification of the North Korean team. Whereas in the 1930s 
government was able to refuse visas to a visiting Russian team, the pressure applied 
by the international governing body of football prevented this from being an option 
for the North Koreans. Indeed, much government attention was taken up with this 
issue, thus reflecting the responsive and pragmatic approach that still endured with 
regards to mega sporting events. 
 
Similarly to the previous events mentioned above, vast amounts of existing literature 
on the 1966 World Cup focus on on-field performances and romantic visions of 
heroism displayed by the likes of Pickles the dog (who found stolen World Cup) and 
very little focuses on the mechanics of the bidding and awarding of these events. The 
reason for this does not appear to lie with an ignorance of scholars in addressing such 
issues, but more to do with the very nature of the bidding process and the absence of 
clear policies for bidding. There is also credence to the theory of path dependency 
identified above. Since initial forays into the area of bidding, it became accepted that 
government should ‘support’ bids in order to achieve diplomatic and financial 
(tourism) gains and despite the formative moment in domestic sports policy in general 
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in the 1960s and 1970s, this was not represented as a formative moment in the 
approach to bidding.  
 
It was suggested earlier that the approach (or lack of) towards bidding for mega 
sporting events can be associated with the nature of international sport and domestic 
politics. From 1908 until at least 1960 the UK witnessed a gradual reduction in its 
global influence with the loss of the Suez Canal, African and Asian decolonisation, 
marginalisation during the Cold War and tentative attempts to integrate into Europe. 
Additionally, international sporting success was declining, especially in the UK’s 
traditional sports.  
 
It would appear logical to suggest that there are two emergent themes that can help 
explain the emergence of ‘hosting’ as a priority in sports policy. The first of these is 
the growing importance of international sport. While the Wolfenden Report suggested 
the importance of this domain, it was formally recognised in the 1960s with the 
formation of an International Committee to advise on two key areas: international 
sport at home and travel costs. In this committee’s remit, the issues of multi-sport 
events such as the Commonwealth Games and Olympics were to be dealt with 
separately. Coghlan (1990: 111) says that ‘it was realised that if Britain was to stage 
major international events, as befitted our standing in international sport, financial 
help had to be provided.’ This quote seems to suggest an assumption that the 
emergence of a bidding policy can be directly related to Britain’s perception of itself 
in international sport and linked to the concept that a declining level of performance 
on the sports field could be salvaged by the display of excellence in the delivery of an 
event.  
 
2.5 The 1980s: Economic Change, Los Angeles 1984 and Local Authority 
Restructuring.   
 
The 1980s was a time of change in domestic sport policy. However, it can also be 
argued that this decade witnessed two key formative moments in the emergence and 
development of a UK bidding policy. The first of these was the financial success of 
the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, which provoked leading sports administrators 
to consider the merits of a United Kingdom Olympic bid. The second was 
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Conservative victory in the 1987 General Election, which had a significant impact on 
the ideology of many local authorities. Those Labour-led councils which had taken up 
oppositional positions to the Conservative Government in the mid-1980s in the hope 
of a Labour victory in 1987 were suddenly forced to adopt more modern, 
entrepreneurial practices which, in turn, further equipped them with the expertise 
required for bidding.  
 
2.5.1 Sport Policy Context 
 
It is argued above that the evolution of sports policy in the 1970s was caused by the 
ideological consensus between NGBs and political parties, which placed sport within 
the realm of welfare provision. Hence, changes in policy were caused by alterations to 
the organisational structure of sport, such as the establishment of the GB Sports 
Council in 1972. However, the late 1970s witnessed the breakdown of consensus in 
UK politics and an ideological split between the two main political parties, which 
directly impacted upon sports policy. The social welfare tint applied to domestic 
policy was replaced by a new economic realism, or ‘period of state flexibilisation and 
disinvestment’ (King, 2009: 54) that responded to the global economic climate in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. 
 
While 1960s and 1970s sport policy can be typified by increasing facility provision, 
an increase in the use of ‘sport as an instrument of social policy’ (Houlihan and 
White, 2002: 28), Thatcher’s government of the 1980s subjected this consensus to ‘an 
abrupt and sustained challenge’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 27). Despite Thatcher’s 
reluctance to accept sport as a positive force (she saw it as a source of problems) it 
still played a role in the solution to inner-city problems through the Action Sport 
programme. Here, local authorities were allocated funding to provide opportunities 
for low participating groups. This represents a further empowerment of local 
authorities in sport, but also helped to ‘promote sports development as a legitimate 
local authority activity’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 37).  
 
According to Green (2004: 369) the GB Sports Council document Sport in the 
Community: the next ten years (1982) represented a key policy event as it represented 
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the ‘growing congruence between government policy and that of the Sports Council.’ 
The document placed an increasing emphasis on schemes for the recreationally 
deprived, such as the unemployed and socially excluded (Coalter et al, 1988) yet it 
also had implications for elite sport (Green, 2004). However, Coalter (1988) also 
suggests that the publication of the document did little to change the existing funding 
patterns for UK sport: funding was focussed towards elite sport prior to its publication 
and remained so afterwards. Elite sport still represented the largest single financial 
commitment of the Sports Council, accounting for 45% of its total spending (Bloyce 
and Smith, 2010). It did so due to government concerns around national success 
(Coalter et al., 1988). Bloyce and Smith (2010) contend that this elite focus was 
caused by the Sports Council being dominated by former staff of the CCPR whose 
previous responsibilities were ‘deferential towards the needs of the elite athlete’ 
(Houlihan and White, 2002: 36). Of particular relevance to the development and 
emergence of a bidding policy is this continued and escalating theme of funding of 
elite sport, despite the altruistically-themed rhetoric of ‘community’ sport.   
 
As well as the maintenance of the elite theme in sporting provision, this period can be 
categorised as one in which sport lacked a ‘voice’ (Green, 2004: 369). Roche (1992) 
suggests that the organisational structure of sport during the 1980s and early 1990s 
was characterised by continuing fragmentation and disharmony between various 
bodies involved in lobbying for sport’s interests. This disharmony existed, and has 
been a key feature of UK sport, due to the conflict between the CCPR, BOA and 
latterly the Sports Council (as detailed above), but particularly in the 1980s due to the 
relocation of sport and sport policy within central government: sport was now 
entwined in the policy areas of education, local government and foreign policy (King, 
2009).  
 
Threats to reorganise sport were plentiful and ‘were hardly conducive to policy 
stability’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 52) and the attempt to unify sport under one 
‘voice’ has been criticised as being unachievable (Bloyce and Smith, 2010). The lack 
of political stability, accompanied by the perceived need to streamline the 
organisation of sport and reduce levels of bureaucracy led to considerable structural 
change at local government level. This was communicated in the Local Government 
Planning Act 1980 and Local Government Act 1988, which resulted in the potential 
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for an increase of commercial and market practices within local authorities, and an 
increased specialism in the delivery of sport and leisure services. However, while 
some local authorities embraced this apparent freedom, ‘many local authorities [did] 
not have a clear idea of what their role in sport should be’ (Coalter, 2007: 12).  
 
2.5.2 The BOA and bidding 
 
The role of the Los Angeles Olympic Games in reinvigorating enthusiasm for large 
scale sports events was explored in Chapter One and is considered in relationship to 
Manchester’s Olympic bids in Chapter Six. However, consideration of how these 
Games impacted upon UK sports policy, and that of the BOA has been relatively 
neglected in academic study (with the exception of Hill, 1996 and Horne and 
Whannel, 2012).  
 
A UK Olympic Bid for the 1988 Games had initially been considered at a BOA 
committee meeting in August 1978 (BOA, 1978). Here, the chair of the BOA, Dennis 
Fellows, had instigated a meeting with the leader of the Greater London Council 
(GLC) to suggest the idea of a London bid that would ‘fit’ with the pattern of London 
hosting the Games every 40 years from 1948. The minutes from this meeting indicate 
that Fellows received ‘an enthusiastic response’ and London went on to commission a 
feasibility study (Horne and Whannel, 2012). This did not materialise into a formal 
bid, but probably best represents the starting point of the current UK bidding strategy 
given that it represents the first documented evidence that leading UK sports 
administrators were considering the impact of these events.  
 
As is explored in much more detail in Chapter Six, the probable origin of bidding as a 
central national concern was the success of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. 
For the reasons identified in Chapter One, central government demonstrated some 
interest in considering a bid for the 1992 Games. The issues surrounding this bid 
effectively demonstrate the fragmented and apparently directionless nature of sport in 
the United Kingdom around this period.  
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In early 1985 the chairman of the BOA met with the Sports Minister in order to 
discuss a British bid (BOA, 1985). News of the meeting was leaked via an article by 
John Rodda in the Guardian in February and reacting to this news of an apparently 
imminent change in the attitude of central government with regards to hosting, 
Birmingham, Manchester and London embarked upon preparing bids without the 
support of the BOA (BOA, 1985). Indeed, a former chairman of the BOA noted that 
he considered this article by Rodda to be the first he had heard of Manchester’s 
intention to bid (Interview #27, 2012). The absence of a strategy on behalf of the 
BOA and the government had provided a space for entrepreneurial cities to operate 
within and this is explored in much further depth in the subsequent chapters, but the 
point here is simply to illustrate that despite a clear organisational framework, there 
was certainly interest ‘behind the scenes’ in UK sport in bidding for these events.  
 
2.5.3 Sport and Economic Change 
 
Coalter (2007) identifies several political and economic reasons why the recreational 
welfare element of sport policy did not last long. Perhaps the two most pertinent 
reasons in relation to the emergence of a bidding strategy are what Henry (2001) 
terms ‘new economic realism’ and the decline in manufacturing and industrial 
production. The concept of new economic realism began in the mid-1970s (Henry, 
2001) when the Labour Government began to reduce funding to local authorities: a 
process accelerated by Thatcher and her neo-liberal policies. The decline of 
manufacturing and industrial production changed the nature of cities and the strategic 
role played by public leisure services. Specifically, Henry (2001) attributes this 
change in emphasis to the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, which is 
explained in more detail below. However, more broadly it can be deemed that cities 
began to invest in sport not as a right of citizenship, but instead as a tool for economic 
and social regeneration (Coalter, 2007). For local authorities, new economic realism 
meant: 
 
investment in sporting infrastructure in cities over the past 20 years was 
not primarily aimed at getting the local community involved in sport, but 
was instead aimed at attracting tourists, encouraging inward investment 
and changing the image of the city (Gratton et al., 2005: 1).  
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Thatcher’s New Right ideology, which set out to embrace private enterprise, was not 
just limited to policies at the level of central government. It also permeated through to 
sub-national policy areas such as the arts, countryside and leisure and to local level 
politics (Henry, 2001). Overtly, this could be recognised by the successive 
appointments made at ministerial level and also to the streamlining and increasingly 
selective membership of the Arts and Sports Councils.  
 
To gain an understanding of the changing nature of sport in this period, a brief 
consideration of processes involving the Arts Council is considered necessary as the 
processes associated with new economic realism led to a clear shift in the rationale for 
the arts and this occurred earlier and more rapidly than it did for sport (Coalter, 2007). 
Upon Thatcher’s election, there was a suspicion amongst the leading actors in the Arts 
Council that theirs could be an area targeted in order to reduce the financial burden on 
the state. These suspicions were justified by the funding cuts that were aimed at 
encouraging ‘the arts’ to seek private sources of sponsorship (Henry, 2001).  
According to Henry (2001: 80) the Arts Council had become ‘grant dependent’ which 
was a ‘cardinal sin’ for the New Right. In response, the government introduced 
incentive funding aimed at rewarding the Council for finding these private sources of 
finance. 
 
The Arts Council’s reaction towards the state funding cuts was evident in a series of 
annual reports in the 1980s that displayed a realignment from a rationale based upon 
aesthetics and access to the arts to one that emphasised the economic importance of 
the arts (Henry, 2001). This culminated in Mysercough’s (1988) report advocating the 
economic importance of the arts in the UK and indicating in detail how the arts could 
contribute to the economy and made direct comparisons between the contribution of 
the arts and those of other industries including transport and energy (Rodgers, 1989). 
The result of these reports was a realisation of the wider importance of the arts and the 
stimulation of a new willingness of private companies and local authorities to 
contribute to them (Rodgers, 1989).  
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2.5.4 Local authorities  
 
As a response to the national decline in manufacturing that occurred during the 1980s, 
many individual cities turned to sport and the arts to help ease the economic decline 
(Coalter, 2007). Naturally, many of the cities affected by economic change associated 
with the New Right attempted to consolidate the loss of commodity production with a 
new type of commodity; one which could be consumed by tourists and the service 
industries. Coalter (2007) provides a thorough explanation of this process and 
comments that in order to achieve this transformation in provision, new and 
imaginative marketing campaigns were devised.  It is argued in this chapter, and the 
resulting thesis, that a major contributing factor to the consolidation of the ad-hoc 
bidding strategies was caused by the restructuring and modernisation of local 
authorities during the 1970s and 1980s. This development appears to be attributable to 
both the response of local authorities to the national economic changes mentioned 
above, but also the intrinsic restructuring of local authorities, particularly the large, 
industrial municipalities controlled during this period by the Labour Party.  
 
The effects of new economic realism on the operations of local authorities were 
numerous and Coalter (2007) provides extensive coverage of ‘new’ sporting 
strategies, including the use of sport to promote health and the creation of a sports 
economy. Coalter goes on to note that due to the increasing urban homogeneity 
affecting United Kingdom cities, where the loss of manufacturing and growth of the 
service sector had led to the loss of their identities, sport provided as a means by 
which several chose to help reinvent themselves.  
  
Large scale sporting events can be strongly linked to the desire of local authorities to 
seek to regenerate urban areas. The success of the Los Angeles Olympic Games in 
1984 provided the catalyst for increased interest in bidding for these events as it 
involved no public funding and generated a great deal of commercial success 
(Coalter, 2007). This increased interest in turn led to intensified competition between 
cities and the competition was usually international (Chalkey and Essex (1999). 
However, Preuss (2004) is careful to note that regeneration and profit-making are not 
certain and often it is those bids which do not place a great deal of importance on 
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regeneration that tend to be a financial success. Despite this, many UK cities, 
especially those with rich industrial heritages began to consider sport, and specifically 
major events, as a means by which to advance their regeneration strategies.  
 
As the key local authorities involved in sporting projects (London, Manchester and 
Sheffield) were controlled by the Labour Party, it is logical to first explain how these 
authorities were influenced by the changing dynamic within broader politics and also 
within the Labour Party. The party’s view of political culture was based on an 
analysis of general political orientations rather than class consciousness (Bianchini 
1989). Thus, a heavy emphasis was placed on the need for moderation and prudence 
so, unlike other European socialist movements, there was little in the way of 
radicalism. 
 
Key features of pre-1980s Labour, according to Bianchini (1989), included: 
 A bias against popular, commercial twentieth century cultural forms. These 
were dismissed as ‘mass’ or ‘low’ culture. 
 An idealisation of the organic community which entailed a unified and 
harmonious neighbourhood. 
 The subordination of culture to political and economic priorities. 
(Bianchini 1989) 
 
However, following the 1981 Labour Party Conference and the divisions in the party, 
exacerbated by defeat in the 1979 General Election, Labour’s most prominent 
administration, the Greater London Council (GLC), broke with these Old Labour 
ideals. 
 
Shaped by the post-1968 emancipatory movements, which included feminism, youth 
and student movements, community action, environmentalism, pacifism, black and 
gay movements and liberalism, decision makers in the GLC rejected the distinction 
between high and low culture. This precipitated a Party Policy Review in 1987 which 
resulted in greater emphasis on more liberal forms of culture. 
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The GLC represented Labour’s most effective form of opposition in the 1980s. With 
significant defeats in the 1979, 1983 and 1987 general Elections, accompanied by 
splits between the right and left of the party, the GLC’s (led by Ken Livingstone) 
ability to make a significant impact on London’s policies suggested that Britain’s 
politics could be understood by the dual-state thesis (Saunders  1984). 
 
Centrally, government was moving increasingly towards the right with its neo-liberal 
project, embracing monetarism and inequality whereas, at the local level, the GLC 
was pushing in a different direction by targeting socially excluded groups with 
programmes of leisure and culture (Henry 1993). 
 
Unable to make inroads in terms of its opposition to central government on key policy 
areas such as the economy, foreign policy, education and crime, Labour turned its 
attention to delivering on issues such as culture, the environment, social inclusion and 
community at the local level. With the 1980s demonstrating a rise in the profile of 
single-issue political parties/interest groups such as the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND) and the Green Party, Labour was able to tap into these issues at 
the local level through the GLC and Livingstone. This was evident in associations 
with the gay, lesbian and bi-sexual group the Rainbow Alliance throughout the 1980s. 
 
The Labour-led local authorities were presented with two options. Firstly, to express 
their opposition to the New Right through cultural forms, including sport, or in order 
to conform to the wishes of central governments, to demonstrate their willingness to 
reform and incorporate business practices. 
 
While it is the argument of this thesis that the policy of ‘bidding’ in the ‘ad-hoc’ era 
of sport policy emerged from the reform of local authorities, Henry (2001) stresses 
that while sport policy can be affected by local authorities, it can also be affected by 
outside factors, meaning that this emergence of bidding could be due to a conscious 
deliberate choice on the part of local authorities or a combination of outside 
influences, or most likely both. 
 
The restructuring of local authorities was largely due to their reaction and stance to 
post-Fordism (Henry, 2001). During Thatcher’s period in office, local government 
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was scaled down and their activities became more highly constrained (Henry 2001). 
This was particularly evident in the area of leisure in which authorities became more 
likely to adopt a view which emphasised efficiency and effectiveness, drawing from 
the ideology of professions such as accountancy and marketing.  
 
The example of the GLC was typical of a leftist take on post-Fordism: the opposition 
to central government through cultural programmes. Effectively, councils such as 
those in Liverpool, Manchester and Greater London used the tools of post-Fordism in 
order to undermine it.  It should be stressed here that the targeting of disadvantaged 
groups by councils was not an example of using public investment to as a replacement 
for the private sector, which would not fit with any type of post-Fordism, but instead 
using public funds to supplement private expenditure in these areas. 
 
Right post-Fordism seems to provide an effective explanation of the changing nature 
of local authorities which then empowered them to develop bidding policies; it is also 
considered by Henry (2001) as being the principal interpretation of the ideology 
within the context of local authorities. Essentially, local authorities were encouraged 
to run their councils in ways more akin to businesses. A good initial example of this is 
the case of Sheffield from 1974 through to the late 1980s. This case will be explored 
in greater depth later, but it is important to summarise here to illustrate the applied 
theme mentioned above.  
 
Sheffield saw three ideological changes within its Labour-led city council during the 
period from 1974 to the late 1980s. Initially, the traditional ‘Old’ Labour leadership 
was supplanted by a group Henry (2001: 223) refers to as the New Urban Left, a 
change which occurred alongside the decline of the city’s steel industry. This group 
contained more representatives from white-collar industries with higher education 
backgrounds. The New Urban Left was subsequently replaced by the Labour 
Modernisers, whose focus shifted towards business and commerce. This pattern, 
although briefly alluded to here, shows a dual impact of changing Labour Party 
ideology in keeping with post-Fordism and also a restructuring of the local authority, 
in favour of business principles.  
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The Sheffield example highlighted the system of sports administration at the time. 
Having decided, without consulting any UK sporting authorities, to host the World 
Student Games the organising committee then requested funding from the Sports 
Council. The Council entertained grave doubts about Sheffield’s initiative, but since it 
had not been involved in the bidding process, nor informed of the intention to bid, it 
‘stood powerless to do anything other than help’ (Pickup 1996: 17). This raised 
serious questions of both the Sports Council and the British International Sports 
Committee (BISC), ‘both of whom were concerned at the ability of cities to 
unilaterally bid for a sports event then push around the begging bowl upon 
succeeding’ (Pickup 1996: 18). A similar scenario had occurred regarding 
Manchester’s bid for the 1996 Olympic Games.  As a result, lessons were learned by 
the Sports Council from the above cases and it was decided that the responsibility of 
planning for such future events should lie with BISC. Hence, the dawning of an era of 
sport-led bids for sports events that would stretch until the late 1990s.  
 
In an attempt to solve the problems of fragmentation and disharmony, John Major’s 
Conservative Government of the early 1990s made policy responses which signalled 
‘an undoubted change in the government’s approach to sport’ (Houlihan, 1997: 94). 
According to Coalter (2007: 14) Major had a ‘more proactive approach to sport’ than 
his predecessor. This involved two key changes: raising the status of sport within 
government via the creation of the Department of National Heritage (DNH) and the 
advent of the National Lottery in 1994, which, according to Green (2004: 371) 
represented the ‘single most important factor in transforming the landscape for the 
development of elite sport [in the UK].’ 
 
In keeping with the changing role of local authorities, the role of the state in sport was 
subject to a period of flexibilisation and dis-investment, under the banner of New 
Right conservatism (Henry and Bramham, 1993). As it had been at the local level 
previously, national sport policy was subject to the introduction of market principles, 
as were other areas that had previously been considered to be autonomous or quasi-
autonomous (King, 2009). The result of this process was a general reduction in the 
political salience of sport at the national, and especially at the local, level. Henry and 
Bramham (1993) state that this was demonstrated by a reduction in inner-city 
spending on sports schemes by 41%, between 1987 and 1990. King (2009) adds that 
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this reduction in resources accompanied a general increase in state intervention in 
sport. 
 
Despite the increased state intervention, local authorities still displayed an 
appreciation of the role of sport, particularly in providing a solution to inner-city 
problems. This enabled the development of the Action Sports programme in the 
1980s, in which local authorities were provided with funding to promote opportunities 
for social groups with acknowledged low levels of sport and leisure participation 
(Bloyce and Smith, 2010). Action Sport was a scheme that was useful in helping to 
‘promote sports development as a legitimate local authority activity’ (Houlihan and 
White, 2002: 37).  
 
The demise of the city-led, ad-hoc approach to bidding occurred in the late 1980s, 
when local authorities had been restructured and there was an evident retreat from of 
social democracy, which impacted upon the ability of the Sports Council to deliver 
sport for sport’s sake. Instead, the Council shifted its focus from participation/Sport 
for All towards social goals and addressing health inequalities (Henry 2001).  
Additionally, according to Henry (2001: 210), the aims of sport and leisure policy 
soon shifted again, from a ‘dominant emphasis on achieving social benefits to one 
which stressed an economic rationale for leisure policy,’ as will be explored below. 
 
2.6 The 1990s and beyond: The National Lottery and UK Sport   
 
2.6.1 Sport Policy Context 
 
John Major’s political tenure represented ‘a period of sustained increase in public 
interest in sport [but] also one of sustained government interest and debate about the 
role of sport in society’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 52). The transition from Thatcher 
to Major led to an increase in the salience of sport at government level (Houlihan, 
2000). This period saw the introduction of ‘equity’ in sports policy and the 
introduction by the Sports Council of ‘Frameworks for Action’ which instigated a 
slight departure from the target group approach to one of social inclusion through 
sport. The aim of sport policy appeared to be to break down the cultural and societal 
barriers to participation (Bloyce and Smith, 2010).  
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Major is often cited as having a personal interest in sport, which resulted in sport 
achieving a higher status in his tenure, but this interest was supported by structural 
and policy transitions in order to achieve real change. These changes were made in 
order to re-establish traditional team sports in schools and achieve nation-building 
through elite sporting success (King, 2009). Additionally, while the New Labour 
period is more often associated with the introduction of a crosscutting agenda, there 
was evidence of a requirement for sporting bodies to work with other institutions 
during the early 1990s, as indicated by the bringing together of policy domains for 
sport and tourism, which is of great potential significance in charting the development 
of bidding to host these events. 
 
The Department of National Heritage (DNH) was established (1992) with sport 
located within it. The founding of the National Lottery in 1994 provided sport with 
substantial funds and helped change the landscape of British sport (Bloyce and Smith, 
2010). However, these developments in sport policy were not indicative of political 
commitment to greater intervention in the policy area. For instance, calls in 1993 for 
the establishment of separate councils for elite and participatory sport were rejected 
by what Pickup (1996) called the ‘whim’ of Minister for Sport Iain Sproat. This was 
despite Sproat’s assertion that sport should ‘withdraw from the promotion of mass 
participation and informal recreation [...] instead shifting [the] focus to services in 
support of excellence’ (Sproat, cited in McDonald, 1995: 72).  
 
Houlihan and White (2002: ix) note that this veto was fairly typical of incumbent 
Sports Ministers as ‘[they] have a capacity to translate their particular enthusiasms 
into policy priorities in a way that is inconceivable in other government departments.’ 
A plausible explanation for this is that despite Major’s alignment of sport within the 
Department of National Heritage, the position of Minister for Sport remained a lowly 
ministerial post (Bloyce and Smith, 2010).  
 
In 1994 Iain Sproat’s opinion changed with regards to this two tier arrangement of the 
Sports Council and an announcement followed, indicating ‘more support would be 
given professional sport and greater effort was to be made to bring key sporting 
events to Britain’ (Bloyce and Smith, 2010: 46). This announcement represented the 
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first ever statement by a government minister indicating a desire to prioritise bidding, 
yet the nature of sport policy meant that it cannot be considered a formative moment, 
due to the failure of the statement to be followed by action. However, it does provide 
evidence that bidding had emerged in government thinking as a policy aspiration. 
 
The advent of the National Lottery, also in 1994, furthered the ‘contractual’ (Houlihan 
and White, 2002: 57) relationship between the Sports Council and NGBs and was 
initially highly successful due to sport’s place as a ‘good cause.’ The increase in 
funding from the lottery led to an elevated role for the Sports Council, but this 
represented an important paradox. More funding led to an increasing political salience 
of sport within government, so this increasing spending power brought with it 
increasing accountability (Bloyce and Smith, 2010). Additionally, funding allocations 
to NGBs were increasingly reliant upon the explicit support for government 
objectives (Houlihan, 1997). According to Jackson and Nesti (2001) the advent of the 
National Lottery can be viewed as the single most significant factor in developing the 
infrastructure of UK sport and, although most other academics do not present it this 
strongly, there seems to be unity in expressing the Lottery’s general importance. 
Green (2004) suggests that this view is accurate, but primarily for elite provision, 
while Houlihan (1997: 94) notes the Lottery’s role in an ‘undoubted change in 
government’s approach to sport.’ Green (2004) also adds that the linking of 
government and NGBs led to the creation of a new policy community for sport, based 
upon the conditional funding to achieve unambiguous policy goals.   
 
Aside from its impact on broader sport, the National Lottery can be attributed to 
having provided another formative moment in the development of a UK bidding 
strategy. Along with Major’s more appreciative stance towards sport, the sudden 
empowerment of the Sports Council with lottery funds meant that it no longer had to 
be a minor supporting partner in bids, but instead could provide the impetus. As one 
former Sports Council leader put it: 
 
The national lottery was the major reason for the emergence of the 
[bidding] strategy. We were running around the £35-40million mark in the 
early 90s, but with the lottery this increase roughly tenfold, we had £400-
£500 million a year and that really changed the nature of the sports 
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council. Literally overnight the sports council became bigger players 
purely due to money (Interview #15, 2010).  
 
From around 1984 both the Sports Council and BOA had been lobbying for increased 
investment, especially in terms of events, but with little success until the financial 
empowerment of the Sports Council through the lottery and the succession of Thatcher 
by Major, which meant that the sports lobby were now ‘pushing against an open door’ 
(Interview #15, 2010).  
 
Shortly after the creation of the Lottery, government provided another key policy 
development in sport. The publication of Sport: Raising the Game represented the 
first attempt by any government to provide a concise strategy for sport, and also 
represented the ‘first major policy document on sport in twenty years’ (King, 2009: 
58). It unambiguously advocated a focus on school sport and elite performance in 
place of mass participation and target groups, as well as marginalising local 
authorities. It suggested that the development of elite performers should be supported 
by an elite academy or institute and highlighted a new role for higher education 
institutions in supporting elite performers (Green, 2004). A new streamlined structure 
of sport facilitated increasing state intervention, particularly with regards to setting the 
sport policy agenda (Bloyce and Smith, 2010).  
 
According to Green (2004) Raising the Game indicated an abandonment of the 
pretence of the multi-dimensional approach to sports development as conceived in the 
late 1980s by the Sports Council. Green (2004) also claims that this was due to both 
the increasing preoccupation with elite sports development and the ongoing 
weakening of central government involvement in community sport, which would 
increasingly be delivered by local authorities. Lentell (1993, cited in Green, 2004 : 
372) states that the Sports Council was ‘ending its dangerous liaison with community 
and re-joining the more comfortable world of sport.’  
 
Structurally, in 1997 the Sports Council was divided into UK Sport, which was given 
the remit of supporting elite sport and the English Sports Council: Sport England (and 
those in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) which held the responsibility for 
participatory sport. This was considered by Green (2004) to represent one of the most 
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prominent policy commitments of the late 1990s, along with a new three-tier funding 
stream for elite athletes. To display a single voice for sport, the English Sports 
Council (ESC) published its own strategy England: Our Sporting Nation, which was 
very closely aligned to Raising the Game (Bloyce and Smith, 2010).  
 
Major’s period in office can be viewed as highly distinctive in its sport policy, but 
there was also evidence of continuity from Thatcher, particularly in the general 
reduction of spending on inner-city social policies, the continued adherence to 
compulsory competitive tendering and an emphasis on economic rather than social 
regeneration (King, 2009).  
 
2.6.2 New Labour, Game Plan and bidding 
 
The election of the Labour government in 1997 somewhat limited the effect of 
Raising the Game as sport was relocated to the new Department for Culture Media 
and Sport. Interestingly, this was the first time ‘sport’ had been included in a 
departmental title, suggesting increased importance, but in reality the Minister for 
Sport remained a junior position.  Houlihan and White (2002: 197) contend that New 
Labour were ‘surprisingly hesitant […] to impose a “New Labour” stamp on sport 
policy,’ but considering the broader political climate this was perhaps not surprising 
given that sport had always been relatively low on the political agenda (Bloyce and 
Smith, 2010).  
 
This hesitancy led to the ESC adopting a new slogan ‘More People, More Places, 
More Medals’ (Bloyce and Smith, 2010) in an attempt to anticipate the new 
government’s view on sport. Perhaps the word ‘more’ should have been ‘new’ to fit 
with Labour’s Third Way approach to policy. According to Roberts (2009: 171) this 
approach represented a ‘simultaneously modernised version of social democracy [that 
was] beyond [the] old left-right dimension of politics.’ Specifically, under the Third 
Way thinking, sport was considered to have a role in tackling both economic and 
social problems, a view inherent in Labour’s eventual first foray into sports policy: A 
Sporting Future for All (DCMS, 2000). With the publication of this document it 
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became clear that the ‘government’s broad ideological orientation [was] best reflected 
in the promotion of social inclusion and best value’ (Houlihan, 2000: 176).  
 
The overt instrumentalist uses for sport indicated in A Sporting Future for All were 
manifest in four key areas: a general increase in the prevalence of a social inclusion 
theme within sport policy; the promotion of healthier lifestyles; boosting national 
prestige/pride through elite success; and economic gain. This did not represent 
anything completely new from previous governments (King, 2009), but it did at least 
present a coherent rationale for intervention. For instance, the establishment of 
specialist sports colleges can be considered a continuation of Major’s school sport 
policy (King, 2009).  
 
Raising the Game and A Sporting Future for All both provided a structural framework 
for the intended direction of sport policy in the 1990s and beyond. There was 
certainly continuity between the documents in terms of a twin emphasis of school 
sport and elite development (Green, 2004). However, this continuity occurred despite 
their respective authors’ ideological differences. While A Sporting Future for All is 
indicative of New Labour’s modernising agenda, Raising the Game clearly has its 
roots in Major’s paradigm of ‘heritage’ and cultural restoration (Green, 2004). It 
could perhaps be suggested that New Labour’s placement of their sporting strategy 
within the modernising agenda was designed to insulate it from the criticisms of 
elitism that were levelled at Raising the Game.  
 
At the local level, compulsory competitive tendering was abandoned and replaced 
with ‘Best Value,’ which meant local authorities had to justify their sport and leisure 
provision and demonstrate efficiency through performance indicators and report to 
their residents (Collins, 2008). Best Value was concerned with quality, effectiveness, 
performance measurement and a distinct customer focus, which was considered to be 
a threat to the principles of sports development by the ESC. However, these fears 
were allayed by A Sporting Future for All which, like Raising the Game, emphasised 
the importance of school/youth sport and elite development (Bloyce and Smith, 
2010).  
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In 2002, New Labour delivered their most important policy strategy entitled Game 
Plan: A strategy for delivering government’s sport and physical activity objectives 
(DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002). Here, the lobbying that had occurred over the previous 
fifteen years was manifested in a dedicated chapter of the strategy advocating bidding 
for large scale events, the first time this had been formally recognised by central 
government.  Specifically, Game Plan called for a new approach comprising three 
elements: a ‘Centre of Expertise’ to manage central government involvement from the 
beginning of projects; long-term forecasting to set out future hosting possibilities and 
an improved, standardised approach to planning, hosting and evaluating events 
(DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002).  
 
In addition, health objectives and community sport re-emerged as priorities, but only 
at the local level whereas NGBs were still encouraged to develop elites. Game Plan 
noted several discrepancies in provision and suggested organisational changes to 
address these. The strategy was fairly critical of local authority delivery of sporting 
initiatives, yet it still acknowledged that sport and physical activity should be 
delivered at a local level (Bloyce and Smith, 2010).   
 
Inherent within Game Plan was a desire to achieve social policy objectives through 
sport. There was a heavy emphasis on social inclusion and a growing willingness to 
use sport and physical activity as vehicles for social policy (Bloyce and Smith, 2010) 
and other non-sport objectives. Green (2004: 374) suggests that the strategy caused a 
major shakeup of sporting structures and placed an explicit emphasis on an 
‘instrumental relationship between sport, health and physical activity and education.’ 
These structural changes were aimed at achieving Game Plan’s two strategic goals: 
increasing participation and encouraging NGBs to target broader social problems 
(Green, 2004).     
 
It is argued by King (2009: 61) that through Game Plan, government’s purpose was to 
‘once again re-organise the sport sector to facilitate national policy implementation.’ 
Specifically, the restructuring encompassed a re-introduction of regional bodies for 
sport that had been disbanded by the Conservatives in the mid-1990s. Game Plan also 
set out to further strengthen the relationship between sport and non-sport bodies for 
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social policy purposes and set out new parameters for the delivery of elite sport 
objectives by government and governing bodies of sport (Green, 2004).  
 
Since 2005, there appears to have been a general move away from social policy 
objectives towards a theme of ‘sport for sport’s sake’ and Bloyce and Smith (2010) 
argue that since 2008 this has been furthered by the re-introduction of community 
sport as a priority, as indicated by the DCMS’ Playing to Win strategy (DCMS, 2008) 
and Sport England’s 2008-11 strategy. Green (2004) notes that the elite-focussed 
sport for sport’s sake agenda has been cemented by the establishment of UK Sport, 
lottery funding, enhanced talent identification schemes and new specialist sports 
colleges. As noted above, this would suggest a path-dependent scenario in which the 
focus and methods of policy makers may change, but UK sport is now committed to 
this elite theme for the foreseeable future, at least until the next formative moment.  
 
Since London’s successful bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games it is clear that a 
‘private sector style’ of policy management has replaced the pluralist style of the 
1960s-1980s. NGBs are now required to adopt a business approach to funding and 
form partnerships with the private sector, which could perhaps represent a formative 
moment in terms of bidding policy. Similarly to the ‘accidental’ empowerment of 
local authorities to develop a bidding policy, the enforced relationship between 
governing bodies and private enterprise could well be empowering the private sector 
with the specialism and resources to provide the lead for future bids.  
 
2.6.3 UK Sport 
 
The issuing of UK Sport with a Royal Charter in 1997 marked the formal application 
of the proposals outlined in Game Plan above. This new organisation ultimately 
became the centre of expertise for events and set about supporting bids at all stages. 
Specifically, UK Sport was set up to distribute lottery funding and support all major 
sports events in the UK. An important distinction, though, is that UK Sport was never 
given the responsibility for ‘mega’ events such as the Olympic Games and the 
Football World Cup. These events remained under the jurisdiction of the DCMS. One 
senior UK Sport official noted that ‘we are not currently responsible for mega-events. 
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There have been on-going discussions with DCMS about how we can get more 
aligned, but there has always been that distinction’ (Interview #21. 2011). 
 
Since its inception, UK Sport has adopted several policy positions with regard to 
events, mostly in response to London’s success in attracting the 2012 Olympic 
Games. This Major Events Programme was initiated under the leadership of John 
Scott in response to the high profile unsuccessful bids for the 2000 Olympic Games 
and 2006 Football World Cup. The initial six-year cycle, which ran broadly until 
2006, of the World Class Events Programme supported approximately 36 events (UK 
Sport, 2006; Interview #21, 2011) with a relatively modest budget. During this period, 
UK Sport took on a reactive approach which was described by a senior executive as 
‘scattergun’ (Interview #21, 2011) due to difficulties in identifying a clear strategy. 
Following this, a second cycle, which corresponded with London’s successful for bid 
for the 2012 Olympics was clearly aimed at preparing the UK for the Olympic and 
Paralympic Games. During this second cycle, UK Sport identified two objectives: 
preparing athletes and coaches for the 2012 Games and building capacity within the 
event staging system (Interview #21, 2011). Compared to the first cycle, this involved 
a far more proactive approach which saw the targeting of Olympic sports. According 
to senior executive:  
 
So, for the first time we were able to be more proactive with Olympic and 
Paralympic sports. For the first time we could go out to our sports rather 
than wait for them to come to us. We could say to them “you can see 
we’ve got the Olympic and Paralympic games, this is the state you need to 
be in by 2012 and how do you want to use a programme of hosting major 
events to help you get there? (Interview #21, 2011). 
 
The stated aim of UK Sport during this second cycle was to have supported the 
staging of 115 events prior to the London Olympic Games. Again, due to the 
organisation’s desire to allow Olympic and Paralympic sports to ‘rehearse’ in time for 
2012, the approach shifted to include more ‘World Tour Events’ than before, rather 
than one-off events such as world championships. The third cycle is scheduled to 
commence in 2013 and aims to reduce the number of events hosted, but to target the 
larger events, using the London 2012 Olympic Games and Glasgow 2014 
Commonwealth Games to market the UK as a major hub of international events.  
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2.7 An International ‘Pull’ 
 
Since the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, there has been a distinct change in the 
view of the IOC with respect its formal and informal expectations of host nations. 
Specifically, this has seen a move away from the view of the Olympics as a ‘private 
sector’ Games and towards one which requires formal government support. 
 
The National Government of the country of any applicant city must 
submit to the IOC a legally binding instrument by which the said 
government undertakes and guarantees that the country and its public 
authorities will comply with and respect the Olympic Charter (IOC, 
2007: 72). 
 
The statement by the IOC above is typical of the international sports federations (IFs) 
that govern major and mega events, in that it clears the IF of any financial burden 
associated with hosting. While this has been a typical disclaimer for all modern events, 
there is an increasing desire by IFs to demand a financial bond from the government of 
host nations. This can be explained by the development of power relations in 
international sport and also by the increasing strategic importance applied to events by 
national governments. 
 
IFs began to exert some influence over national governments around 1980. The 
intense diplomatic activity that accompanied the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, 
resulted in only a partial boycott (Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, 2008). Chappelet 
and Kübler-Mabbott (2008) contend that this somewhat strengthened the IOC’s 
position (and, necessarily that of other IFs) with regards to individual nations. The 
inability of a group of nations to exert pressure on the IOC through a large-scale 
boycott, accompanied by the financial success of the 1984 and 1988 Games meant the 
games attracted far more potential hosts. The transformation of potential hosts from 
partners to ‘applicants’ also strengthened the IOC’s position.  
 
At the time of writing, the evidence of the increasing influence of IFs and the precise 
expression of this influence was difficult to locate. Although, a growing number of 
academics are producing work on the organisational structure of a bid and the 
considerations of nations when bidding (see Theodoraki, 2007; Lee, 2006; Roche, 
2000), few have focussed on the rationale for the increasing prevalence of 
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international sporting events and the expression of IF expectations, both formal and 
informal. 
 
Firstly, globalisation has increased competition within global markets (Roche, 2006) 
and mega events are ‘sought after commodities’ (Nauright, 2004: 1325) due their 
relative ‘scarcity’ (Andranovich et al., 2001, Johnson et al., 2005). Governments have 
increasingly diverted large sums of money into national sporting programmes aimed at 
international success (Nauright, 2004). It can be argued that countries with adequate 
resources can generate a higher global profile through elite international success, but 
since sporting competition intensified in the late twentieth century ‘hosting’ became 
seen as a way to achieve a higher position in the global hierarchy of nations (Nauright, 
2004).  
 
However, the number of nations capable of the level of spending required to achieve 
both international success and a successful bidding policy is limited, so many must 
choose between the two. It would seem that, for a variety of reasons, many nations are 
now adopting a bidding strategy, hence the increasing demand for mega and major 
events and thus the possibility that more power is given up to IFs. Of course, this 
could be countered by the suggestion that the recent proliferation of events has created 
a seller’s market.  
 
Whitson and Horne (2006: 73) suggest that ‘enthusiasm to host mega-events has 
grown in the past twenty years for three reasons.’ These reasons all surround the vast 
sums of money available to hosts through television coverage and sponsorship. 
Whitson and Horne (2006) continue that this money can be intended for several 
purposes, but it is the request for this money that has led to the empowerment of IFs.  
 
Andranovich et al. (2001) suggest that hosting events became a priority for many 
cities due to the global economic crisis of the 1980s. This crisis had important impacts 
upon urban areas and specifically those areas, like Sheffield that had a tradition in 
production-based jobs. A combination of declining industrial production and a general 
shift towards a leisure and consumption-based development plan meant that mega and 
major sporting events such as the Olympic Games were seen as more attractive. These 
events were so prized due to their scarcity and potential to create an economic 
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resource in their own right and despite the potential for making a substantial loss, 
many cities are prepared to risk the costs in an attempt to gain the possible benefits.  
 
The sections above have indicated the rise of mega-event bidding onto the UK’s 
political agenda. However, due to globalisation and economic restructuring, bidding 
for such events has also become increasingly attractive for cities around the world 
(Hillier, 2000), and these bids are not always as heavily linked to urban regeneration 
as those stemming from the UK. Whether motivated by a desire to ‘place market’, 
provide urban boosterism or act as showcase opportunities removed from urban 
challenges (Ley and Olds, 1988), there is evidence that the fiscal demands of these 
projects have resulted in the permanent alteration of the various urban environments 
(Hillier, 2000).  
 
Hillier (2000) contends that all potential host nations and cities face two important 
issues raised by the prospect of hosting a mega-event. Firstly, what is the urban 
impact of mega-events and in what way do they contribute to urban transformation? 
And second, how are mega-events legitimated in order to justify public support? This 
section attempts to answer both of these questions, drawing on examples from 
numerous international cases. In doing so, it aims to set the context for the upcoming 
empirical case studies.  
 
Following the relative successes of Atlanta in 1996 and Barcelona in 1992 in 
providing urban regeneration (Gold and Gold, 2008), the IOC required bidding cities 
to demonstrate a legacy commitment as part of their bid (Bernstock, 2014). Watt 
(2013) contends, however, that these legacy promises have led to a process of 
residential displacement that forms part of what Smith (2012:12) described as ‘the 
dark side of events’ and in which existing residents and businesses are moved aside in 
order to facilitate the staging of the Olympic Games and other large scale sporting 
events.  
 
Watt (2013) continues that despite promises to the contrary the legacy impacts of 
large scale sporting events often form patterns that mean the Olympic Park and 
surrounding areas only become revitalised for the benefit of middle-class 
communities, rather than the immigrant and working-class communities that often 
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currently live in the area to be redeveloped.  According to Butler and Hamnett (2009), 
the processes of deindustrialisation and professionalisation have meant that, in many 
post-industrial cities, the ‘old’ traditional industrial working class is replaced by a 
professional and managerial middle class, however, Watt (2013) contends that the 
process is not one of replacement, but instead displacement, as a replacement 
downplays the ongoing political and social struggles over space in modern cities. 
Davidson and Wyly (2012: 396) go further to indicate that while the notions of class 
struggles involving manual working classes and ethnically homogenous city 
populations is anachronistic in modern society ‘we should not mistake the changing 
appearance of class structure with the disappearance of class antagonism.’ Indeed, in 
many cities, most recently London, the existing social geographies and old divides 
have continued and gentrification is often most noticeable in the more traditionally 
working class areas, partially caused by clusters of middle class gentrifiers, but mostly 
due to large-scale capitalist processes of new-build developments, such as those 
connected with large-scale sporting events (Watt, 2013).  
 
In his work on the urban legacy of London 2012, Watt (2013) argues that 
contemporary gentrification occurs vis-à-vis class relations where lower class 
residents are pressured out of their homes and neighbourhoods. Traditionally, this has 
resulted from either ‘direct’ coercion through housing demolitions and landlord 
evictions in the run-up to the events, or ‘indirect’ coercion which Marcuse (1986: 
157) refers to as ‘when a family sees its neighbourhood changing dramatically […] 
when changes in public facilities, transportation patterns and support services are all 
making the area less liveable.’ More recently, however, Watt (2009) points to a third-
wave in terms of the forms of gentrification: a state-led form whereby policy issues, 
especially national policy issues, are brought to the fore. Here, national policy 
projects, such as hosting large scale events, often result in increased local property 
prices, which in turn represent a golden opportunity for property investors. This, 
accompanied by with practises associated with indirect coercion, contributes towards 
the erosion of social housing, which Watt (2013) considers to represent a traditional 
barrier to gentrification. Examples of such processes are readily available in the more 
recent mega-event cities as demonstrated in London (Watt, 2013; Bernstock, 2014) 
and Rio de Janeiro (see Vannuchi, 2013; Sanchez and Broudehoux, 2013; Florentino, 
2013) and in both of these well-researched cases the sports event represented the 
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symbolic contrast between corporate affluence and deprivation, with people being 
directly and indirectly coerced into leaving their homes. In both London and Rio there 
exist examples of Watt’s (2013) third-wave gentrification, which in turn invited the 
wholesale physical, economic and social transformation of deprived inner-city areas. 
Hence, the processes connected with bidding for and hosting large scale sporting 
events provide opportunities for urban spaces to be restructured, but by accumulation 
by dispossession, not what might be considered to be traditional and desirable 
gentrification.  
 
The second question posed by Hillier (2000) above concerns the legitimacy of the 
organisation of bids. Despite the IOC’s insistence that cities, not nations, must bid for 
the Olympic Games, many cities lack the resources to compile a bid, hence detecting 
how a bid emerges is useful in determining the key players in a city (Andranovich et 
al., 2001). The upcoming case studies explore the origins of three UK bids whereas 
this section explores these processes in the international context.  
 
Andranovich  et al. (2001) provide a useful starting point for the comparative analysis 
with their work on the development of bids in three US cities: Los Angeles, Atlanta 
and Salt Lake City. In summary, these three cases indicate the presence of business-
dominated growth coalitions which play an important role across all cases, with a 
variable role for local governments. The processes across the three cities is not 
uniform, but all three were underpinned by the rhetoric of economic growth and 
image enhancement. Andranovich et al. also provide a useful table to illustrate the 
origins and development of these bids, which is included here as Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.2 US bidding cities. Adapted from Andranovich et al. (2001).  
City/Timeframe Initiated by Funding Goals of the Bid Role of local 
government 
Los Angeles 
1975-1978 
Pre-existing 
organising 
committee 
Private Provide LA with 
a global stage. 
Tourist income. 
 
Negotiate to 
remove city’s 
financial 
liability.  
Atlanta 
1987-1990 
Entrepreneur Private/ 
public 
Tourist income. 
Redevelopment. 
 
Support 
private/public 
partnerships/ 
Salt Lake City 
1988-1995 
City, state, 
entrepreneur. 
Private/ 
public 
Re-branding the 
city. 
Generate state 
income. 
Facilitator.  
 
 
 
Los Angeles’ bid for the 1984 Olympic Games originated with a group of downtown 
business leader and civic notables (Andranovich et al., 2001), The bid was initially 
led by a private bid committee with the role of government limited to keeping the city 
financially removed from the Games. In the early stages there was some considerable 
public opposition to the bid, but the city’s mayor was able to use his political skills to 
maintain majority support (Sonenshein, 1993). While the bid for the 1984 Olympic 
Games emerged in 1975, there had been processes to bring the Games back to city 
since 1932. Similarly, Salt Lake City’s bid for the 2002 Winter Olympics came as a 
result of a tradition of Olympic interest and also originated as a result of a small group 
of private-sector entrepreneurs successfully lobbying the state legislature for support. 
However, unlike in Los Angeles, the Salt Lake City bid team were able to secure 
considerable support from the state legislature.  
 
Unlike Los Angeles and Salt Lake City, Atlanta had no history of hosting, or desiring 
to host, the Olympic Games. Here, the bid emerged from a local lawyer and sports 
enthusiast who was able to recruit a group of local business acquaintances to support 
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his idea. However, the initial group of entrepreneurs had little success until they were 
able to recruit the support of Atlanta’s political and economic elite, which enabled 
them to attract first political and then considerable private resources from Atlanta’s 
businesses (Andranovich et al., 2001).  
 
The American bids for the Olympic Games share two common features. First, the bids 
emerged as the product of regime politics. Bids emerged from influential members of 
each city’s business elite with the addition of public-sector sector endorsement to add 
legitimacy to the bids. Second, the rationale for each bid was the desire to enhance 
each city’s image. Los Angeles, Atlanta and Salt Lake City desired to know as a 
‘world class city’, ‘convention city’ and ‘winter sports city’ respectively 
(Andranovich et al., 2001). These visions helped in gaining public support for the bids 
and were often underpinned by rhetoric and symbolism.  
 
It is argued throughout this thesis that the emergence of the three UK bids for large 
scale sports events, at city level, shares some similarities to those processes in 
American cities, especially the entrepreneurial activities of local elites. However, the 
similarities end at this local level due to the presence of a developing national strategy 
for bidding and hosting such events. Hence, attention now turns to a bid that was 
shaped in a context where national government had much more power in the policy 
making process: Cape Town’s bid for the 2004 Olympic Games.  
 
Unusually for contemporary bids for such events, the Cape Town Olympic bid 
emerged during a time of uncertainty in a city from the developing world. According 
to Hillier (2000) the very idea of bidding, for many residents, seemed overwhelming 
due to the recent (1994) national elections and the ongoing post-Apartheid truth and 
reconciliation process. Traditionally, bids had been restricted to the developed world 
as these cities usually had the infrastructure, financial resources and political stability 
required for a successful bid. Indeed, Hillier (2000) contends that these were probably 
the reasons for the failure of Cape Town’s bid, but he goes on to speculate that the 
Cape Town bid was still important due to the different public/private sector 
relationships that emerged from it. 
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Similarly to the American bids mentioned above, Cape Town’s bid emerged as a 
result of a pro-growth, business-focussed coalition, or regime. However, underpinning 
the rhetoric of the bid was not just the opportunity for the private sector to benefit, but 
there was also a strong social welfare undercurrent to the bid rhetoric. The bid was 
well-developed by the private-sector coalition until Cape Town’s first ever local 
government was formed in 1996. As this was two years after the national elections, 
the local entrepreneurs were able to operate with considerable freedom in developing 
the bid. However, after both (local and national) elections, the local elites were 
pushed aside by national government who embedded the bid as part of national policy 
(Hillier, 2000).  
 
Hillier (2000) suggests that the social welfare rhetoric associated with Cape Town’s 
bid, accompanied by a lack of any real social welfare policies was representative of an 
urban regime in Cape Town, where a ‘growth machine’ comprising entrepreneurs 
with political actors was present and united in its advocacy of growth (Molotch, 
1993). The Olympic bid, in this case, represented an regime-building opportunity for 
private-sector entrepreneurs and also local political elites who were able to influence 
public opinion through unrealistic boosterist rhetoric.  
 
Internationally, cities have become ‘captives’ of new, highly competitive economic 
environments, due to globalisation (Beriatos and Gospodini, 2004). Markets have 
transcended national boundaries and cities have been able to operate outside of 
national interests to interact directly with external structures and agencies, such as IFs. 
The result of globalisation, at the level of urban politics, has been that urban networks 
have changed and hierarchical arrangements within cities have been re-arranged. With 
the exception of what Sassen (2001) terms ‘global cities’, cities have been able to 
manage the volatility of capital themselves to become competitive with each other in 
the quest for capital investment, such as those associated with hosting large scale 
events.  Hence, the main task of urban governments has become to create the 
conditions that are attractive to prospective investors. In essence, the increasingly 
competitive ideology running through local authorities has preconditioned cities to 
seek opportunities such as those associated with bidding.  
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2.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored the emerging importance of hosting large scale sports events 
within the context of broad UK sport policy. In doing so, some distinct periods can be 
identified and the genesis of bidding as a political priority can be attributed to a 
number of formative moments. 
 
While the United Kingdom had a pivotal role in the organisation of global sport in the 
early twentieth century, this had diminished by the 1960s and was not addressed 
domestically until the 1990s. Indeed, as later chapters reveal, the UK not only 
suffered from a decreasing role in global sport, but UK bidders were slow to accept 
the changing dynamics of global sport and as recently as England’s failed bid for the 
2018 Football World Cup, international sports federations have accused UK bids of 
‘arrogance’ (The Telegraph, 2012). Certainly, as outlined in Chapter 6, the refining of 
Manchester’s Olympic Bids partially entailed reducing the colonial feel to their bid 
presentations. 
 
Concurrent with this process, groups of individuals began to appreciate the potential 
benefits of hosting large scale events, as indicated by the consideration of Olympic 
bids by the BOA in the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, the absence of any 
formative moment in bidding policy meant that cities were able to independently bid 
for events without the prerequisite of either central government or Sports Council 
support, as exemplified by Sheffield’s bid for the World Student Games in 1991. 
 
Sheffield’s hosting of these Games was, in itself, a formative moment from the Sports 
Council’s perspective as it represented the time a city was able achieve such 
independence from sports organisations. The path dependent inclusion of central 
government in bid decisions occurred during Manchester’s Olympic bidding process 
and culminated in their bid for the 2000 Games, although it should be stressed that 
here the government simply insisted on involvement, not leadership of these bids. 
 
It could also be argued that the unsuccessful Manchester 2000 bid represented the 
watershed in government discovering the role they should play in hosting events. This 
is somewhat backed-up by the consolidation of mega event policy in Game Plan, 
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which was furthered in 2001 when Labour’s election manifesto pledge to ‘maintain... 
a first class athletics stadium for the 2005 World Athletics Championships and a new 
stadium in Manchester for the Commonwealth Games next year (Labour Party, 2001). 
In general, the UK government’s attitude can be summarised by the 4th Report of the 
Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport which called for increased government 
involvement, noting that ‘the government cannot be expected to throw its weight  
behind bids and events over which it has no say’ (Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee, 1999: 4).  
 
Following the empowerment of the Sports Council in 1994 by the advent of the 
National Lottery and the creation of UK Sport in 1997, ‘sport’ now had the means by 
which to articulate its intention to bid for events. This was solidified by central 
government, partially due to pressure from IFs deciding to locate the hosting of mega 
events within DCMS and has meant that potential hosts do not, in theory, have such 
freedom to bid.  
 
The chapter has provided the rationale for the selection of the case studies and also 
the unofficial hypothesis for the study: that the increasing centralisation of bidding 
policy would have led to significant changes in the way in which bidding decisions 
are made at the local level, with the expectation that power would have moved further 
towards central government from one case to the next.  That said, the chapter also 
demonstrates the fractious nature of sport policy in Britain, especially relating to large 
scale events. An understanding of the complicated relationships between bodies is 
central to understanding the development of the bids later in the thesis.  
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Chapter Three: Theoretical Frameworks 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter outlined what appear to be relatively distinct eras in the 
approach of central government to bidding for large scale sports events. While the 
role of central government was important in shaping the preferences of actors within 
the following empirical case studies, this needs to be understood in relation to deeper, 
more theoretical issues concerning policy analysis and discussions of power within 
policy systems.  
 
According to Hill (2009: 8) ‘any discussion of the policy-making process must 
necessarily be grounded in an extrinsic consideration of the nature of power within 
the state.’ Hence, the chapter commences with a discussion of power, with a specific 
focus on where power lies in the policy-making system. Following the discussion of 
the nature of power, the chapter sets a framework for analysing policy and policy 
change. In order to achieve this it considers the contextual suitability of macro-level 
‘power models’ (Parsons, 1995: 248), as the meso-level theories identified below 
incorporate implicit, if not explicit, macro-level assumptions about the distribution of 
power, the role of the state and the division between the state and civil society, which 
is of particular importance to this study. Additionally, this also provides an 
opportunity to sensitise the reader to the themes that will be explored throughout the 
chapter.  Wiarda (1997) identifies three great ‘isms’ that can be used to explain the 
development of politics and society and allow a framework to be set for meso-level 
policy analysis: these are Marxism, pluralism and corporatism.  
Following this is a broad summary of meso-level theory which will identify the most 
compelling ‘sensitising’ frameworks to use in the proposed research project, as at this 
stage they present as sensitising tools, but potentially could feature as frameworks for 
analysis. These are the Multiple Streams Framework (Kingdon, 1984), the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1988, 1993) and policy network 
theory (Rhodes, 1988; Marsh, 1998).  These theoretical perspectives provide useful 
tools for the analysis of policy decisions, but further contextual refinement is offered 
through the consideration of theories of local governance that offer more explicit 
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depictions of power in local policy settings. These are manifested in the form of the 
Dual State Thesis (Saunders, 1984) and various aspects of regime theory.  
The use of multiple theoretical lenses to explore public policy decisions is advocated 
by the work of Cairney (2011) and Van der Heijden (2013). Cairney (2011) contends 
that most contemporary accounts attempt to explain policy decisions by focussing on 
one theoretical perspective. He advocates, in the absence of a single irrefutable 
unifying theory, an approach based upon gathering the insights from one theoretical 
lens and comparing it with insights from others. Drawing on Allison’s (1969; 1971) 
work, Cairney argues that in order to understand policy decisions, researchers must 
understand the institutions responsible for drawing up policy, shifts in the behaviours 
of policy makers and the power balance of the private and public sector organisations 
that are involved in the policy arena. Add to this that policy outcomes are largely 
based upon idiosyncratic episodes, such as short windows of opportunity and multiple 
events occurring simultaneously (Cairney, 2012) and single lens approaches appear 
insufficient due to the range of perspectives required to inform the analysis. Van der 
Heijden (2013) adds to the critique of the single theory approach, pointing to the use 
of diverse theoretical lenses to policy as ‘obvious’. He continues that using this 
multiple lens approach, researchers can avoid the pitfalls associated with single lens 
studies, such as ‘managing’ the narrative to fit within a narrow theoretical perspective 
and also focussing too heavily on macro-theoretical explanations of the narrative.  
Instead, Cairney argues that the starting point for research should be the questions we 
want to answer. Then, consideration needs to be given to how these questions are 
synthesized by policy theory. With these results, comparisons can be made to other 
case studies and the results can be compared to those from other complementary 
theoretical insights. Van der Heijden adds that each theoretical lens informs the 
contours of the narrative and often emphasizes separate but complementary aspects of 
it. In the conclusion to his study, Van der Heijden (2013: 12) warns researchers 
against ‘picking a theory, applying it and defending it to the death’ as in the ‘woolly’ 
world of public policy analysis, there are too many variables and too much interaction 
between these variables for a single theory to attempt to explain.  
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3.2 The nature of power in policy-making.  
 
Hill (2009: 25) claims that ‘studying the policy process is essentially the study of the 
exercise of power in the making of policy.’ His point is that one cannot disregard 
questions about the sources and nature of power, hence this section attempts to 
achieve two objectives. Firstly, it considers the competing definitions of power and 
secondly, it provides some comment on this debate with reference to the policy 
process. 
Providing a definition of power has been problematic.  Thomas Hobbes (2008, 
originally published in 1651) provides a useful starting point to his debate by claiming 
that the power of a man is his ability to use his present means for future good. Galston 
(2006) interprets this to mean that power is the ability to turn natural attributes (charm, 
good looks and intelligence) into ‘goods’ that include friends, wealth and fame. This 
definition that stresses the ability to have the power to achieve goals seems insightful 
given that many definitions focus on the ability to achieve power over another actor. 
Dahl (1961) asserted an approach to power by claiming that A has power over B, if A 
gets B to do something that they would not otherwise do. This is explained in greater 
detail in the ‘pluralism’ section below. The debate advanced largely due to Weber’s 
critique of Dahl’s theory in which he suggested that power is better defined as the 
probability that an actor in a social relationship will be able to carry out his will, 
despite resistance (Weber 1947). Therefore, Weber implies that the definition of 
power goes beyond simply having ‘power over’ someone, but instead suggests the 
coercion and ‘ power to’ achieve a goal. This could mean A getting B to do something 
they would not ordinarily do by paying them. Here, the exchange of money makes the 
task desirable to B. Galston (2006) cites the example of asking an academic to write a 
book chapter, the academic refusing but subsequently accepting the request upon the 
offer of payment. Under this more sophisticated definition of power, it would also be 
possible for B to exert power over A simultaneously. 
In his study on the feasibility of particular policies, Galston (2006) claims that 
whether a policy is successful depends entirely on the location of power within the 
system. In order to understand where exactly power lies, he points to the historical 
debate surrounding the nature of power. The starting point for Galston was the 
behaviourist notion of power as identified by Dahl (1961) and pluralist thinkers. In the 
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summary of the pluralist notion of power detailed below, there is a focus on power 
over individual, empirically observable decisions. Methodologically, using Dahl’s 
theory, the researcher would locate power by detecting which actor’s interests ‘won’. 
There is a heavy emphasis on success or failure within policy, with the assumption 
that power is exercised by the most influential actors (Lukes 2005). Therefore, 
pluralists need to study decision-making as the central task, observing who prevails as 
an effective way of identifying where the power lies.  
The focus on empirically observable decisions was challenged by Bachrach and 
Baratz (1970) on the basis there was little emphasis on the process by which key 
issues were excluded from the decision-making process. To generalise, Bachrach and 
Baratz agree with Dahl’s A and B analogy, but take this further suggesting power is 
also evident when A makes it impossible for B to engage in the policy process, which 
can occur through social and political values and practices (Lukes 2005). Under this 
interpretation, it is not just open conflict that depicts power, but also more subtle 
forces of coercion, manipulation and influence. 
While Bachrach and Baratz’s approach was seen as an advance of the study of power, 
Lukes (1974) criticised both theirs and Dahl’s explanations as they rested on an 
‘unexamined conception of human wants’ (Galston 2006: 546). He goes on to claim 
that while Bachrach and Baratz’s conception was an improvement, it was not radical 
enough (Lukes 2005). Instead, Lukes offered a ‘radical’ understanding of power that 
attempted to develop an objective conception of human interests and assess whether 
the influence of processes within a given society unequally hindered certain groups 
from realising their interests. 
Lukes draws attention to his three-dimensional view of power (Lukes 2005). He 
claims that Bachrach and Baratz’s conceptualisation was only two-dimensional and 
inadequate for three reasons. Firstly, even though it was critical of Dahl’s 
behaviourism, it was itself too committed to these very principles and concerned itself 
with conscious coercion and influence. Secondly, in identifying actual, observable 
conflict, it ignored ideological conflicts of values. Lukes claims that the view ‘ignores 
A’s ability to “shape” preferences of B’ (2005: 27) and instead states that power can 
be exercised when conflict does not arise. Thirdly, he criticises the view that if there 
are no grievances there must be a genuine consensus, as this ignores the very nature of 
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power in that it is possible to shape the preferences of groups thus leading to false or 
manipulated consensuses. 
A summary of Lukes’ three dimensions is provided in Figure 3.1 below. He uses this 
to decide upon a definition of power, which involves A exerting power over B when 
A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests. 
 
Figure 3.1 Three Dimensions of Power. Adapted from Lukes (2005: 29). 
 
One-Dimensional View of Power 
Focus on  (a) behaviour 
  (b) decision-making 
  (c) (key) issues 
  (d) observable (overt) conflict 
(e) (subjective) interests, seen as policy preferences revealed by political participation. 
 
Two-Dimensional View of Power 
(Qualified) critique of behavioural focus 
Focus on  (a) decision-making and nondecision-making 
  (b) issues and potential issues 
  (c) observable (overt or covert) conflict 
  (d) (subjective) interests, seen as policy preferences or grievances. 
 
Three-Dimensional View of Power 
Critique of behavioural focus 
Focus on  (a) decision-making and control over political agenda (not necessarily 
through decisions) 
 (b) issues and potential issues  
 (c) observable (overt or covert), and latent conflict 
 (d) subjective real interests. 
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Critics of Lukes have generally developed three cases. Firstly, Habermas (1984) 
claims that the radical view of power failed to provide a methodologically-useful 
account of how real human interests could be identified. Secondly, Giddens (1984a) 
suggests that Lukes overemphasises individual human agency at the expense of social 
structures and, more importantly, had failed to clarify the relationship between 
structure and agency. Giddens attempted to clarify this by offering a ‘dualism’ 
whereby agency can be seen to produce structures, but structures condition agency. 
Finally, Hill (2009) claims that the weaknesses of Lukes’ theory stem from a 
methodological viewpoint in that it is extremely difficult to identify the ‘real’ interests 
of actors. 
Hay (2002) argues that one can get away from the problems identified with Lukes’ 
radical power by ignoring the three-dimensional approach and instead adopting an 
approach based upon two uses of power: conduct shaping and context shaping. ‘To 
define power as context shaping is to emphasise power relations in which structures, 
institutions and organisations are shaped by human action’ (Hay 2002: 185). This 
would appear to fit with the principles of Lukes’ third dimension, but draws attention 
to identifiable actors in the policy process. 
The debate was shifted further by Foucault (1975) in two specific ways. Firstly, he 
attempted to replace the duality of structure/agency with a conception of ‘discursive’ 
practices that form power. Clegg (1989: 158) clarifies this: 
Foucault seeks to show how relations of “agency” and “structure” have 
been constituted discursively, how agency is denied to some and given to 
others...The focus is on how certain forms of representation are 
constructed rather than upon the “truth” or “falsity” of the representations 
themselves. 
Secondly, Foucault rejects the historical focus of classical political theory on 
sovereign power. Instead, he favours a discursive model that suggests power transfers 
from one actor to another, throughout society. Methodologically, Foucault’s work 
indicates that the study of power is far more suited to meso-level approaches than the 
macro-level ones detailed above.  
Basing his theory on the Enlightenment and the emergence of biopower Foucault’s 
understanding of power can best be described using Kafka’s story ‘The Castle’ 
(Danaher et al., 2000). In this story, a man is summoned to the castle because of a 
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non-evident wrongdoing. Upon his arrival, he cannot find anyone to tell him what he 
has done wrong. He searches the castle, but no-one can tell him why he is there and he 
is executed without ever finding out why. Foucault claims that this represents a post-
Enlightenment concept of power as in the absence of a feudal monarch, sovereign 
power is dispersed throughout ‘the system’ (Danaher et al., 2000). He continues that 
power is not a thing that can be measured, or indeed held by anyone within a system, 
but instead functions in terms of the relations between different fields and these 
relations are not set in stone (Danaher et al., 2000).  In slight similarity to the pluralist 
theories articulated above, Foucault believes that the way in which power flows 
depends on how different groups, institutions and discourses negotiate and compete 
with each other.  
Foucault also interpreted power within policy systems to be based on discourses. In 
particular, in considering the methodological merits of carrying out discourse analysis, 
he noted that often the evidence used in policy-making ‘is created within the confines 
of the discursive formations, so that the “truth” conforms to the rules and norms of the 
discourse’ (Hewitt, 2009:7). This seems to apply pertinently to the policy area of 
bidding. As mentioned in Chapter Two, and continued throughout the following 
analysis, when the power of ‘Old’ Labour had expired during the mid-1980s, this 
created the freedom for policy actors to both operate and create a new discourse: one 
in which the social aspects of bidding for events began to appear heavily in bidding 
rhetoric, alongside the economic factors. In essence, the costs of events were (and still 
are) under-estimated and the benefits over-estimated in order for the hosting lobby to 
‘win’. This fits clearly with Foucault’s notion that the knowledge production and 
rationalisation of policy options are limited and shaped by the discourse itself 
(Foucault, 1970).  
In terms of researching the policy-making process, the debates over the nature of 
power can be seen to focus on two key themes: the extent to which systems have 
power distributed in an egalitarian way and the extent to which power is fragmented 
(Hill 2009). This is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2. Power in the Policy-making Process. Adapted from Hill (2009: 26). 
 Power structured Power fragmented 
Power distributed 
relatively equally 
1. Representative 
government in which a 
unified executive is 
responsive to popular 
will 
2. Pluralist government in 
which popular will 
prevails through 
competition between 
groups 
Power distributed 
unequally 
3. Government by an 
unrepresentative elite, 
or in the grip of external 
influences 
4. Unpredictable and 
chaotic government, 
buffeted by multiple 
pressures. 
 
The ‘macro-theory’ section of this chapter addresses Hill’s two themes, but further, 
more specific consideration is required in order to outline an appropriate framework 
for understanding power in the policy-making process.  
Prior to the empirical research being undertaken, it was unclear how decisions were 
made to host mega and major sporting events. The previous chapter indicated that 
there have been shifts in terms of the leadership of bids, but it still remains unclear 
how power is distributed between potential decision-makers. An exploration and 
understanding of power are useful in helping to locate powerful interests within bids, 
with particular focus on local authorities, political parties and sports governing 
bodies.  
Theories of power also help explain why issues such as bidding do or do not emerge 
onto the political agenda of cities. As Bachrach and Baratz indicate above, non-
decisions are themselves exercises of power in that they often actively exclude some 
interests and actors from the decision-making process. In late 2009 several English 
cities submitted bids to act as hosts for the 2018 Soccer World Cup, which involved 
making a publicly funded pledge of £15million to the sport’s governing body. 
Understanding power allows the researcher to understand why some cities felt this 
was appropriate, but also why several did not.  
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3.3 Decision-making within policy analysis 
 
The place of power within the policy-making domain is explored in more detail in the 
sections below, but here attention turns to a discussion of the role of decision-making 
in understanding policy-making. This thesis examines the policy outcomes of 
decisions and while it does focus on the crucial decisions to bid for events, it aims to 
pay more attention to the contextual factors that helped shape the decisions.   
According to Parsons (1995) decision-making takes place throughout the policy cycle 
and concerns the allocation of values and the distribution of resources by the 
formulation of a policy. Hence, decision-making permeates all ‘stages’ of policy 
making, from agenda setting, to deciding policy options, to implementation and 
evaluation of the policies. With respect to event bidding policy, the analysis of the key 
decision (the decision to bid for each respective event) is essential to understanding 
the formation and development of bids. Underpinning the detailed analysis of policy 
in the later empirical chapters of this thesis are underlying normative values attached 
to the concept of decision-making, while it is acknowledged that de facto decision-
making analysis does not take place. As the cases that follow explore ‘the ways in 
which facts and values interact’ (Parsons, 1995: 246) the policy analysis needs to 
clarify both the decisions that were made and also the forms of knowledge and 
expressions of power that helped shaped the decisions. The following section explores 
in more detail how various depictions of power can help shape the decision-making of 
actors involved in the policy process.  
  
3.4 Macro Level Policy Theory 
 
3.4.1 Pluralism 
 
Leading pluralist theorists such as Dahl (1961) advocate the theory by drawing 
attention to power relations in Western societies. Dahl maintains that in such 
societies, no group is without power and no group is totally dominant. He does not go 
so far to suggest that power is evenly distributed, but he does contend that even the 
least powerful interest groups can exert some influence over policy.  
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In their work on the UK political system, Dearlove and Saunders (1991) identify 
fourteen key features of pluralism of which a handful are pertinent to this research. 
Several of these surround the differences between Marxism and pluralism and can be 
summarised as follows. In a pluralist system, there is balance, equilibrium and fair 
competition: no group, including the state, is dominant. Additionally, the neutrality of 
the state means that business interests are not necessarily ‘protected’ and that the 
policy-making system is healthily fragmented, preventing dominance of power and 
resources by any one group.  
Pluralist theory is based on the premise that governments wish to seek re-election, and 
in order to do so need to seek support from pressure groups. McLennon (1995: 43) 
defines pluralism as ‘the study of the formation and intermediation of political interest 
groups as a precondition of competitive liberal democracy.’  Additionally, the theory 
suggests that in order to effectively manage the economy, governments must liaise 
with various interest groups (Hill 2009). The policy-making process is described as 
taking place on behalf of the people via the plentiful and diverse range of pressure 
groups that attempt to influence government. However, this fairly simplistic 
conception of pluralism is contested, mostly on the basis that since governments have 
a mandate to legislate that they have unequal power in the system. 
Early proponents of pluralism, such as Truman (1958) and Bentley (1967) argued that 
the complexity of a pluralist system was its strength as complexity resulted in 
openness, and thus enhanced democracy. Schwartzmantel (1994: 50) continued to 
advocate pluralism’s complexity by commenting that: 
because pluralism takes its starting point to be a modern society in which 
there are different interests, popular power is realised through group 
activity, the working of political parties and pressure groups or interest 
groups, each of which represents one of the many interests into which a 
developed society is split. Pluralist perspectives salute and emphasise this 
diversity of interest.  
Initial critiques of pluralism were twofold (Hill 2009). Firstly, it was argued that with 
such diversity of interests, identifying a ‘general’ will is unfeasible. Secondly, it can 
be perceived to be a misleadingly optimistic expression of how power is organised in 
real societies.  
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A question that appears to go unanswered within pluralist thinking is the specific 
status of government agencies. Government is said to be neutral, yet these could also 
be considered to be pressure groups that have their own preferences that they wish to 
pursue through the policy process.  This links to the main discussion point within 
pluralist thought: the location of power within the policy-making system. This is 
addressed in more detail below, but it is worth considering that pluralists, such as 
Dahl, believe that power can be identified not by organisational position (as in 
Marxist theory), but rather by focussing on the actual decisions made and examining 
which groups were able to exert influence (Hill 2009).   
An alternative interpretation of power in pluralism is offered by Bachrach and Baratz 
(1962) who suggest that a simple of analysis consisting of the identification of overt 
influence and persuasion ignores the subtlety of cultural processes. They suggest that 
power can be understood not by just examining decisions, but also by detecting when 
groups are able to create or reinforce social and political values that limit the 
opportunities of other groups to achieve their goals.  
Bachrach and Baratz’s views can be extended further to the concept of ‘nondecision-
making.’ These situations exist when ‘the dominant values, the accepted rules of the 
game, the existing power relations among groups, and instruments of forces, singly or 
in combination, effectively prevent certain grievances from developing  into full-
fledged issues which call for decisions’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1962: 642). 
Methodologically, then, it is important to study not only what does occur in policy 
discourse, but also what does not. Nondecision-making is not deciding not to act or 
decide (this would constitute a decision) on a certain matter because in this process 
the matter does even arise in order for a decision to be required. 
Nondecision-making, it appears, can be linked to path dependency in that once some 
decisions are made, such as the commitment to elite sports provision, future decisions 
are pre-empted and the discourse becomes increasingly narrow thus making it 
difficult to include rival positions.   
The pluralist response to this critique was that nondecision-making cannot be 
validated as it is unfalsifiable. However, Hill (2009) counters this by suggesting that 
by investigating grievances and conflict nondecision-making can be found; although 
for clarity this is only when there are not any evident grievances or conflict.  
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To summarise, pluralist theory is based upon two central components (Hill 2009); the 
political stage is accessible to all and those elites that do mount this stage do so 
largely as the representatives of larger groups of people. However, critiques (see 
Lindblom 1977, Schattschneider 1960) highlight a fundamental flaw in this approach 
which is the absence of the consideration of the market/businesses and social class. 
Marxists argue that the ruling elite is just that: an elite. They contend that all groups 
cannot be represented as the elected representatives are generally drawn from the 
upper and middle classes. In terms of sport, groups are a logical starting point when 
analysing sport policy.  
As a result of its numerous critics, including Lindblom (1977), a revisionist neo-
pluralism was established by the theory’s proponents. Neo-pluralism accepts that elite 
members of society are overrepresented in the ruling elite. However, they are keen to 
emphasize that this group are internally divided. Indeed, one could argue that within 
these elite groups a form of ‘micro’-pluralism occurs so there is still some discourse. 
Competition between elites is still competition and therefore democracy remains 
protected. 
Neo-pluralists also accept that ‘outside’ interests, including commercial interests, can 
shape government behaviour (King 2009). They also accept that the role of businesses 
is becoming increasingly prominent in policy-making and understand that these 
interests have the potential to skew the democratic process. However, they do not 
accept that major decisions operate outside the realm of democratic government. 
While pluralism provides an agency-led interpretation of policy, neo-pluralism 
accepts the input of corporate power, thus is able to accommodate a structuralist 
emphasis into its theory and methodology.  
It is noteworthy here to mention the potential overlap in the interpretation of policy 
decisions from apparently competing ‘neo’ perspectives. While neo-pluralism resulted 
from a critique of pluralism that was based upon the latter’s unrealistic perception of 
plurality in localised power sources (Kidd et al., 2006), some other critiques (see 
Richardson and Jordan, 1979) identified an elite pluralist position. This elite pluralism 
suggested that decision-making was still essentially plural, just that this plurality was 
not equal as some groups were able to influence the policy system more than others. 
Below, it is suggested that the Multiple Streams Framework (Kingdon, 1984) fits 
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within this elitist interpretation of the policy process as the framework pays special 
attention to the ability of some actors to exert individual influence over others.  
The elite connotation applied to pluralism above necessitates further clarification 
between neo-pluralism, elite pluralism and neo-elitism although it is accepted that 
there is significant congruence in these interpretations of theory, which is partly due 
to the shared origins of elitism and pluralism. Indeed, pluralism itself stemmed from 
economic interpretation of traditional elitism (Parsons, 1995).  
As indicated above, neo-pluralism drops the pluralist assumption of equality of access 
to the decision-making process. It furthers this to suggest that business is able to gain 
influential positions in policy formation by virtue of its economic power (Lindblom, 
1977). The most relevant similarity between neo-pluralism and neo-elitism comes 
from observing local political settings and the appearance that governing coalitions 
might result in the creation of urban elites.  However, despite the similarities, elite 
theory and pluralism, even in their ‘neo’ guise are quite different, even if the 
observable indicators of each theory might be similar. Ultimately, an elitist 
interpretation of a policy system still presumes that the starting point was one of 
inequality, thus demonstrating some overlap between neo-elitism and neo-Marxism 
(Kidd et al., 2006). In addition, there is uncertainty whether the assumptions of power 
within the urban elite is economic power based upon stratification theory: a requisite 
of an elite theory interpretation (John and Cole, 1995).  
According to Houlihan (1997) pluralism, and specifically neo-pluralism, offers a 
framework by which power can be understood within the policy-making process and 
for the purposes of this research it appears most convincing. Given that contemporary 
sport policy has incorporated wider, often social, issues it seems appropriate to apply 
a pluralist analysis to this research, as interests as diverse as those from the 
construction industry, tourism and the economy expect to gain from hosting mega and 
major events. In addition, it forms the basis of the Multiple Streams Framework, 
which in itself provides a useful framework for analysing bidding decisions.  
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3.4.2 Marxism 
 
Marxist critiques of both the state and policy were abundant until the late 1980s. 
Indeed, Hill (2009) and Geddes (2009) consider the time immediately before its 
decline as a ‘golden age’ for Marxist interpretations of the policy process, with 
particular emphasis on urban policy-making. Essentially, the key difference between 
this system and pluralism is the abandonment of the ‘natural’ connotations that 
pluralism implies.  
Geddes (2009: 56) claims that ‘most discussions of Marxism and urban politics 
inevitably refer back...to the 1960s and 70s, and the series of major works by 
Lefebvre and Castells and David Harvey.’ Lefebvre’s interpretation of Marxism 
centred around the importance of the production of space. He contends that the battle 
for urban space is paramount in defining the state and parameters of modern class 
struggle (Lefebvre 1991). However, this is criticised by Castells (1978) who claims 
urban spaces are the site of reproduction, not production and also of collective 
consumption.  
Lefebvre’s and Castells’ viewpoints, which both share the notion that cities are the 
location of either production or reproduction, are countered by functionalist Marxists 
whom view cities (and local authorities) as instruments of the dominant class, 
although this is again contested by other Marxists (see Pickvance 1995).  
While the internal divisions within Marxist theory are problematic, they do indicate 
that Marxist thinkers demonstrate an ability to adapt their theory to changes in society 
and capitalism (Smith 1991).  These varying interpretations also permit a 
consideration of the development of a bidding policy, particularly in the city-led era. 
For instance, any evidence of a city’s decision to host a mega-event being influenced 
by central government can be open to a Marxist critique. Additionally, non-
government organisations, especially businesses, influencing bidding policy in order 
to achieve financial profit can also be explained under this framework.  
Classical Marxism commences its critique by first outlining the structure of society 
under capitalism. According to Marxist analysts such as Ralph Milliband (see 
Milliband 1969), when the capitalist mode of production dominates two major classes 
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are created: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. While fluctuations in occur within the 
distribution of wealth, these changes tend to always be characterised by the continued 
concentration of wealth in a small section of the population: the bourgeoisie (Hill 
2009). Under a Marxist interpretation the state is not considered neutral and instead 
actively reinforces the existing class domination.  
Milliband (1977) goes on to suggest that sport, especially commercial and spectator 
sport, have increasingly been used as an avenue for the cathartic release of the stresses 
that the proletariat accumulate from capitalism. His belief, though, is that sport does 
not provide an appropriate means for this as this form of participation is ‘by no means 
conducive to the development of class consciousness’ (Milliband 1977: 51).  Allison 
(1986) extends this point and cites the similarities between sport under capitalism and 
the ‘bread and circuses’ approach to distracting the masses in Ancient Rome.  
In response to the Classical Marxist conception of the dominating, power-wielding 
state, Structural Marxists, including Poulantzas offered an alternative depiction of 
society, whilst still retaining the key concepts of the Marxist paradigm. Poulantzas 
disagreed that the state was simply a tool controlled by the ruling class, but instead 
argues that the state retained some autonomy. He argued that despite this autonomy, 
the state still attempted to facilitate the smooth operation of capitalist society (Jessop 
1985) and that, in agreement with Gramsci (see below), the repression of the 
proletariat was not the sole function of the state. Instead, in order for repression to 
occur consent has to be given for this by the repressed. 
The latter point above adheres to the principles of hegemony set out by Gramsci 
.While he expressed no interest in sport, his concepts have been utilised by neo-
Marxists in order to suggest a newer humanistic approach to Marxism (Rowe 2004). 
Specifically, Gramscian Marxists have rejected traditional Marxist views of sport on 
two grounds. As well as contesting that suppression by cultural means, such as with 
sport, is a two-way, negotiable process, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony challenges 
the ‘monolithic and deterministic scenario of class struggle resulting in revolution’ 
(Rowe 2004: 99). Instead, dominance is constantly remade through a series of 
negotiations that can result in minor triumphs of subordinated groups. Rowe (2004) 
points to the successes of football supporters in opposing the closure of clubs, or the 
relocation of franchises as examples of these successes in cultural (sporting) activities.   
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Hill (2009) develops the concept of the state further and suggests that it is not neutral 
for three reasons. Firstly, the individuals that form the state elite are from the 
bourgeoisie. Second, unlike in pluralism (see below) pressure groups that are able to 
mobilise are those that are included within the bourgeois network. Finally, the state’s 
power is constrained by capital interests; hence its ability to act autonomously is 
inhibited.   
For Marxists, the absence of a neutral state undermines the policy-making process. 
Policies that are created are determined not by agencies, as they are in pluralist 
accounts, but instead by a power structure, which is determined by the means of 
production (Hill 2009).  
A central theme of Marxist theory is that power is embedded within the structure of 
the state and thus the structure of the policy-making process. In a Marxist 
interpretation the state reflects the interests of the bourgeoisie (John 1998) and also 
acts to optimise the opportunities for capitalists (Hill 2009). Naturally, then, any 
products of the state, such as policy, will also do this. Marxists explain policy in terms 
of the power of the capitalist class and/or the logic created by the capitalist mode of 
production.  Within this system the interests of the working class (proletariat) are 
constrained by having severe limits imposed with regards to access to the decision-
making process (John 1998).  
However, the simplistic view outlined by classical Marxists is rejected by 
contemporary scholars (Hill 2009, see Ham and Hill 1984) as they state that the 
activity of the state is bound up with the economic developments in society. The key 
criticism is based upon a doubt that all agencies of the state represent capitalist 
interests (John 1998), however even these critics admit that Marxism still offers 
useful insights for policy analysts. 
In particular John (1998) suggests that there are two ways in which the Marxist 
argument can be advanced with regards to policy studies. The first is through 
explaining the close links and alliances between leaders of industry and political 
leaders. The suggestion is that while capitalists do not rule directly, they do so 
indirectly through the links between themselves and the political elite. Hence, this 
instrumentalist interpretation of Marxism claims that influence can be covert and 
indirect, rather than the overt nature of capitalist dominance suggested by classical 
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Marxism. In respect to bidding policy, the extent to which business interests and the 
pursuit of financial gain have influenced the decision to host modern mega-events 
could give credence to this type of theoretical analysis.  
The second development of Marxist theory offered by John is based upon the premise 
that the state produces policy that favours capitalism by virtue of its role in society, 
rather than through networks or influence. This structural or functionalist 
interpretation of Marxism explains a process whereby the state naturally protects 
capitalism as it matures and varies. Hence, the recency of the commitment by the state 
to support the hosting of mega-events does not exclude it from a Marxist critique.  
Broadly speaking, Marxists also offer an explanation of the advent of new policy 
areas in that changes in the structure of the economy are responsible for shifts in 
policy. This concept links to path dependency and formative moments (see chapter 2) 
as a Marxist interpretation would place economic factors as the driving forces behind 
these seismic shifts in policy and this theory does appear to have merit, especially 
given that formative moments tend to occur during political and economic transitions.  
According to John (1988) the decline in the popularity of Marxist theory in the United 
Kingdom is attributed in part to the election of Margaret Thatcher and the subsequent 
strengthening of the right-wing platform. The winning over of the working class 
voters by Thatcher and her authoritarian populist style indicated that the simplistic 
two-class categorisation of Marxism was now redundant. However, the concept still 
has credence in this study as the debate surrounding the World Student Games in 
Sheffield took place prior to the retreat from Marxist theory and many of the local 
Labour administrators were considered to be influenced it.  
More specifically, one of the 1980s’ updates to Marxist thinking, the dual state thesis 
(Saunders, 1984), offers a more sophisticated interpretation of Marxism in relation to 
local policy-making. Moving away from the instrumentalist ideas that focussed on the 
surface levels of decision-making, Saunders suggested that the state seeks to structure 
policy-making so that those issues more closely concerning the interests of capital are 
administered by the higher reaches of state decision-making, whereas those issues 
which required non-capitalist legitimacy were permitted to be dealt with in more 
pluralistic policy-making styles (Parsons, 1995).  
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With regards to sport, Saunders claimed that the local state is amenable to such policy 
areas because the issues that were contentious, strategic and expensive had been 
removed to the central state. It is here that the potential of the dual state thesis to 
provide a theoretical framework for this study becomes apparent. As indicated in 
Chapter Two, the early forays into hosting undertaken by cities such as Sheffield 
occurred independently from, and often in opposition to, central government and 
hosting events was not at that time considered to be a capitalist priority until much 
later. While a critique of the dual state thesis is that it is now an outdated and time-
relevant theory, the timings of events in at least two of the upcoming case studies 
coincide with its zenith. This is again supported by Henry (2001) who identified that 
the dual state thesis assumed that the local tier of government was regarded as 
performing different and conflicting functions to those of central government.  
Marxism is of potential benefit to this research project, especially the Gramscian 
arguments concerning the role of the state and hegemony. The ‘bread and circuses’ 
theory implies that sport, and thus events, serve a purpose of distracting the proletariat 
from greater issues in society, such as recessions. Classical Marxists would point to 
the economic potential of mega and major events and specifically their role in 
providing a catalyst for industries, such as construction. 
The consideration that the state’s actions are constrained by and determined by 
economic institutions is at the core of Marxist theory, but also forms the basis of other 
theories and theorists that do not consider themselves to be Marxist (Hill 2009). 
Marxism is a structuralist theory, much like functionalism: a largely outdated theory 
that is perhaps worthy of some brief consideration here.  
Functionalism ‘sees social institutions as determinants of policy, but unlike Marxism, 
the evolution of these institutions would not lead to a crisis, but they would 
progressively adapt’ (Hill 2009: 44). Therefore, functionalists interpret the policy-
making process as one in which there is a series of extrinsic factors to which the 
political system would respond. Hence, the emergence of new public policy 
discourses, such as bidding, will always coincide with economic growth, 
industrialisation or modernisation, all of which can be interpreted as ‘formative 
moments.’ 
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3.4.3 Corporatism 
 
While the post-second world war period can be typified by the rivalry between 
Marxism and pluralism (Wiarda 1997), a third ‘ism’ became popular in the 1970s: 
corporatism. It emerged because scholars did not see Marxism or pluralism as 
providing answers to new phenomena such as the movements of interest groups into 
the decision-making machinery of the state (Wiarda 1997).  
Corporatist theory provides a framework through which scholars can understand the 
role of the state, the formal incorporation of interest groups into the government 
decision-making and how new areas of public policy, such as sport, emerge.  
However, while corporatist advocates such as Wiarda (1997) suggest the theory 
represents an ‘honest’ attempt to analyse new phenomena, they also recognise its 
limits and inability to stand independently from Marxism and pluralism; rather it 
serves to complement these more established theories. 
Schmitter (1974: 93-94) describes corporatism as a system of interest representation, 
which is defined as  
[a system] in which the constituent units are organised into a limited 
number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered 
functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed [if not 
created] by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and 
supports. 
Leading from this definition, which emphasises the unequal distribution of power 
among pressure groups, Hill (2009) identifies two forms of corporatism. The first is 
the state corporatism that was largely evident in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany and 
is now largely redundant. The second, and more pertinent form, is societal 
corporatism.  This originated from the initial decay in pluralist thought (prior to ‘neo’-
pluralism) and was triggered by the changes in the institutions of capitalism, such as 
the concentration of ownership (monopolisation) and competition between national 
economies (globalisation). In response to this, the state needed to secure the 
conditions for capital accumulation and had to bargain with political associations. The 
result was a ‘legally recognised system, with powerful interest groups [which had] 
sometimes monopolised access to the state’ (Hill 2009: 54).  
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While, Hill (2009) contends that the evolution of corporatism can be linked to the 
growing interventionism by government in the 1960s and 1970s, a time which also 
witnessed growing interventionism in sport, Middlemas (1986) argues that in Britain, 
this can be traced back as far as 1926. He states that union and employer associations 
‘shared’ the state’s power and became more than interest groups. Indeed, under this 
corporatist interpretation these actors became governing institutions in order to 
maintain harmony and avoid conflict.  
This triangular relationship endured until the 1980s, when Mrs Thatcher’s expulsion 
of the trade unions from this relationship led many to predict the demise of 
corporatism (Hill 2009). However, this can only be accepted if one subscribes to the 
limited view that corporatism had only really existed in the 1960s and 70s. Instead, it 
may be argued that it was damaged, but not fatally so.  
It is important to note here that while the three great ‘isms’ offer competing 
perspectives on society, that they also moved beyond this descriptive analysis of state-
society relations and presented ideological visions. 
Pluralism proposed the freedom of interest groups that operate completely 
independently of the state. They should be able to operate and organise around any 
issue and the plethora of groups is deemed to enhance democracy. In the pluralist 
utopia only a minor role is played by the state.  Conversely, while it has revolutionary 
undertones, Marxism interprets the state to be powerful and interest groups are thus 
subordinated (Wiarda 1997) with this subordination occurring in varying degrees. As 
a theory, corporatism attempts to offer a ‘third way’ between the two. It advocates and 
foresees a strong, guiding state, but not a totalitarian system (Wiarda 1997), state-
sponsored and state-controlled interest groups and an attempt by the state to reach a 
position of harmony and compromise by incorporating a range of interest groups into 
the decision-making process. Corporatists argue that interest groups should become 
part of the state, but that these groups are not necessarily given equal opportunity to 
do so.  
As with both Marxism and pluralism, corporatism has evolved along with changes in 
society and become rebranded with the ‘neo’ prefix. Modern neo-corporatism (also 
referred to as ‘open’ or societal corporatism) suggests that while interest groups are 
part of the decision-making process this is generally limited to explicit policy-
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domains, which usually comprise industrial policy, social welfare and economic 
planning (Wiarda 1997).  
In response to the threat of Thatcherism to the theory, Pantich (1980) tentatively 
suggested a new definition for corporatism; one which limited its scope and did not 
attempt to theorise an entire economic system, but a partial political phenomenona 
specific and partial political phenomenon. He states that corporatism is: 
A political structure within advanced capitalism, which integrates 
organised socioeconomic producer groups through a system of 
representation and co-operative mutual interaction at the leadership level 
and mobilisation and social control at the mass level (173).  
Wiarda (1997) contends that this type of corporatism is clearly visible in 
parliamentary democracies, such as the UK, although it perhaps features more visibly 
in Scandinavian nations. It can be seen when agreements are reached by consultation, 
negotiation and compromise.  
Despite its apparent decline in salience, the corporatist debate did help to stimulate a 
new wave of theoretical and empirical work on pressure groups promoting a re-
examination of pluralist theory and thereby encouraging the development of new 
forms of pluralist analysis, such as the ideas of policy ‘communities’ (Grant 1989). 
However, while communities will form a useful meso-level analytical tool in this 
research (see below), the utility of corporatism should not be overstated. The attention 
played to the neutral nature of the state, the role of businesses and state interests is 
important, but in the UK sporting interests are not ‘incorporated’ into the decision-
making system. While the Sport and Recreation Alliance (SRA) acts as a ‘voice for 
sport’ it is not wholly effective in doing so, and certainly does not have the influence 
over policy as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) or Trades Union Congress 
(TUC).  
In the UK corporatist theory and corporatist tendencies have fluctuated in importance, 
but corporatist theory highlights the way in which interests may be aggregated and the 
extent to which the state may play a role in bringing capital and labour together. In 
modern, globalised society where the system is more complicated than a triangular 
relationship between the state, workers and employers, it does seem dated. However, 
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corporatism does still suggest that collaboration within networks may be a feature of 
the policy process (Hill 2009).  
 
3.5 Meso Level Policy Theory 
 
 
Initial academic forays into policy analysis by academics in the 1970s were largely 
seen as a means by which democratic governance could be facilitated (Houlihan 
2005). The field of study emerged as governments were becoming more 
interventionist in several areas, including sport. Generally, these early analyses 
focussed on the early stages of the policy process: policy identification, agenda setting 
and policy formulation and they were characterised by a largely quantitative 
methodology based upon a neo-positivist epistemology (Houlihan 2005).  
However, when government invested in areas such as sport failed to produce the 
intended policy outcomes, there was a refocusing of this approach towards a macro-
level, quantitative approach which became broader and relied more heavily on an 
analysis of the role of the state. Traditional macro-theoretical accounts which 
attempted to generalise on policy areas were no longer deemed as solely adequate for 
explaining policy. For instance, with regards to elite sport and bidding for events, neo-
Marxist accounts argue that the attempt to bring mega events to a nation are merely 
rationalising the entrenched political interests of the state in order for capitalists to 
legitimise their interests, however, this ignores the softer ‘ideas’ such as Olympism 
which are not subordinated to the needs of instrumental rationality (Houlihan 2005).  
Hence, attention has shifted towards a meso-level approach for policy analysis and 
several authors (see Richardson 1982, Kingdon 1984, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1988, 1993) have attempted to create frameworks to aid understanding. In processing 
the competing theories and applying them to sport, Houlihan (2005) points to four 
criteria evaluating policy frameworks. Firstly, there must be a capacity to explain 
change and also stability. There is an assumption by theorists influenced by 
structuralism, and even many actor-centred theories, that policy systems are relatively 
stable and that change generally occurs at the margins. Secondly, there must be a 
capacity to illuminate a range of aspects of the policy process. Houlihan (2005) goes 
on to suggest that too many frameworks focus on discrete areas of the policy process 
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or select stages, rather than offering a holistic approach.  Thirdly, he points to the 
applicability of frameworks across a range of policy areas as comparison is 
considered useful and it is rare that sport policy does not ‘spill-over’ into other policy 
areas such as health and education. Finally, a framework should facilitate a medium to 
long-term (5-10 years) historical analysis of policy change in order to distinguish 
between minor fluctuations and sustained policy change.  
Against this criteria, this chapter now considers three meso policy theories which are 
selected for their compatibility with corporatism and neo-pluralism and also their 
relative adherence to Houlihan’s analytical criteria. These are policy communities, the 
multiple streams framework and the advocacy coalition framework. 
 
3.5.1 Policy Networks  
 
Policy networks, conceptualised by Rhodes (1988) and Marsh (1998), allow for meso 
level policy theorisation based upon the principle of neo-pluralism or corporatism. 
According to Adam and Kriesi (2007) policy-making takes place in domain specific 
subsystems, which operate more or less independently of each other. It follows, then, 
that analysis of policy in a domain such as sport should focus on the features of that 
specific subsystem. Adam and Kriesi (2007) indicate that processes within 
subsystems are not controlled solely by state actors, but also by other private and 
public actors, hence a more holistic network approach is endorsed. Smith (1993) notes 
that networks are the manifestations of prior policies, ideological processes and 
whether some actors have a privileged position or not. Within the broad realm of 
network theory, two alternative models are offered: policy communities and issue 
networks.  
Issue networks were defined by Rhodes (1988) as having large numbers of 
participants which have limited interdependence. In comparison with policy 
communities, they are less stable and have looser ideological bonds uniting them.  
Perhaps the key feature of issue networks, and the one that suggests their possible 
incompatibility within this research project is the absence of an ideological focal point 
that ties them together. King (2009) claims that this has meant issue networks have 
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tended not to have a significant impact on the policy-making process, unlike policy 
communities.  
The concept of policy communities was developed by Richardson (1982), by 
comparing policy styles and deciding that many were reactionary rather than 
anticipatory. Rhodes (1988: 78) defines policy communities as being characterised by 
‘stability of relationships, continuity of a highly restrictive 
membership,…independence [from] other networks and invariably the general 
public.’  From a sports policy perspective, Houlihan (1997) claims the defining 
characteristic of policy communities is the emergence of a core set of values that will 
inform how problems are defined and identified, and also how solutions are selected.  
Smith (1993) suggests that through policy communities, state actors such as local 
government are able to increase their autonomy. They can also be sites of resistance 
through their control of the policy system, although it is considered that central 
government can change the power dynamics of a community, hence the extent of 
actual autonomy is limited. Smith continues that policy communities can only emerge 
in three specific contexts: 
1. The state is dependent on networks for the implementation of policy 
2. Government wants to avoid policy failure 
3. Interest groups hold significant resources 
 
In terms of an analysis of hosting, all of these can be considered to apply, hence the 
apparent applicability of this theory. Due to the lack of specialism, government is 
dependent on a network comprising sports governing bodies and local authorities to 
deliver mega-events; the potential political damage of failure to deliver a frugal mega-
event is high and interest groups, especially from the commercial sector, are the key 
source of funding.  
Policy networks are suggested as a means for understanding policy change and policy 
learning. Indeed, in his work on sport policy in Liverpool, King (2009) notes that 
policy communities have been catalysts for change, but also inhibitors of change. In 
both issue networks and policy communities, groups without influence can achieve 
power by arranging sycophantic relationships with those groups already in power. 
This is largely due to the dependency of actors within a policy community on each 
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other’s resources (Adam and Kriesi 2007). In terms of applicability of this theory, 
King (2009) claims that the researcher should attempt to locate the resource 
dependencies of actors as conflict over resources can break coalitions within the 
communities.  The key difference between issue networks and policy communities 
can also be witnessed in the framework of UK sport policy, as networks are 
considered to exist, as opposed to communities, when the issue is politically low-
ranking or not institutionalised. This has been the case in sport in the United 
Kingdom, as noted by Houlihan and Green (2005), but these authors also point to the 
field of elite sport achieving a higher political salience and can now be considered 
institutionalised.  
To summarise this approach, Adam and Kriesi (2007: 129) provide the following 
metaphor ‘regular communication and frequent exchange of information lead to the 
establishment of the stable relationships between actors and to the coordination of 
their mutual interests.’ However, the process is not necessarily as simple as this, and 
the theory has been exposed as having some limitations. The principal one of these is 
the contested definition of ‘networks’ (Adam and Kriesi 2007) and the evidence that 
authors seem to apply their own definition to the concept to include generic 
application of the recognition of patterns in a process to a quantitative formal 
approach which concentrates on the outcomes of policy, not the relationship between 
actors. Below, two further approaches will be explored that build upon policy 
communities and attempt to address its limitations.  
In terms of its applicability to the proposed research project, policy communities 
would seem to be the more appropriate of the two forms of network theory. However, 
there is no evidence that a policy community exists in UK sport. Tentative evidence 
would suggest that one is emerging, based upon ‘elite’ sport, but constant changes in 
strategic direction by Sport England cast doubts upon the unity of ideology required 
to express the existence of a policy community. As stated, though, if mega-events are 
considered to be an extension of elite sport policy, then policy communities could 
provide a limited analytical framework for analysis.  
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3.5.2 Multiple Streams Framework 
 
The Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) is primarily concerned with the process of 
agenda setting, although some proponents (Zahariadis 2007) suggest it can be used 
across the entire policy process. The framework was conceptualised by Kingdon 
(1984), who followed the tradition of Cohen et al. (1972), and is argued to follow a 
temporal order, in which the adoption of alternative policy choices depends on when 
policies are made. 
However, Kingdon (1984: 175) also says ‘[it] is as far away from the sequential 
model of policy-making as can be imagined’. Thus, while timing is important in 
policy-making, this should not be considered to mean that these timescales are 
necessarily well-planned. Cohen et al. (1972) use the analogy of a ‘garbage can’ as 
the starting point for this framework and describe the organisations involved in the 
process as having anarchical tendencies. Essentially, groups ‘dump’ their problems 
and solutions as they are generated into the can, highlighting the randomness, 
ambiguity and complexity of the process. Zahariadis (1999: 6) goes further, 
highlighting that ‘complexity, fluidity and fuzziness are particularly appropriate 
characteristics of policy-making.’ 
According to Kingdon (1984) there are three distinct streams that can be identified 
using the MSF: the problem stream, the policy stream and the politics stream. The 
problem stream contains issues that government actors have identified as requiring 
action. These are usually prompted by events, such as crises, or the changing scale of 
an existing problem, such as the increase in cardiovascular disease in the UK 
(Houlihan 2005). In order to explain the policy stream another analogy is useful: that 
of a ‘primeval soup’ (Kingdon 1984). Within this soup, ideas supported and generated 
by policy communities float around and some occasionally rise to the surface. Once 
there, they can be adopted by policy entrepreneurs and then go on to achieve their 
objectives. However, they only rise to the top if they fulfil a number of criteria, which 
Houlihan (2005) describes as technical feasibility and a compatibility with the 
dominant views of the community. This could help describe the rise of bidding as a 
policy area, especially given its compatibility with the existing dominant elite sport 
policy community in the UK. Finally, the political stream is independent of the other 
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two previous streams and is best described as reflecting the national mood and the 
interests organised political forces, such as interest groups and government actors. 
Policy entrepreneurs are usually individuals or corporate actors who attempt to couple 
the three streams (Zahariadis 2007). They are not simply advocates of a particular 
cause, such as mega events, but instead power-brokers and manipulators of 
problematic preferences. They are only able to operate when the launch window 
provides the opportunity to do so and must do so immediately, before the window 
closes. During this short period of time, the success of the policy entrepreneur 
depends on their ability to find politicians that are receptive to their ideas. A good 
example of this, provided by Zahariadis (2007) is that of the Adam Smith Institute 
think tank and its close relationship with Margaret Thatcher’s government.   
The MSF suggests that the emergence of issues on to the political agenda occurs as a 
result of coincidence (Houlihan 2005) and there are strong links between the MSF and 
chaos theory, especially the concept of randomness (Zahariadis 2007). The 
coincidence applies to the three streams which, when conditions are right, provide a 
‘launch window’ where a problem is recognised. 
In his development of the MSF, Kingdon provides a strong critique of rational models 
of policy making, and also that there are deeply rooted institutional interests that 
distort the political system, as suggested by rational theory. Instead, he argues that 
‘ideas’ play an important role in the policy process. John (1998: 175) claims that these 
ideas allow policies to ‘emerge from a contingent and contradictory selection 
process.’ Under this interpretation, ideas can have a ripple effect and spill over in to 
other policy areas, which according to Houlihan (2005: 172) is of use in ‘explaining 
the manipulation of sport by health, diplomatic and educational interests.’ However, 
King (2009: 40) contends that while the ‘MSF offers insight into sport policy 
processes [it] may not be able to fully explain it.’ Proponents of the framework (2007, 
see Zahariadis 1999) point to the ambiguous and serendipitous characteristics of the 
policy process and claim that the MSF offers a way of explaining how political 
systems make sense of an ambiguous world. 
The utility of the MSF in analysing sport policy is contested. King (2009) draws upon 
its insights, but rejects the theory on the basis of the lack of empirical testing. Indeed, 
he points to two studies by Chalip (1996, 1995) as the sole evidence base for its 
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application. Houlihan (2005) is more amenable to the MSF in that he outlines a 
potential use for it due to degree of change and opportunism in complex policy areas 
such as sport. The high level of organisational fragmentation provides greater scope 
for policy entrepreneurship, especially concerning issues like bidding, which have 
only recently become embedded in the political infrastructure.  
The concept of policy entrepreneurs, also outlined by Kingdon (1984), offers the 
opportunity to explore the role of agency in policy, especially sport policy and also 
help explain the un-embedded nature of sport policy within the national policy 
framework. Their role within the MSF is indicated in Figure 3.3 below. 
 
Figure 3.3. Diagram of the Multiple Streams Framework. Adapted from Zahariadis 
(2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite its attempt to go beyond the rational tradition of policy-analysis, the MSF is 
considered to have some weaknesses. Houlihan (2005), when analysing it against his 
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due to the absence of a detailed explanation of power in the policy process. There is, 
he argues, also too much emphasis on agenda setting and not enough on 
implementation. However, Zahariadis (1999) has gone some way to address this, by 
attempting to extend the approach beyond the agenda-setting phase. Zahariadis 
suggests that policy entrepreneurs deliberately present an overt pre-occupation with 
agenda setting so as not to inhibit their ability to manipulate policy actors. Hence, 
from the outside it appears that there is a bias towards agenda setting, but in reality 
the policy entrepreneur drip feeds actors through the other stages of the process in a 
careful and considered manner. The reason given for this is that by overtly expressing 
policy-goals that apply to the entire process, entrepreneurs would generate fear in the 
actors.  
On reflection, the definition of the MSF would point to mega-events providing a 
window of opportunity for central and local governments as well as other interested 
parties. As expressed in the previous chapter, there has been a proliferation of these 
events, hence the windows of opportunity are becoming more frequent and can 
increasingly be planned for.  
 
3.5.3 Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) was developed and subsequently updated 
by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988, 1993) and further revised by Sabatier and 
Weible (2007). The initial model was aimed purely at aiding policy analysis within 
neo-pluralist forms of government and the revisions were made in order to facilitate 
its utilisation in European corporatist regimes (Sabatier and Weible 2007). It 
represents an attempt to complement and extend the premises of both policy networks 
and the MSF (King 2009). In particular, the ACF aims to deal with ‘wicked’ problems 
that involve significant levels of government (Sabatier and Weible 2007). 
Figure 3.4 below provides an illustrative overview of how Sabatier and Weible 
perceive the role of the ACF within policy subsystems. However, prior to analysing 
this, and prior to exploring the technicalities of the theory, it is important to indicate 
that the ACF is based upon three ‘foundation stones’ (Sabatier and Weible 2007: 
191). Firstly, is a macro-level assumption that most policy making occurs among 
 90 
 
specialists within a policy subsystem. However, the behaviour of these actors is 
affected by factors in the broader political and socio-economic system. Secondly, at 
the micro-level, there is a ‘model of the individual’ which is drawn from social 
psychology. Finally, at the meso-level there is a conviction that the best way to deal 
with the multitude of actors in a subsystem is for the researcher to attempt to 
aggregate them in to advocacy coalitions.  
Within these advocacy coalitions, stakeholder beliefs and behaviour is embedded 
within informal networks and policy making is, in part, structured by the networks. 
The ACF assumes that these actors seek out other actors with shared beliefs or 
potentially beneficial resources in order to translate their beliefs in to policy (Sabatier 
and Weible 2007).  
In addition to the ‘foundation stones,’ the theory makes five assumptions: 
 That a medium to long term time period (at least 10 years) is required to chart 
policy change, specifically differentiating change from temporary fluctuations.  
The reason given for this is that 10 years allow for the policy process to 
complete one ‘cycle’ (see (see Hogwood and Gunn 1984) and allows for the 
results to be fed back in to the process.  
 Focus should be applied to policy sub-systems and policy communities. 
 Sub-systems involve actors from different levels of government and non-
government organisations, as well as from other nations. 
 Technical information is of high importance. 
 Policy incorporates sets of values and priorities and causal assumptions about 
how to realise them.  
 
The ACF applies particular importance to the role of sub-systems, which each contain 
between two and four coalitions that compete for influence, although one may be 
dominant (Houlihan 2005). A subsystem ‘consists of those actors from a variety of 
public and private organisations who are actively concerned with a policy problem or 
issue…and who regularly seek to influence public policy in that domain.’ 
Specifically, these entail interest groups, administrative agencies, legislative 
committees, journalists, researchers, policy analysts and individuals from all levels of 
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government (Sabatier and Weible 2007). The coalitions are tied together through a set 
of ‘beliefs.’ Sabatier and Weible (2007: 194) note that: 
the ACF differs from rational choice frameworks primarily in its model of 
the individual. While rational choice frameworks assume self-interested 
actors rationally pursuing relatively simple material interests, the ACF 
assumes that normative beliefs must be empirically ascertained and does 
not a priori preclude the possibility of altruistic behaviour. 
Within this belief system, Sabatier (1998) goes on to state that the ACF 
conceptualizes a three-tiered hierarchical structure: deep core beliefs, policy core 
beliefs and secondary policy core beliefs. As stated above, the ACF assumes that 
advocacy coalitions are tied together through shared core beliefs and the strength of 
these bonds depends on the level of the beliefs. Any conflict between the rival 
coalitions within a subsystem will generally be mediated by a policy broker and it is 
this conflict that results in both policy change and policy-oriented learning (Houlihan 
2005).  As Sabatier (1998) claims, coalitions will, by their nature, resist any 
challenges to their core beliefs, but when challenges occur, they would err on the side 
of caution and act to preserve the unity of the coalition. Within this system, policy 
change can also be caused by exogenous developments such as recession or war (see 
Figure 3.4 for an illustration of the ACF). 
Deep core beliefs are those that involve ‘very general normative and ontological 
assumptions about human nature’ (Sabatier and Weible 2007: 194). These could 
include broad concepts such as liberty and equality and also a consensus on who 
should participate in governmental decision-making. Policy beliefs are the 
applications of deep core beliefs that can span an entire policy subsystem, such as that 
surrounding elite sport (Sabatier 1999). Secondary policy core beliefs are those which 
are relatively narrow in scope and address detailed and technical aspects of problems 
within a specific locale. 
Policy-oriented learning is defined by the ACF as ‘relatively enduring alterations of 
thought or behavioural intentions that result from experience and/or new information 
and that are concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives’ (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1993: 123). The ability of the learning to take place varies 
depending on the level of the belief system. Sabatier and Weible (2007) claim that 
deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs are very resistant to change. However, 
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secondary beliefs are more susceptible to policy-oriented-learning, because change 
requires a narrower scope. 
Figure 3.4. The Advocacy Coalition Framework. Adapted from Sabatier and Weible 
(2007). 
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coalitions…is now largely beyond dispute.’ Of particular relevance to this study is its 
application by Houlihan and Green (2005) in the realm of UK elite sport, given its 
close link to the emergence of bidding. From a practical perspective the utility of the 
ACF relies upon the researcher investigating the beliefs of those seeking to influence 
power (Sabatier and Weible 2007).  
The evidence would seem to suggest that the ACF provides a good explanation of 
stability through the dominance of core beliefs, but is not so effective in explaining 
policy change. Here, Houlihan (2005) claims that it is vague in terms of what 
constitutes membership of a coalition and weak in theorizing power.  Sabatier and 
Weible (2007) also recognise some limitations of the ACF; especially that it has been 
forced to be constantly updated in order to remain relevant.  However, the ACF does 
address one concern of the MSF and provides a rationale beyond the agenda-setting 
phase.  
 
3.6 Theories of Local Governance: Regime Theory  
 
 
To this point, this chapter has identified appropriate frameworks for analysis for the 
proposed research project. However, this has been somewhat limited given that the 
theories explored are not specific to any particular sector of governance (local or 
central), instead they are generally applicable. The attempt now is to analyse sector-
specific theories of local policy-making which arguably straddle the boundary 
between macro and meso level theories in that they incorporate more explicit macro-
level assumptions, but also theorise how power is exercised in practice at the local 
level.  
These are considered under the broader concept of a regime paradigm which, 
originally set out by Stone (1987), offered an alternative view of local policy-making 
to accounts based on structural Marxism. Under this paradigm, researchers accept that 
structural constraints on local policy makers are real, but policy arises from the 
mediation of the political arrangements that permit a particular coalition, or ‘regime’ 
to govern. That is, cities are limited in their strategies by the structure of the situation, 
but the settings in which policy is made varies from city to city and governing 
regimes are situationally specific.  Stone (1987) continues that researchers 
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investigating the presence or characteristics of regimes must focus on the values and 
choices made by policy actors and not place such a heavy emphasis on structural 
issues. 
3.6.1 Urban Regimes 
 
According to Mossberger (2009) and Imbroscio (1998) urban regime analysis has 
become one of the most prominent approaches to researching local policy-making 
since the 1990s. There are several different forms of urban regime analysis, although 
most debate the formal and informal modes of collaboration between the private and 
public sectors. More specifically, they focus on the fragmentation caused by market 
forces and elected political institutions, which makes cooperation between the sectors 
necessary (Mossberger 2009).  
Theoretically, these analyses touch upon the fundamental questions of politics, such 
as the nature of power and the potential for democratic governance and the their 
appeal, in methodological terms, is that by using urban regime analysis, researchers 
can explain urban politics by incorporating political and economic interests and 
influences (Mossberger 2009), thus resolving the macro-level debate over 
Marxism/elitism, pluralism and determinism.  
In a more applied sense, given that a regime can be defined as a ‘set of governing 
arrangements’ (Mossberger 2009: 41), which implies collaboration across institutional 
boundaries, or beyond the formal apparatus of government when we consider ‘urban’ 
regimes, the focus of theories that attempt to explain such regimes tends to be on the 
formal and informal modes of collaboration between business interests and local 
democratic institutions. 
As an early critic of the rising prominence of economic interests in urban regimes, 
Petersen (1981) claimed that cities were increasingly being expected to compete with 
one another over access to resources, hence city-level policy was driven by the need 
for economic growth. Therefore, local, social issues became less pressing as generous 
local spending necessarily attracted poorer people to cities and strained resources. He 
contends that due to this cities were reluctant to invest in social welfare provision. 
However, this was rebuffed by proponents of urban regime analysis, who claimed the 
formation of regimes was more complicated than Petersen suggested and regimes 
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actually provided greater potential for politics and autonomy at the local level, which 
could be precursors to welfare policy (Mossberger 2009).  
Fanstein and Fanstein (1983) advanced the understanding of regimes further defining 
local regimes as comprising powerful administrators and elected officials who move 
in and out of office. They were also careful to distinguish between regimes and the 
local state, with emphasis given to the notion that city governments (regimes, not the 
local state) negotiate between the demands of social movements and economic forces. 
The underlying principle of this approach, characterised by other early forays into 
regime theory, was clarifying that these approaches were not concerned with class 
control, but instead were constitutive and formative (Mossberger 2009).  They were 
concerned with bridging the gap between public interest and business interests. 
Urban regime theory (URT) was the next, and most significant, development in 
providing a framework by which regimes could be conceptualised. URT was provided 
by Elkin (1987) and Stone (1989) and stemmed from their work on regimes in two 
American cities: Dallas and Atlanta. In particular, Stone extended the previous 
concepts of regimes and explained them in terms of governance within cities. Indeed, 
he claimed that urban regimes were governing arrangements, that is they are 
embodied within the actors of a governing coalition and best described as ‘an 
informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it 
to have a sustained role in making governing decisions’ (Stone 1989: 4).  Stone 
contended that businesses play an important part in urban regimes due to the 
resources they can wield and hence URT can be described as providing a political 
economy perspective to policy making (Mossberger 2009).  
While both Elkin and Stone can be credited with the initial development of the URT, 
it is worthy of note that their studies were not based upon the same emphases. Elkin’s 
work on Dallas was primarily concerned with structural pressures and the production 
of a collaborative imperative among government and non-government actors (Davies 
2002), whereas Stone displayed more interest in political processes that allowed these 
structural pressures to rise. The studies were clearly different, but complemented each 
other and can be considered theoretically interdependent (Davies 2002), which is of 
relevance when considering the utility of URT in other national settings.  
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At a local level, URT claims a distinction must be made between holding political 
power and governing, which implies a distinction between local government (narrow) 
and local governance (wider) (Harding 2000). Stone and Sanders (1987) point out that 
while electoral leaders control the levers of power, they do not necessarily ‘govern’. 
In order to achieve more than statutory tasks they need support from powerful 
business interests, and this support must be mutual. The end result is that no group 
controls the resources of the regime, which means that ‘a governing regime must, 
therefore, be constructed through informal bargaining and the “tacit understandings” 
of its members’ (Harding 2000: 55). Stone (1989: 6) extends this by claiming that a 
regime can be described as ‘informal arrangements by which public bodies and 
private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing 
decisions.’  
Despite being highly specific to the city of Atlanta, Stone’s theory has been widely 
used by academics due to an apparent common theme: that regimes consisted of 
groups whose primary intentions were not the same, but also co-operated over a 
number years in order to shape governing arrangements. In essence, this is highly 
similar to the concept of issue networks, but with far stronger bonds between the 
actors.  
For researchers, Harding suggests that URT is advantageous for a number of reasons: 
 It allows researchers to look for evidence of cross-sectional and 
intergovernmental coalition-building, 
 It suggests there is more to the formulation of policy than the bureaucratic 
processes of publicly visible institutions, 
 It highlights formal as well as informal agreements and bargaining, 
 It stresses that bargaining at different levels can affect policy outcomes to 
varying degrees, and 
 It encourages analysis of how difficulties are (or are not) overcome.  
 
In terms of power, URT embodies the ‘power to’ paradigm, rather than ‘power over’ 
as coalitional power is not unilateral and preferences are open to change through 
negotiation with change occurring when new actors, with new resources, become 
incorporated (Mossberger 2009). Conceptualising this within a single theory has 
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proven difficult and thus the theoretical origins of URT are complex (Davies, 2002). 
In part, it represents a development of Dahl’s (1961) and Lindblom’s (1977) concepts 
of pluralist, but more so neo-pluralist, power as there is no contention that power is 
evenly distributed and the role of the markets is accentuated.  
Stone’s view of power is based upon Lindblom’s conceptualisation of systemic 
power: that is in market societies governments are strongly predisposed toward the 
preferences of business leaders. This power then results in indirect conflict (Davies 
2002) between favoured and disfavoured groups, with the favoured ones usually those 
concerned with economic growth, therefore businesses are likely to occupy privileged 
position within a regime.  
However, there is also evidence that URT has roots in structural Marxist theory as, 
despite the general rejection of structure in favour of agency, structuralism is evident 
in both Elkin’s and Stone’s work. For instance, Stone’s discussion of systemic power 
and the contradiction between political democracy and economic liberalism reflect 
Poulantzas’ notion of the state as the ‘condensate’ of class forces (Davies 2002). 
Stone’s concept of power does deviate slightly from that of Poulantzas and errs 
towards a pluralist understanding as he claims the state bears the forces of both 
liberalism and democracy and the equal pull from each of these maintains the state’s 
neutrality (Stone 1989). In an additional break from Marxism, Stone also contends 
that researchers should conceptualise the key debate in society as that between 
liberalism and democracy, as opposed to a class-based struggle. URT is also based on 
different normative commitments that Marxism as it does not set out the utopian goal 
of socialism, instead proclaiming the ascendancy of the market. 
URT is an American theory (John 2001), relevant to the nuances of the federal, 
capitalist political system, yet the economic restructuring and changes in the welfare 
state in the UK in the 1980s increased the pressure for economic development policy 
at the local level. Central government began to advocate privatisation, markets and 
public-private partnerships at the local level and the simultaneous impact of 
globalisation produced a greater demand in cities to compete with each other 
(Mossberger 2009). These combined forces have meant that URT has provided an 
effective tool for analysis in the UK and in wider terms, since most western capitalist 
democracies feature fragmented power between the state and market, then URT 
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becomes even more useful.  For the purposes of this research, the trends identified 
here: public-private partnership and city versus city competition are directly relevant 
to the formation of sport policy and bidding at the local level.  
The application of URT in a wider sense was carried out by Sellers (2002) who 
discovered stable urban regimes in France, Germany and the United Kingdom. He 
added that generally the more stable regimes were evident when there were locally 
dependent businesses. 
With regards to the UK, Harding (1994) claims that the utility of URT is to highlight 
the role of informal relationships and networks that were often neglected in earlier 
studies of local government and governance. He goes on to suggest that there is no 
requirement to ‘fit’ with a concise definition of regimes, or even find a regime in 
order for the theory to be useful. He interprets regimes as governing coalitions that 
influence citywide priorities, not as discrete policy networks with vertical links to 
central government and this looser interpretation gives the theory more scope from a 
methodological perspective. Harding continues that it does not matter that his 
interpretation of urban regimes is different to Stone’s, providing that their core 
dimensions are not ignored. 
Mossberger and Stoker (2001: 829) define coalitions as ‘based on informal networks 
as well as formal relationships’ and view the core dimensions that Harding refers to as 
follows: 
 partners are drawn from government and non-governmental sources requiring 
(but not limited to) business participation  
 collaboration based-upon social production 
 identifiable policy agendas that can be related to participants in the coalition, 
and  
 a long-standing pattern of cooperation rather than a temporary coalition. 
 
While adhering to the core dimensions of URT outlined above, Harding (2000) 
provides a useful insight into the theory as applied in the UK that has particular 
relevance to this study. He commences by reiterating that URT is a theory that ‘takes 
the essential feature of liberal democracy for granted’ (Harding 2000: 55), meaning 
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the division of labour between the state and market. He then goes on to adopt a neo-
pluralist position in which he argues that governments depend on markets to satisfy 
human wants and needs and therefore business groups have a privileged position 
within the policy-making process. He also points out the importance of the state in 
‘inducing’ businesses to cater to society’s needs, rather than commanding them to do 
so. 
Harding contends that URT became pertinent in the UK when the old values of 
political analysis became untenable. This ’old’ approach entailed a narrow focus on 
three areas: local government politics and administration; relations between national 
and local governments; and the delivery of social welfare services (Harding 2000). 
These values were necessarily altered by the following changes, which required 
analysts to form broader conceptual horizons. Firstly, there was a fragmentation of the 
institutional structures of local governance, particularly in the post-1979 Thatcher era 
that was characterised by market-led reforms. This process provided a catalyst for the 
growing importance of the urban politics of production (Harding, 2000), a 
proliferation of public-private partnerships and the steady government-induced 
metamorphosis of local authorities into enabling, rather than executive bodies. As 
discussed in chapter two, this could also be seen as the setting free of local authorities 
to develop strategies for sport.  
Harding’s study of urban regimes in Manchester and Edinburgh provides some useful 
information, especially in Manchester, that will be explored in detail later in this 
study. Methodologically, his intention was to find the senior decision-makers in each 
regime and while he found around 22-24 people in each city fitting this loose 
description, he did not contend that these constituted urban regimes, but instead they 
were individuals well placed to comment on key questions.  
Harding’s work indicates that in the early 1980s Manchester was governed by a 
municipal socialist regime that was ‘ill-equipped to deal with the challenges it faced’ 
(2000: 69). The regime displayed no desire to enter dialogue with businesses nor was 
it equipped to deal with the industrial restructuring required when Manchester could 
no longer be reliant on its industrial traditions. They openly alienated businesses from 
governance and set about promoting equal opportunities throughout society. 
However, the Conservative victory in the 1987 General Election sent a clear message 
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to local authorities that partnerships were required in terms of social and economic 
policy. The changes brought about by this election meant that local economic policy, 
from being a ‘marginal activity within local government undertaken for its political 
demonstration effects, as much as its results, developed wider and more practical 
ambitions with implications for mainstream policy areas’ (Harding 2000: 65). 
The changes that occurred in Manchester meant that the city was seen by government 
as a model of effective partnership work, and the project which best symbolises the 
changes in the urban politics of production in Manchester is the bid for the 2000 
Olympic Games (Cochrane et al., 1996). As contended in chapter two, the bid rested 
upon a ‘sport-led’ strategy to transform East Manchester and raise the city’s profile. It 
was triggered by unprecedented levels of inter-governmental, inter-agency and public-
private sector cooperation which continued in to other projects (Harding 2000). This 
preliminary evidence would appear to suggest that one possible reason for bidding, at 
least in the 1990s, was the desire for a regime to be created, given the potential 
‘knock-on’ effect for other areas of local politics. The bid was delivered primarily by 
various partnerships including Manchester City Council, government departments, 
other local authorities, quangos and sports organisations, but also drew in a range of 
local and non-local businesses which saw substantive and symbolic short term 
benefits in associating with the bid (Harding 2000) and long-term opportunities if the 
bid was successful.  
Despite the bid’s eventual failure, the regime formed around brought in £70million in 
the form of direct government investment in sports facilities and drew funding from 
other government departments (Harding 2000). It was also considered to be the 
driving force behind the successful bid to bring the 2002 Commonwealth Games to 
Manchester and it spurred the development in areas such as transport, the arts, 
housing, higher education and regeneration. Harding concludes that it is difficult to 
say for certain whether Manchester was governed by a regime here and points to the 
ongoing debate between proponents of URT and its critics as the reason for his 
uncertainty.  
The theoretical debate over whether regimes are always present (Stone, 1989) or 
whether cities can be ‘regime-less’ (Stoker 1995) has dominated discourse in this 
area.  Harding concludes that the central problem is that regimes in the UK are clearly 
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different entities to those in the USA. Manchester contained a group of people who 
exercised power collectively and the processes of coalition forming and consensus 
building were clearly evident, but these were not as overt as in Stone’s case study on 
Atlanta, partly because the nature of UK local government means that they are more 
concerned with peripheral matters, such as sport, rather than key economic areas, as in 
America.  
Critics of URT (see Imbroscio 2004) claim that researchers should provide 
alternatives to the corporate-centred development mapped out by Stone as this 
provides a framework that is too narrow and ignores other important issues within the 
sphere of urban politics, such as the politics of identity. Additionally, DeLeon (1992) 
claims that while URT is useful in explaining regime continuity through the view that 
successful regimes will repel critics and gather a critical mass of popular support, it is 
less effective in describing situations when no regime has been established.  
Davies (2002: 13) continues the critique of URT and claims that there are ‘serious 
theoretical and empirical difficulties for urban regime theory advocates.’  The main 
problem he identifies is that URT offers very limited theorisation of the way in which 
economic forces affect local political institutions and the balance of power within 
them. URT identifies that fluctuation in the economy affect regimes, but does not say 
how this occurs or whether these fluctuations enable or constrain political options, 
thus URT’s ability to explain city politics is weakened. Harding (2000) continues that 
this can be seen as being too ethnocentric, in that the theory assumes liberal 
democracy, particularly in its American form.  
Stone responded to Imbroscio’s criticism by redrawing and re-emphasising his 
definition. He defines four interrelated factors that provide the core elements of a 
model of local governance: 
1. an agenda to address a distinct set of problems 
2. a governing coalition formed around the agenda, typically including both 
governmental and non-governmental members 
3. resources for the pursuit of the agenda, brought to bear by members of the 
governing coalition and  
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4. given the absence of a system of command, a scheme of cooperation through 
which the members of the governing coalition align their contribution to the 
task of governing       (Stone 2005: 329). 
 
While Imbroscio and Stone have carried out an exhaustive debate over the nature of 
power and utility of URT through the medium of the Journal of Urban Affairs, Davies 
(2002) notes that there are two key elements missing from the debate. These are the 
definition of the power of URT as a theory of structuring and the goals to which it is 
committed. Davies cites previous works by Ward (1997) and Painter (1997) and uses 
their studies to discount URT as being neither a localist nor an internationalist theory. 
While Stone (1989) claims that URT is best understood as a theory of structuring, as it 
is concerned with the dialectic between the market control of production and the 
popular control of government, Davies contends that it is unable to explain ‘how’ 
economic trends affect urban regimes. He continues that the ‘goals of greater 
democracy and the amelioration of inequality in regime politics are not sustained 
theoretically or empirically’ (Davies 2002: 2), thus equality seems to be secondary to 
the protection of the market’s interests.  
As stated above, Harding’s Manchester case-study provides evidence of the 
usefulness of URT in this research, not least since Manchester’s bid for the 2000 
Olympic Games forms one of the case studies here. However, while this theory can 
provide a framework for analysis its utility should not be overplayed. Harding’s work 
indicated that the characteristics of an urban regime could be identified in 
Manchester, but there is no evidence to suggest that one has ever existed in its true 
‘American’ sense.  
Despite this, bids for major and mega events do provide opportunities for local 
industry, particularly construction, leisure, accommodation, transport and tourism. For 
each of these, bids represent an opportunity for substantial profits to be made; hence 
achieving a position within the decision-making infrastructure of a city seems to 
provide businesses obvious tangible benefits, thus making URT seem even more 
salient.  
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3.6.2 Symbolic Regimes 
 
Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) provide a useful extension of Stone’s 
interpretation of regimes in their work on Sheffield. The specific details of this in 
connection with the World Student Games are considered in Chapter Five, with their 
theoretical insights detailed here. Broadly, they support the argument that Stone’s 
URT is only truly applicable in the USA due to ethnocentric considerations, however 
they identify elements of regime theory that can be applied in the UK. The advance 
Henry and Paramio-Salcines offer to the theoretical underpinning of this thesis is 
initially an acceptance that regimes are typically concerned with ‘the mobilisation of 
collective action around, or resistant to, particular projects or programmes’ (Henry 
and Paramio-Salcines, 1999: 643), but they also highlight the neglected area of 
political activity in regime literature, which is the symbolic construction of shared 
meanings and values. This notion of symbolism is important here and offers the 
opportunity to investigate the central feature of any regime, especially those 
concerned with rebranding a city in association with a large scale sporting event.  
Henry and Paramio-Salcines’ concept is based upon Stone’s (1989) view of power, 
which is characterised as pre-emptive and involves the capacity to occupy, hold and 
make use of a strategic position, as well as Bourdieu’s postmodern interpretation of 
politics, which contends that new social groups often seek to distinguish themselves 
from the class-based system through new cultural configurations. This view is further 
strengthened by the contention that sport lends itself well to postmodernism as, 
according to Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999:643), ‘it is not as directly associated 
with the industrial politics of class…like education, housing and transport.’ In 
addition, sport can act as a conduit for direct profit generation or for future 
investment, thus making sporting projects or events highly attractive to postmodern 
regimes.  
Aside from a few cited examples (see for example Cochrane et al., 1996) Henry and 
Paramio-Salcines point to a distinct lack of academic coverage of the role of regimes 
in creating sports strategies and claim that the key for this is the lack of consideration 
of the potential ‘symbolism’ of sports events. Stoker and Mossberger (1994) identify 
symbolic regimes, as opposed to organic and instrumental regimes, as those which 
attempt to fundamentally change a city’s ideology or image. They further sub-divide 
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this category into progressive regimes: those that emphasise the basic values about the 
quality of growth, which are often environmental or inclusion-based and urban 
revitalisation regimes which seek to change a city’s image to attract investment. The 
latter of these is usually sustained by the generation of a structured vision of the city 
around which groups can be mobilised (Henry and Paramio-Salcines, 1999).  
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter explores the key theoretical issues that underpin the analysis of the 
following data. Along with the historical discussion in Chapter Two a context and 
analytical framework have been set through which the findings of the study can be 
interpreted. The various levels of theory detailed above will be considered separately 
in this conclusion, thus offering some reflective insights into how these separate 
frameworks can be utilised throughout the thesis.  
The meso-level theories discussed above, through which the analysis of the thesis is 
driven, all concern assumptions of power and these needed to be contextualised 
within the broader realm of macro theory. The macro-level theories discussed are 
based on depiction of the distribution of power and roles of government, both of 
which apply to this thesis, hence their inclusion above.  
With regards to power theories, neo-pluralist theory appears to be the most 
convincing lens through which policy-making can be observed, especially with 
regards to sport. This view has been endorsed by recent academic forays into the field 
of sport policy (see for example Houlihan 1997, King 2009). While there appears to 
be some congruence between the elite theories, the presumption going forwards is 
because the decisions explored later in the thesis are ultimately made or endorsed by 
local authorities, that these authorities are fundamentally democratic. In keeping with 
the regenerative undercurrent of modern bids identified in Chapters One and Two, it 
is expected that various groups will have more power than others in both national and 
local settings (elite pluralism) and that policy decisions will possibly be biased 
towards corporate and capital interests (neo-pluralism).  
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While it is expected, based solely on the review of a very limited field of existing 
literature in the field of sport policy analysis, that analytical frameworks informed by 
neo-plural accounts of power distribution will be most suitable for this study, 
consideration of other theoretical frameworks has been provided in order to 
contextualise the range of meso-level frameworks considered. The purpose here was 
not eclecticism, but instead an attempt to provide a broad range of possible 
frameworks in the absence of any most suitable one.   
Early consideration of the meso-level frameworks indicates a somewhat blurred 
picture, in that each appears to demonstrate some potential usefulness for charting 
policy decisions in regards to bidding and all could have some value. Indeed, it is 
considered unlikely that any one theory presents a perfect ‘match’ to the findings of 
this study, nor is this an objective of this study. The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
has been used widely in charting national policy change in sport and policy network 
theory used extensively to chart the development of informal networks involved in the 
delivery of policy, although the lack of permanence in national bidding policy 
outlined in Chapter Two possible suggests these may not be as useful as those 
frameworks that consider policy-making in a more fluctuating nature, such as the 
Multiple Streams Framework. Similarly, there is no strong evidence that URT is 
entirely applicable in the UK, given the absence of any formal urban regimes existing 
in the American sense. However, Harding’s work on Manchester indicates that the 
theory can still elucidate the organisation of local interests around an event such as the 
Olympic Games, thus elements of the theory do appear compelling, especially given 
the increasing demands on cities to compete internationally for major events. 
However, being more directly related to policy-making at the local level than the 
concepts considered in the previous paragraph, aspects of Advocacy Coalitions, 
Policy Networks and the Multiple Streams Framework will have particular utility in 
underpinning the data collection and analysis in this study. They, along with regime 
theory, also provide the opportunity to facilitate the discussion of the similarities and 
differences between each case.  
In summary, the thesis does not adopt a single theory or framework as the basis for 
analysis, mostly to a lack of evidence on one which may be most suitable. Instead, a 
range of theories and concepts are utilised where they are deemed to offer support for 
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the analysis of the empirical data. For instance, while advocacy coalitions can help 
account for embedded interests in national policy settings, URT and the MSF may 
well provide a clearer explanation of policy-making at the local level. This approach 
aims to provide a more nuanced explanation of issues of structure and agency within 
policy making. Furthermore, it permits a review of the different theoretical 
frameworks to occur in the final chapter, hence achieving the third research objective.  
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Chapter Four: Methods 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline and justify the intended research strategy for 
the study. The previous chapters have discussed the historical and theoretical contexts 
of the study, from which the key research objectives identified in Chapter One were 
deduced.  
 
Grix (2002) refers to ontological and epistemological assumptions as the ‘building 
blocks’ of generic social research and that researchers should not embark upon 
research projects without prior training in these disciplines. In particular, he argues 
that the understanding of these concepts will present researchers with a preferred 
‘path’ in their research, as the interrelationship between ontology and epistemology 
will precipitate a ‘directional relationship’ (Hay 2002: 63) with methodology and 
research methods.  
 
Grix (2002) clarifies the importance of a clear and transparent knowledge of ontology 
and epistemology by claiming they are necessary in order: 
1. to understand the interrelationship of the key components of research 
(including methodology and methods); 
2. to avoid confusion when discussing theoretical debates and approaches to 
social phenomena; and 
3. to be able to recognise the ontological and epistemological assumptions of 
others and to defend our own. 
This chapter follows Grix’s template and demonstrates a logical ‘flow’ from the 
chosen ontological position to the detailed methods to be employed.  First, it 
considers three ontological, and the related epistemological, positions that can be 
adopted in social science/policy research. Within this section, there is a brief 
discussion on the competing nature of these positions. Second, the primary discussion 
facilitates the selection of the ontological and epistemological positions for this study, 
which will in turn allow for a brief consideration of its methodology. Finally, there is 
a detailed consideration of the methods to be utilised in order to address the research 
objectives. 
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4.2 Ontology and Epistemology 
 
As Grix (2002) contends that the research process cannot commence without prior 
consideration of ontology and epistemology, it is important to provide a suitable 
definition for both, before considering the different paradigms and traditions 
associated with each one. Blaikie (1993: 6) initially points to the ontology as the 
‘science or study of being,’ but later makes a more sophisticated attempt to define 
ontology as: 
 claims and assumptions that are made about the nature of social 
reality, claims about what exists, what it looks like, what units make it 
up and how these units interact with each other. In short, ontological 
assumptions are concerned with what we believe constitutes social 
reality. 
 
Linked to, and building upon, ontological assumptions are a second set of assumptions 
of an epistemological nature that refer to questions of the nature of knowledge 
(Sparkes 1992). Blaikie (1993: 6) defines epistemology as ‘the theory or the science of 
the method or grounds of knowledge’ and goes on to outline the epistemological 
assumptions that are made about how knowledge accumulation is possible and how 
what exists may be known.  
 
Ontological assumptions are the precursor of research and researchers must decide 
whether a ‘real’ world exists independent of our knowledge of it. Those who believe 
that it does adopt a foundationalist ontology, whilst those who do not adopt an anti-
foundationalist or constructivist ontology. 
 
Foundationalists, such as those connected with the ‘Putnam School’ of social 
research, tend to subscribe to the traditional ontological, epistemological and 
methodological premises of political and policy research (Grix 2002). Here, trends in 
society are seen as ‘measurable’ and quantifiable and survey questions are often 
drawn up to test existing theories, so a positivist epistemology accompanied by a 
quantitative methodology and a method incorporating surveys and questionnaires 
would most logically follow.  
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The anti-foundationalist ontology (see Bevir and Rhodes 2003) is more suited to the 
study of something that cannot necessarily be observed and thus a positivist 
epistemology is less appropriate (Grix 2002). In his work exploring social capital, 
Grix (2002: 179) employs an anti-foundationalist ontology as he believes ‘that 
institutional structures and modes of governance matter for the existence, 
maintenance and creation of social capital.’ In order to account for these ‘institutional 
structures’ Grix (2002:180) adopted an ontological position that differed from the 
Putnam School as ‘not all social phenomena are directly observable, structures exist 
that cannot be observed and those that can may not present that social and political 
world as it actually is.’ For the purposes of this study, it is felt that this anti-
foundationalist ontology is more appropriate due to the complex impact of ‘structures’ 
and their interplay with agency on policy decisions, as discussed below. In addition, 
as stated in Chapter Three, the purpose of the theoretical ‘lenses’ applied to this study 
is to provide an analytical lens to analyse policy decision-making by attempting to 
gain an understanding of how actors saw their place within the policy system.  
 
The positivist position is one which ‘affirms the importance of imitating the natural 
sciences’ (Bryman 2008: 13). While Bryman (2008) argues that the exact nature of 
positivism is difficult to identify due to multiple variations in its application and 
interpretation by authors, a point supported by Giddens (1979), the broad assertion 
that the approach favours those evident within the natural sciences in determining 
what is real seems consistent. Blaikie (1993) contends that this view considers that the 
research environment is an ordered universe made up of atomistic, discrete and 
observable events and that the ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ is limited to what can be observed. A 
convincing description of this position is also provided by Sparkes (1992: 20), who 
states ‘positivism postulates that the social world... is made up of hard, tangible... 
facts that can be observed, measured and known for what they really are.’  As well as 
asserting that the truth is what can be observed, positivists go further to suggest that 
the truth can actually be found by using theories to generate hypotheses that can be 
tested. The insistence that there is a ‘real’ world ‘out there’ that is independent of the 
researcher’s and subjects’ knowledge of it points to clear links between positivism 
and foundationalism. Indeed, Marsh and Smith (2001) claim that positivism is clearly 
foundationalist for the same reasons.   
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Perhaps the most obvious alternative to positivism is interpretivism; a paradigm 
underpinned by a ‘network of ontological and epistemological assumptions that are 
very different to positivism’(Sparkes 1992: 26). This position ultimately rejects the 
positivist view that it is possible to apply the natural sciences to achieve a ‘God’s eye 
view’ (Sparkes 1992: 26) of the social world, as it is impossible to construct an image 
of a world outside of our place within it. Blaikie (1993) claims that there are 
fundamental differences between the subject nature of the natural and social sciences 
and a strategy is required that respects the differences between people and the objects 
of the natural sciences. Indeed, Bryman (2008) states that in order to fully understand 
these differences the social scientist needs to grasp the subjective meaning of social 
action.  
 
A methodology informed by interpretivism would require the researcher not to 
attempt to study the field from the ‘outside’, but instead develop an understanding of 
the social world which people have constructed through their continuing activities. 
Naturally, any such methodology would need to be underpinned by ontological and 
epistemological paradigms which view social reality as a product of the processes by 
which social actors negotiate meanings within that reality (Blaikie 1993). Hence, 
under an interpretivist epistemology, knowledge is seen to originate from everyday 
concepts and meanings and researchers must attempt to reconstruct these into social 
scientific theories. While it is argued below that this study is not wholly interpretivist, 
this aspect of the paradigm cannot be ignored in light of the analytical role of theory 
in this study. In considering the usefulness of the meso-level theories identified in the 
previous chapter, it is accepted that an interpretivist stance could be beneficial, 
especially given that the existence of regimes and networks is more likely to be 
represented in the meanings applied to the actions of actors, rather than any physical 
manifestation. However, while this is not ignored, the epistemology for the study 
more succinctly fits under the critical realist paradigm.  
 
Sitting between the diametrically opposed paradigms of positivism and interpretivism 
is critical realism, a paradigm that forms the basis for both the ontology and 
epistemology of this study. This, according to Bhaskar (1989) is a specific form of 
realism, which recognises that researchers will only be able to understand the social 
world if they identify the structures at work that generate those events and discourses. 
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Bryman (2008) adds that the key difference between critical realists and positivists is 
their relative perception of reality, with positivists arguing that only what is 
observable can be said to be real, whereas critical realists contend that what is 
observed is merely one conception of reality. Indeed, Baert (2005) suggests critical 
realists claim that knowledge is a social construct and any knowledge accrued is not 
fixed outside of its political and social-historical setting. Therefore, in order to fully 
understand the changes in bidding policy, and more specifically the case studies that 
follow, a chapter providing the broad historical and political context of policy 
decisions has been provided. Sparkes (1992) claims that social reality is not derived 
from a voluntary (agent-based) process as negotiations are shaped by organisational 
relations. This would appear to fit succinctly with the concept discussed in Chapter 
Two that policy actors are often bound not only by their political context, but also by 
previous policy decisions in the area, or ‘path dependency’. 
 
From a critical realist epistemological perspective, reality is derived from negotiation 
processes that take place in situations of unequal power relations. This stance, then 
privileges knowledge based upon the subjective perspectives of the research 
participants, in this case the policy actors. Methodologically, critical realists cannot 
necessarily expect to describe the objects of inquiry and hence are ready to use 
theoretical terms that are not amenable to observation (Bryman 2008). Bhaskar (1975) 
uses the term ‘generative mechanisms’ to explain the acceptability of the use of 
hypothetical entities to account for regularities in the social order. Bryman (2008) 
argues that while researchers cannot necessarily observe the ‘structures’ affecting 
‘agents’ within the research field, one can observe the effects of those structures. 
Hence, it is perfectly permissible for these unobserved influences to be theorised.  
 
The paragraph above alludes to the concepts of structure and agency and their 
importance within the chosen critical realist epistemology.  However, in order to fully 
employ these, a more sophisticated understanding of structure and agency is required. 
Jessop (1990) directly aligns his strategic-relational approach with a critical realist 
epistemology and in doing so rejects the three alternative approaches of 
intentionalism, structuration theory (see Giddens 1984) and structuralism. Similar to 
the structuration theory offered by Giddens (1984), critical realists, such as Bhaskar 
(1989, 1975), offer a dialectical model to understand the relationship between 
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structure and agency (Hay 1995). However, Jessop’s approach differs to the extent 
that he approaches ‘the dualism of structure and agency from a more structuralist 
starting point’ (Hay 1995: 199), which positions several layers of structure that can 
condition ‘agents’ and thus define the range of their potential actions.  Giddens, 
Bhaskar and Jessop all agree that society is both the cause and outcome of human 
agency.  
 
In short, critical realists view structure and agency not as two sides of the same coin 
(as does Giddens), but instead ‘as two metals in the alloy from which the coin is 
moulded’ (Hay 1995: 200). Thus, while structure and agency are, in theory, separable, 
in reality they are completely interwoven. Hay (1995: 200) continues his analogy in 
stating that 
we cannot see either metal in the alloy by looking at the coin, but we can 
see the product of their fusion. The properties of the coin (society) derive 
not merely from the sum of its component metals (structure and agency), 
but also from their complex chemical interaction. 
 
With regards to this study, the selected paradigms require a methodological approach 
that focuses on individual agency in terms of their engagement with general and 
sport-specific policy at the national level. Consideration needs also to be given to 
Bourdieu’s concept of ‘structuring structures’ (Bourdieu 1990) which suggests that 
the conditions of policy decisions are key and that context can be a shaping structure 
as it inhibits free choice.  To summarise, a critical realist ontology has been adopted 
for this study, which has informed the epistemological assumptions. These, whilst 
also critical realist, do not rule out interpretive understandings of the meso level 
policy theories used to analyse decision-making.    
 
4.3 Methodology 
 
Following Grix’s (2002) template outlined above, the methodological issues 
connecting the ontological and epistemological assumptions and the specific research 
objectives must be discussed. Rather than making a distinction based upon the 
philosophical theories of knowledge, this involves making such a distinction on the 
ground of the type of data to be collected (Gratton and Jones 2004). Therefore, this 
section will attempt to firstly outline the type of data that is deemed relevant to 
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address the research objectives, before discussing the methodological issues that arise 
from such data. 
 
The research objectives highlighted at the beginning of this chapter indicate that there 
is a need to understand how policy decisions are made for hosting mega and major 
events at the local level and also assess the impact of national policy on these 
decisions. In order to achieve this it was necessary to speak to individuals involved in 
the decision-making processes in order to seek their perceptions, but also to try to 
identify and specify the less observable structures affecting decisions. Additionally, it 
was felt that qualitative data would be most useful as it permits researchers to gauge 
the strength of the actors’ points of view and also identify the constraints of everyday 
life. Silverman (2005) suggests that qualitative data allows researchers to gain a more 
sophisticated understanding of an individual’s perspective as it prioritises the study of 
perceptions, meanings and emotions. Denzin and Lincoln (2007) also point out that 
qualitatiabout researchers seek answers to questions of how social experience is 
created, rather than emphasising the measurement of causal relationships between 
variables, as is the priority of quantitative research. The usefulness of qualitative data 
for this study is further endorsed by Vromen (2010: 249) who states ‘when we seek to 
understand or explain how and why a political institution, event, issue, or process 
came about, we are necessarily asking questions that can be answered through using 
qualitative methods.’  In short, qualitative data was sought in this study in order gain a 
more in-depth understanding of processes and also identify the interactions between 
structures and actors.  
 
Stemming from the selection of a qualitative methodology, consideration must be 
given to the limitations arising from it, namely reliability and validity.  The principal 
distinction between these is that one concerns the quality of methods (reliability) 
whist the other concerns the quality of analysis (validity). Validity, then, is concerned 
with the ‘truth,’ or more specifically ‘the extent to which an account accurately 
represents the social phenomena to which it refers’ (Hammersley 1990: 57).  
Silverman (2005) claims that the challenges of validity are not confined to qualitative 
researchers, but unlike those involved in quantitative study, the solution to ensuring 
validity is less simple, mostly because of the tendency to anecdotalise. This represents 
the temptation that qualitative researchers face with their in-depth case-studies to over 
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simplify their findings, mostly by being selective in the data that they analyse. 
However, one potential solution to this potential problem is to provide more than one 
case-study, in an attempt to triangulate the findings. According to Silverman (2005: 
212) the triangulation of data ‘refers to the attempt to get a “true” fix on a situation by 
combining different ways of looking at it or different findings. He continues by 
suggesting that a range of methods should be used to analyse data, such as seeking out 
anomalies, being comprehensive in terms of the data to be analysed and searching for 
data that refutes initial conclusions.  
 
As stated above, reliability concerns the quality of methods. To ensure reliability in 
this study, three forms of triangulation will be undertaken. Firstly, three case-studies 
were selected in order to strengthen the conclusions. Within these cases, several actors 
were interviewed who had been selected, in part, for the range of perspectives they 
brought to the policy process and include those directly and indirectly involved in 
bids and those involved with government agencies and NGBs. The final form of 
triangulation to ensure reliability was the use of documentary sources, which 
contributed to broader contextual information, but also allowed for triangulation with 
the data collected in interviews.  
 
4.4 Research Methods 
 
The following section represents the next stage in Grix’s (2002) framework, in that it 
outlines the specific research methods to be employed.  As mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, the data were collected through the use of documents and interviews and 
the merits, application and potential limitations to these are indicated below. 
However, these methods were used in order to contribute to a wider case study 
framework, a method that also receives this level analysis below.  
 
4.4.1 Case Study Research Design 
 
The case study research design in qualitative research has been a traditional tool of 
historians (Rhodes 1995), but can also play an important and useful role in elucidating 
the unique factors within a situation or context (Bryman 2008) or providing a 
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framework for comparing and generalising (Rhodes 1995). Broadly speaking, Patton 
(2002) states that case study data results from the collection of data by other, more 
specific methods (such as interviews and documents), which is then collated and 
analysed. This is endorsed by Stake (2000) who contends that case studies are not a 
methodological choice, but a choice of what is to be studied. Therefore, this section 
introduces the broad principles of case study research, which set the context for the 
two following sections. 
 
A concise rationale for the use of case studies is provided by Punch (1998: 150):  
 
the basic idea is that one case (or perhaps a small number of cases) will be 
studied in detail, using whatever methods seem appropriate. While there 
may be a variety of specific purposes and research questions, the general 
objective is to develop as full an understanding of the case as possible.  
 
Case studies are used to gain a holistic understanding of a set of issues and how these 
relate to a particular group, organisation or situation (Gratton and Jones 2004). Yin 
(1994) suggests that the case study approach is particularly applicable in three 
instances: 
1. where the theory suggests particular outcomes in a particular context, thus 
cases need to be selected that provide such a context  
2. to be able to explain or describe a unique  or rare situation, or 
3. to describe and explain a case that has yet to be studied in any detail 
Considering Yin’s criteria, the cases selected in this study fit succinctly with the 
‘theoretical context’ concept in that they are to be selected on the basis of the period 
in which they occurred.  
 
Yin (2009) identifies five types of case study and the one that appears most relevant 
to the proposed research is the ‘representative’ or ‘critical’ case study, which Bryman 
(2008) terms ‘exemplifying’ in order to avoid ambiguity. Here, the case study is used 
as a typical example of a broader category and seems ideal for this study, given that 
the three cases selected are intended to represent three distinct periods in approaches 
to bidding policy. The selection of these three case studies is in keeping with Yin’s 
(2009) view that muforiple case studies are more suitable to single studies as they 
inevitably result in more compelling findings. With regards to this study, the three 
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cases not only represent three apparently different approaches to bidding, but also 
concern three different sports events, each concerning different local authorities and 
governing bodies. This enables cross-case analysis whilst also containing the scope of 
the research.  Yin continues that the design for a multiple case-study research project 
can be deemed either literal, where the findings of each case are expected to be 
similar or theoretical, where the reasons for differences are explained by theory. In 
this case, to avoid speculating on the findings, which may well display the similarities 
between the cases/time periods, a theoretical perspective has been selected whereby 
policy decisions were subjected to the scrutiny of policy theories. While a justification 
has been provided for the selection of case studies, care must be taken not to pre-
judge the outcomes of the research as the relevance of case studies may not become 
entirely evident until after the data have been analysed and subjected to detailed 
scrutiny (Bryman 2008, Yin 2009). Indeed, Patton (2002) contends that in some 
instances new cases emerge from the analysis of the original data.   
 
In the implementation of the case study approach Bryman (2008) indicates that whilst 
some studies appear to be located within a geographical region such as a city, this 
geographithe titleeature should not form the basis or title of the caseare directly 
linkeduniqueness of the case is directly linked to it. Hence, this study involves case 
studies from bidding cities, but attention must be given to the extent to which the 
issues occurring are unique to that particular city. If, as tentatively hypothesised, these 
are bids with features common to others that took place in the respective time periods, 
then the focus should be on the local policy decisions to bid and the titles of each case 
should reflect this. Failure to adhere to this principle would mean the study is in fact 
cross sectional, rather than a case study (Bryman 2008).  
 
For illustrative purposes the cases to be selected for this research project must adhere 
to the following three criteria. They must firstly fit within the broad definitions of 
mega and major events outlined in Chapter One. For triangulation purposes, the ideal 
scenario would involve the selection of cases that concern three different major/mega-
events to take place within three different UK cities/regions. Secondly, in keeping 
with the ‘formative moments’ argument expressed in Chapter Two, cases were 
selected in accordance with three identified eras: city-led approaches; sport-led 
approaches and government/non-government led approaches. Thirdly, allowing for 
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limitations posed by the availability of empirical data (see the sampling issues 
connected with the two following sections) the cases were also required to have taken 
place at, or near to, the transition from one period to the next. Hence, the 1991 World 
Student Games in Sheffield and the failed 2000 Manchester Olympic Bid were 
tentatively proposed as the first of the three case studies. The final case study 
represented a successful bid for an event yet to take place with the most obvious 
appearing to be the London 2012 Olympic bid, however, due to perceived difficulties 
in accessing interviewees given the limited timescale and the desire to select from 
three different events, preference was given to Glasgow’s bid for the 2014 
Commonwealth Games.  
 
The limitations of case study research have many similarities to the general criticisms 
of qualitative research and generally focus on concern with the credibility and quality 
of the overall findings (Patton 2002), which will largely depend on the quality of the 
individual cases. The limited opportunity for generalisation possibly represents the 
most obvious limitation of the case study approach as it is the standard aim of 
quantitative research (Silverman 2005). However, qualitative methods such as the 
case study cannot expect to achieve quantitative-style generalisation as researchers 
rarely use similar random sampling methods. Despite this, Silverman (2005) 
challenges qualitative researchers to produce work that is generalisable in order to 
have wider resonance. He goes on to outline three methods by which this can be 
achieved: (i) combining qualitative and quantitative research methods; (ii) through 
purposive sampling; and (iii) by using theoretical sampling. The last of these is most 
pertinent here as the cases were theoretically sampled in accordance with their place 
in the three ‘eras’ of bidding identified in Chapter Two.  Debate over the 
generalisation of case study data has been rife, but many qualitative researchers do not 
believe that it is worthy of note as by their nature case studies are not generally 
intended to provide a basis for claims about ‘other’ contexts (Yin 2003). Instead, they 
aim to allow for theoretical analysis with the central issues becoming the quality of 
the theoretical reasoning in which the researcher engages (Bryman 2008).  
 
Contemporary academic debate has focussed on the generalisability of single case-
studies, and the paragraph above has illustrated that even with a single case, this 
potential limitation can be overcome. However, this study goes further to overcome 
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this by using multiple cases and triangulating through the use of other methods. 
Rhodes (1995) suggests that the use of multiple case studies for the purpose of 
comparison, as is employed here, allows for valid generalisations provided there is a 
theoretical statement against which to compare them. In the present research macro-
level theories provide a context in which the policy process may be explained. Rhodes 
continues that if each case is compared to the initial theory in turn, then it is possible 
to make analytical generalisations.  
 
Broadly following Yin’s (2009) iterative model, the initial analysis of the first case 
study provided an insight into the concepts used in the analysis of the data from the 
subsequent cases and revisions were being made to the understanding of the 
theoretical concepts as each case study was analysed. 
 
The data analysis phase typically commences with the pulling together of and 
organisation of the case data (Patton 2002), in relation to this study that collected 
from the interviews and documentary research. The specific analysis of the data 
gathered within the selected case studies is explained in detail in the two following 
sections; however, some broad principles of analysis are employed and discussed 
here.  For instance, Patton (2002) argues that the analysis of case study data 
necessarily involves organising the data by specific cases for in-depth study and 
comparison and this must be undertaken in a context-specific and holistic manner 
whilst adhering to Bryman’s (2008) warning that, as a guiding principle, researchers 
should aim to provide as much generalised information as possible, but not delude 
themselves into thinking that what they see is typical.  
 
 
4.4.2 Interviews 
 
The case study research design was used for the reasons detailed above and attention 
must now turn to the specific methods that were used to collect empirical data. 
Possibly the most important of these is the use of semi-structured interviews. Unlike 
their traditional alternative: questionnaires, interviews enable the researcher to gather 
‘rich’ data (Gratton and Jones 2004, Long 2007). Essentially, this means data that 
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incorporates explanations rather than descriptions with researchers aiming to answer 
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, rather than ‘how many’ or ‘when’ (Gratton and Jones 
2004). Long (2007) adds that interviews are preferential to other methods as they 
make for easier comparison and simpler data handling. With respect to their use in 
political science, Vromen (2010: 258) provides a convincing case for the use of 
interviews in studies such as this because 
 
[i]nterviews conducted in-depth rather than through formal survey 
mechanisms tend to be exploratory and qualitative, concentrating on 
distinct features of situations and events, and upon the beliefs and personal 
experiences of individuals. 
 
Crucially, for addressing the research objectives posed above, Vromen (2010) 
continues that interviews are often used by political scientists to study political 
behaviour, inside and outside of political institutions.  
 
As stated above, the preferred type of interview used in this study was the semi-
structured interview, as opposed to the three other forms: structured/standardised; 
unstructured and focus groups. Semi-structured interviews were selected because they 
allow the major questions in the interview guide (Patton 2002) to remain constant 
through all interviews, but permits researchers to alter the sequence of the questions 
and probe for more information if necessary (Fielding and Thomas 2008). These 
interviews involve the researcher developing a list of questions or issues that will be 
explored in the interview, but also provides an opportunity for further probing 
questions that can ‘elucidate and illuminate that particular subject’ (Patton 2002: 343). 
This was of particular use when exploring both the structure and agency aspect of 
decisions to bid, as interviews allowed for the gathering of information on context as 
well as processes (May 2001). As a side note and a precursor to the following 
discussion Silverman (2005: 48) notes that the main priority of qualitative interviews 
is with the analysis of data, not the gathering of it and ‘to provide recipes for data 
gathering is to risk either gross over-simplification or utter triteness.’ Additionally, he 
attaches importance to what happens in the field as researchers attempt to gather their 
data, as this in itself is a source of data. With this comment in mind, the remainder of 
this section outlines some broad principles to which the research will adhere.  
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As well as constituting a highly effective method of studying political behaviour, there 
is a growing academic discussion (see Pierce 2008; Burnham et al., 2008) on the use 
of interviews in gathering data from individuals occupying important political, 
business, or administrative positions, in other words ‘elites’ (Vromen 2010). Long 
(2007) indicates that here, the researcher will forego the processes of random sampling 
and make purposeful selections of potential interviewees. As this study is designed to 
outline how decisions were made for bids, the work in this field, and specifically the 
methods used to gather this data are of paramount importance. The selection of 
appropriate interviewees is of critical importance for ensuring the validity of data and 
also, for studies such as this, in identifying those stakeholders who can contribute the 
richest data. Bryman (2008) claims that the lack of transparency often associated with 
qualitative work is often apparent in the sampling of respondents. Therefore, the 
approach to sampling adopted here was that of purposive sampling, which is 
essentially strategic and entails an attempt to establish a good correspondence between 
the selected research objectives and the sample of interviewees (Bryman 2008). The 
result of purposive sampling is that the researcher is able to interview those 
individuals who are directly relevant to the research objectives. The documentary 
research detailed below, specifically local government records, provided the main 
source for these potential interviewees, but the sample was not necessarily limited to 
these individuals. An open mind was kept in terms of snowball sampling, a process 
that enables researchers to rely on the social and professional contact between 
individuals (Bryman 2008), as this was useful in locating previously unknown 
sources. However, while snowball sampling was considered, care was taken to avoid 
too large a sample, as Gratton and Jones (2004) indicate that this could be detrimental 
to the research project. The sample size was not limited, but the interviews for each 
case study ended when ‘saturation’ (Gratton and Jones 2004) had occurred and no new 
information was being provided by individuals.  
 
The paragraph above made broad references to interviews deemed ‘directly relevant’ 
that can contribute the ‘richest data’ and indicated that interviewees were 
‘purposefully sampled.’ Here, a specific rationale for the identification of these 
participants and estimating their perceived value is considered. Grix (2009) justifies 
the selection of his interviewees based upon their perceived expertise, not their 
opinions and advocates the identification of some primary participants from whom 
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other relevant interviewees will be identified by snowballing. For the purposes of this 
study, these initial respondents had to have fulfilled one or more of the following 
criteria: 
 in senior strategic positions within local authorities or relevant governing 
bodies 
 primary stakeholders with direct interest in the bids 
 representatives of government and non-government organisations involved in 
the bids 
 involved in the bidding process in the long-term 
Initial document searches were used to identify these principal ‘targets.’  
 
In all cases, interviews were carried out with those individuals cited in the document 
sources and in other interviews to have initiated the bid. In addition, representatives 
from the key domestic national governing body of sport in relation to the event, local 
authority representatives, local representatives from the private sector and bid leaders 
were interviewed across all cases, as well as those actors considered to offer unique 
contextual information. The positions held by the interviewees are available in 
Appendix One. In total, twenty-seven interviews were undertaken with ten informing 
the Sheffield case study, eleven for Glasgow and six for Manchester. The discrepancy 
in number between cases can be accounted for on the basis that interviews continued 
until it was felt that saturation had occurred. Given that document sources and 
previous academic material concerning the development of a UK Olympic bid in the 
1980s and 1990s was relatively plentiful, mostly due to the scope of the event, 
interviews that looked to explore the context of the bid within the relevant IF were not 
required to the extent that they were in the other two cases. In short, additional 
information was sought for both the Glasgow and Sheffield cases to account for the 
lack of official or academic coverage of the IF perspective.  
 
Given that the Manchester case related to the Olympic Games as opposed to the World 
Student Games and Commonwealth Games, supporting contextual information 
detailing the arrival of the bid onto the agenda of the BOA and UK Government was 
plentiful. Hence, the number of interviews required for the Manchester case study, 
especially those providing the sporting context, was less than for the other two cases. 
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When using semi-structured interviews, it becomes necessary to employ techniques 
which can make some analytic sense of the raw data (May 2001). The first stage of 
this analysis is usually to carry out a transcription of recorded data (see, Appendix 
One), and Fielding and Thomas (2008) point to two general forms that this process can 
take: full or selective transcription. Full, or verbatim, transcription is beneficial if the 
researcher is not being guided by significant substantive issues and is taking purely 
deductive approach to the research (Fielding and Thomas 2008) and also if 
conversational analysis is taking place whereby the researcher is paying attention to 
the length of pauses, stutters or tone of what is being said (nervousness, laughter etc) 
(Long 2007). However, since the research obejctives for this study are more concerned 
with what is said, rather than identifying these mannerisms, a process of selective 
transcription took place which omitted such utterances. This said, while these may not 
have been transcribed, a detailed set of field notes were produced which contained 
information additional to the interview transcripts. These notes were used to record the 
‘nature’ of the interview: whether the respondent seemed busy and keen to end the 
interview; defensive or aggressive to the questions or whether the interview suffered 
from interruptions. Coding of the data adhered to the principles of the theories set out 
in Chapter Three. The main tenets of Advocacy Coalitions, Policy Networks and 
Urban Regimes provided a focus for the coding, although as Fielding and Thomas 
(2008) indicate, an approach to coding can alter depending on any new dimensions 
that are identified during the transcriptions.  
 
Anonymity was offered to all interviewees and full terms under which the data might 
be used were discussed with them prior to, and following, data collection. With 
respect to this, respondents were permitted to view any direct quotes attributed to 
them within the context of the study prior to submission and exercise a veto on 
anything they did not wish to be included.  
 
Having already identified the strengths of interviews as a qualitative research method 
and provided a brief rationale for their usage in this study, attention must now turn to 
the limitations of this method and the attempts that will be made to overcome them. 
Gratton and Jones (2004) point to a number of limitations to qualitative interviewing, 
although those most relevant to this study can be summarised as: (i) resources; (ii) the 
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interviewer; and (iii) reliability of data. Since the case studies selected present a 
geographical barrier in terms of access to municipal libraries and interviewees, careful 
budgeting was required in order to ensure all accessible data was indeed accessed. As 
mentioned above, in all qualitative research, the researcher has the potential to 
introduce bias (Gratton and Jones 2004). This could be during the data collection 
phase and take the form of ‘guiding’ the interviews to the expected or desired 
responses, by the subconscious use of body language (nodding and gesturing). Devine 
(1995) highlights that it is important during interviews to build trust with the 
interviewee, but this must be achieved by avoiding the tensions that May (2001) 
suggests could jeopardise the reliability of the method. Several authors (Vromen 2010, 
Long 2007, Fielding and Thomas 2008) suggest that this can be avoided through the 
recording of the interview and general professional etiquette of the researcher. Finally, 
Long (2007) draws upon his experience of qualitative interviews and considered that 
often, respondents aim to ‘please’ the interviewer by providing seemingly desirable 
responses, or that there are inconsistencies in terms of recall. An attempt was made to 
avoid both of these hazardous impacts on the validity of the data and reliability of the 
methods by carrying out triangulation through other case studies and also through the 
use of documentary sources. 
4.4.3 Documentary Analysis 
 
Documentary research is not as prominent as other social research methods, but can 
be considered an important tool in its own right, or as a primary method of 
triangulation (MacDonald 2008). According to MacDonald (2008) this type of 
research is very closely aligned to ethnography and ‘fieldwork’ (case-study research) 
as it does not presume a starting point, as is required in positivist empirical data 
collection. Indeed, researchers may not know what they are looking for until the 
research process begins. Documents are also considered to be impervious to the 
prejudgements of the researcher’s questions, unlike interviewees and they can provide 
a reliable alternative to interview and case-study data. Scott (1990) considers that 
documents are also useful in illustrating the social conditions in which they were 
formed and May (2001) continues that official documents are the product of the 
power relations in society. Hence, for the purposes of this study, they were primarily 
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used to triangulate the data gathered in the interviews, but also as a point of reference 
to understand the context within which policy decisions were made.  
 
Prior to discussing the limitations of documentary research, and the possible solutions 
to these, Lindsey (2007) notes that it is worthwhile to clarify the types of documents 
that the study considered. Primarily, these were local and central government records, 
policy documents of NGBs, local newspapers and selected biographies (for example 
Pickup, 1996). The main purposes of these documents were to triangulate other data 
and ‘set the scene’ for the contexts of bids, but also to facilitate the selection of 
interviewees.  The relationship between the interviews and documentary analysis is 
twofold in that the documents helped pinpoint suitable research participants and 
interviews yielded access to additional documents. 
 
Relevant official documents were identified through extensive archive searches, 
through initial interviews and by analysing minutes from meetings. The archives 
targeted were those of the local authorities in question and also those of key sports 
organisations, such as Sport England and UK Sport, the Commonwealth Games 
Council for Scotland (CGCS), the British Olympic Association (BOA) and British 
Universities and Colleges Sport (BUCS). Official documents were also sought from 
central governmental departments and identified through a systematic key word 
search of the National Archives and Hansard, with the Freedom of Information Act 
being utilised if necessary. Both national and local newspapers also formed part of the 
documentary research for this research project, and for consistency these involved a 
sample of quality nationals, such as The Guardian and The Telegraph and also the 
primary local newspaper(s) in each case study city. A systematic approach similar to 
that used with official documents was employed. A summary of the document sources 
used for each case study is provided in Table. 4.1 below. As stated above, each case 
study commenced with the creation of a narrative timeline of the development of the 
bid. In all cases, this process initially began with the review of the official council 
minutes, the local newspaper of the city in question and then the minutes of the sports 
governing body. In Glasgow, to reflect the added layer of government, a national 
Scottish newspaper was incorporated into this process. Additional resources, mostly 
in the form of correspondence, were located upon carrying out the interviews. Table 
4.1 below outlines the documentary sources that were utilised in the study.  
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Table 4.1 Documentary Sources 
Case Study Documents Utilised 
Sheffield Personal collection of Interviewee #7. 
 
Archived minutes from full Sheffield City Council and sub-
committee meetings 1984-1991. 
 
Sheffield Telegraph. 
 
Sheffield Star. 
 
BSSF/BUSA Archive. 
 
The Guardian. 
 
The Telegraph. 
Manchester  Personal collection of Sir Bob Scott. 
 
Archived minutes from full Manchester City Council and sub-
committee meetings. 
Personal collection of interviewee #27. 
 
Manchester Evening News. 
 
The Guardian. 
 
The Telegraph. 
Glasgow CGF archives. 
 
Archived minutes from full Glasgow City Council and sub-
committee meetings. 
 
Daily Record 
 
Glasgow Evening Times 
 
The Herald 
 
The Guardian 
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Scott (1990) and MacDonald (2008), whilst both proponents of documentary research, 
point to some potential hazards for the researcher. MacDonald (2008) points to the 
socially-constructed nature of documents and that they can rarely be deemed to be 
unbiased. Even if they do appear to be objective this might simply be a deliberate ploy 
by the authors to ignore the social context. Scott (1990) provides a thorough account 
of the limitations of documentary research and alludes to four principle problems: 
authenticity, credibility, representation and meaning. The following discussion  
demonstrates  how these limitations were addressed in this research project. 
 
The first of Scott’s criteria is authenticity. This is perhaps the least problematic of the 
four for this study as documents will mainly be from official sources. MacDonald 
(2008) does point to the rare instances where copyists make errors in reproducing 
these documents to microfiche or film, but there is no reason to doubt the origin of 
official records, newspapers and biographies in this study. Unlike authenticity, 
credibility is given more attention as the researcher must consider whether the 
information in the documents is ‘sincere and undistorted’ (Scott 1990: 6). This means 
considering the intended recipients of the original documents and a need to consider 
that documents emerging from bidding teams often aim to either solicit more funding 
or justify the funding they have already received. Representativeness was also 
important when considering the accessibility of the documents. For example, if 
minutes of the meetings were used in any case study,  consideration had to be  given 
to accessing minutes from other meetings, or in other case studies in order to 
determine whether ‘the evidence is typical of its kind’(Scott 1990: 6). 
 
Perhaps the most pertinent of Scott’s four quality control criteria with regards to this 
study is that of meaning, ‘which refers to the extent to which the evidence is clear and 
comprehensible to the researcher’ (Scott 1990: 8). Scott draws attention to the 
distinction between what is observable and what is comprehensible to the researcher. 
For instance, an observer investigating football hooliganism would need to be able to 
differentiate between ritual aggression and real violence. However, this type of 
contextualisation is not as easy for secondary, documentary researchers and a form of 
micro-triangulation is required in order to understand ‘meaning’. MacDonald (2008) 
claims that the researcher must first analyse the contents of the documents, then 
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understand their context to gauge meaning. In this study, the data provided by the 
interviews allowed for both the contents and context to be triangulated.  
 
4.5 Presentation of Results 
 
Following the review of literature in Chapter Three, this section outlines the specific 
key concepts drawn from the literature that are pursued through the aforementioned 
methods and reported in the following empirical chapters.  Broadly, an attempt is 
made to ascertain the place of power in the policy-making processes of each case 
study. More specifically, this will entail the consideration of different aspects of the 
policy-making process. According to Parsons (1995) public policy analysis typically 
focuses on one, or several, of the following ‘stages’ of policy making: 
 
 the relationship of public policies to ‘problems,’ 
 the content of public policies, 
 the actions, or non-actions, or decision-makers in the policy area, and 
 the consequences of policies. 
 
Taking the lead from Parsons, the data here will be arranged and discussed in four 
sections in each case study. Following an account of the ‘problem’ in each city, focus 
will shift to how each bid rose to the political agenda, how the decision was made to 
support the bid, how relationships between actors involved in the policy transpired 
and also the consequences of each decision to bid on future policy-making in the city. 
These sections aim to outline as much of the policy-making process as possible 
without favouring any particular analytical framework.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The ontological paradigm selected fits most closely with that of critical realism, in 
that it sat between the more traditional foundationalist and anti-foundationalist 
positions. That said, the anti-foundationalist reality is considered to be local and 
specific, often unobservable. Those realities, which do exist and are often shaped by 
unobservable political and social processes, were not overlooked. This links 
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succinctly to the chosen critical realist epistemology which implies that in order to 
demonstrate these realities, researchers must attempt not only to uncover the actions 
of agents within a policy subsystem, but also the structures which influence and 
inhibit these actions. Again, though, the strategic-relational leaning of the 
epistemology does not discount elements of the interpretive paradigm, especially 
when considering the analytical role of theory in the data analysis. Having considered 
its limitations, a qualitative methodology which encompasses extensive triangulation 
has been deemed the most appropriate methodology for uncovering the relationship 
between structure and agency.  
 
The specific methods used to collect data were documentary research and interviews, 
while these contributed to a wider case study approach. Multiple case studies and 
varying methods were selected in order for geographical, methodological and 
theoretical triangulation to be undertaken, enhancing reliability and validity, but also 
for allowing theory to be generalised.  
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Chapter Five: The 1991 World Student Games, Sheffield. 
 
This chapter, the first discussing the empirical findings of the thesis, commences with 
a section that sets the context of Sheffield’s successful bid for the 1991 World Student 
Games. In keeping with the working hypothesis identified in Chapter Two, the case 
study was selected as it represented the final bid for such an event that not only 
received no formal central government support, but also was also the last time a 
British city was able to independently bid for a large scale sports event without the 
support (or even knowledge) of the Sports Council. The chapter continues with a brief 
outline of the nature of the event, an analysis of decision-making processes at the 
international-level for the award of the event and an outline of the political context of 
the aspiring host city. Following this contextual introduction, a timeline of key 
decisions and a separate table introducing the key actors is presented. The objective of 
the chapter, as with the following case studies, is to outline how the bid arose onto the 
political agenda, which actors were driving it and how the decision was made to 
support it.  
 
As explored in further detail below, the World Student Games were identified by 
Sheffield’s City Council as a potential catalyst for existing ideas concerning 
regeneration. In addition, since the time period concerned was shortly following the 
successful Los Angeles Olympics in 1984, there was renewed hope amongst policy 
makers for the profit-making potential of large scale sporting events.  
 
Henry (2001) provides a useful overview of the circumstances surrounding the 
emergence of the World Student Games onto the local political agenda and this is 
discussed in brief below. However, the main focus of this chapter is to move beyond 
the political causal factors identified by both Henry (2001) and Roche (1994) and 
assess the decision-making process. Roche (1994) and Critcher (1992) highlight a 
need to indicate how discussions took place between key actors and also move 
beyond detailing broader political and economic reasons for bidding for large scale 
sporting events.  
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5.1 The political context of Sheffield  
 
From the 1940s until the late 1980s Sheffield had been governed mostly by Labour 
administrations which were characterised in the 1960s and 1970s by high levels of 
public spending (Seyd, 1990). However, the collapse of the steel industry in the 1970s 
and 80s and a brief loss of local political power to the Conservatives from 1968-9, led 
to the development of a radical stream of socialist thinking that had been typical in 
many local initiatives in Western Europe (Seyd, 1990). This ‘New Urban Left’ had 
formed from a new breed of Labour recruits who were typically university educated 
with professional backgrounds and set about gaining control of the party at national 
level and despite their failure to achieve this, gained control of some cities, including 
London and Sheffield. Indeed, according to Lawless (1990) Sheffield was one of a 
few cities that developed a radical alternative to the economic liberalism of Thatcher’s 
governments and was seen as a beacon of hope for many on the left. However, by the 
end of the 1980s, this hope had largely disappeared as the local authority, whilst still 
governed by Labour, increasingly embraced market investment, partnerships and 
became pre-occupied with image (Lawless, 1990).  
 
In terms of economic decline, the collapse of the steel industry hit Sheffield 
particularly hard due to the virtual absence of viable alternative industries, such as 
finance or the high-tech sectors that were beginning to emerge in other northern cities 
such as Leeds and Manchester. Also, employment in Sheffield had been dominated by 
the public sector to the extent that by 1989 only one of the North of England’s largest 
one hundred firms was located in Sheffield, leading Lawless (1990: 135) to refer to 
Sheffield as the ‘epitome of [a] heavy industry labour market.’ As one representative 
of Sheffield’s City Council (SCC) commented: 
 
We’d gone through a nightmare in Sheffield. We’d lost...about fifty 
thousand jobs, that’s in the steel industry, we lost more in two years than 
the mining industry across the country and it got very little publicity. Not 
only that, it left so much dereliction...certainly from the M1 almost to the 
city centre there were factories. When they’d closed they demolished 
them, so it were [sic] just like a moonscape (Interview #4, 2010).  
 
From a political perspective, Labour had dominated local politics in Sheffield from 
the 1920s through to the 1980s, with the brief exception in 1968/9 indicated above. 
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This was strongly linked to the local economy, which provided an environment within 
which trade unions were able flourish (Lawless, 1990) and also resulted in very close 
links between unions and the local Labour Party. Not only were Labour relatively 
unchallenged politically, but until the 1980s the relationship between the city council 
and the local business community was also relatively uncontentious which only 
furthered the dominance of the council in all local political matters.  
 
The New Urban Left, spearheaded by David Blunkett, seized political power in 1980 
and influenced by their non-traditional backgrounds (working class, yet university 
educated and often from non-manual professions) wanted to intervene on 
consumption as well as production issues, which led to a ‘decade of extra-ordinary 
political change’ (Lawless, 1990: 139). There was increasing and overt evidence that 
in the early 1980s Sheffield City Council blamed national government for the 
economic problems in the city, especially central macro-economic policy, and this 
resulted in a general move towards a more ‘top-down’ approach by council 
department leaders. However, the result of this transition in ideology and also 
operation was largely ineffective and, as indicated in numerous academic enquiries 
(see Seyd 1990; Henry 2001; Roche 1991; 1994; Lawless 1990), it was considered to 
have provided little benefit to communities and individuals.  
 
However, the period between 1983 and 1988 witnessed a significant move towards 
partnership working between the public and private sectors, which broke down 
barriers and brought about cooperation leading to tangible benefits to communities. 
Lawless (1990: 141) suggests that ‘somewhere in the mid-1980s a substantial change 
in attitudes took place within the city’ and below it is argued that the bid for the 
World Student Games contributed to this change. A possible cause of this was, in 
part, a change in personnel in important council positions, such as the replacement of 
the Westminster-bound David Blunkett with Clive Betts and a general move away 
from dogmatic ideology towards a development oriented approach.  
 
Also contributing to the decline of the New Urban Left was the Conservative victory 
in the 1983 General Election, which indirectly led to Sheffield losing its key allies in 
London with the abolition of the Greater London Council in 1986. Politically, the 
extended political tenure of Thatcher’s government raised the real prospect of 
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increased central control of local government and it became clear that urban policy 
would be devised by central government and its purpose would be to benefit the 
market (Lawless, 1990). Hence, along with inability to remain as the ideological 
‘Independent Republic of South Yorkshire’ council leaders were also faced with an 
erosion of influence within their own city and the imposition of new ‘rules’ for urban 
governance. These were manifested through the creation of the Sheffield Economic 
Regeneration Committee in 1987 which brought together the public and private 
sectors. Fortunately for the city, and this represents one of many coincidences in the 
generation of Sheffield’s bid for the World Student Games, at this time both the 
council leadership and chamber of commerce were receptive to this concept, 
something that could not have been stated just two years previously.  
 
The New Urban Left’s intention to consolidate their shift to the left were further 
undermined by the Conservative victory in the 1987 General Election and the almost 
total collapse of manufacturing.  In addition, Lawless (1990) points to two more 
intrinsic forces behind the eventual urban regeneration in Sheffield during the late 
1980s: economic decline and dominant political realities. 
 
The new approach adopted by the Labour Modernisers (Henry, 2001) was also 
facilitated by a change in leadership, specifically the replacement of Blunkett with 
Betts. Henry (2001) indicates that the new Labour Modernisers were identifiable for 
their embracing of partnership with the private sector, their tendency to adopt an 
event-led regeneration approach and the financial commitment shown towards the 
Games.  
 
The partnership between the public and private sectors in Sheffield was formalised 
through the establishment of the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee 
(SERC) in late 1986, which brought together multiple agencies charged with the 
regeneration of the Lower Don Valley and planning the general regeneration of the 
city. Seyd (1990: 339) indicates that Labour’s failure at the national polls directly 
influenced the establishment of the SERC in 1986 and that the ‘most spectacular 
outcome of the SERC was the bid to host the World Student Games.’ However there 
appear two points of ambiguity here. Firstly, the bid seems to have been decided in 
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mid-1986 and without much wider consultation and secondly Roche (1994) indicates 
that it was ‘fortuitous’ and coincidental that they bid for the WSG.  
 
The following case studies draw upon existing redevelopment/regeneration strategies 
in order to locate the respective bids into a broader policy programme in each city. 
However, the situation in Sheffield was such that while the bid was eventually tied to 
regeneration schemes, this was largely after a process of post-hoc rationalisation. In 
reality, it was developed alongside and separate to the other regeneration schemes in 
the city, largely due to the limited timescale the city had to bid. According to Roche 
(1994) the fast moving changes in Sheffield in the late 1980s can be detected 
structurally, politically and in sectoral terms. Structurally, changes in the global 
market of steel production were responsible for the sudden and severe loss in 
employment in the city (Lawless, 1990). Politically, central government’s approach to 
urban regeneration was largely private-sector oriented and featured development 
corporations in its core, encouraging local authorities to act collaboratively with the 
private sector. In sectoral terms, government policy involved the vigorous promotion 
of tourism, hence a wave of large hallmark events was instigated in several British 
cities in the late 1908s (Robson, 1988). Combined, these forces led to the formation of 
the SERC in 1986, a partnership between the Labour Council leadership and the 
private sector (Roche, 1994).  
 
The establishment of the SERC ‘fortuitously’ (Roche, 1994) coincided with the 
development of the Meadowhall leisure complex and the bid for the World Student 
Games, yet the ambitions of the new partnership became closely linked to the two 
major regeneration projects. Hence, the structural, political and sectoral context of the 
city can be said to have motivated the redevelopment of the city and also the World 
Student Games bid, but caution must be taken to differentiate this case from those that 
follow, in that bid did not stem from the establishment of the SERC and was only 
later rationalised to ‘fit’ within the redevelopment plans advocated by the SERC.  
 
Again, due to Sheffield’s bid appearing in the immediate aftermath of 
deindustrialisation whereby redevelopment strategies were embryonic, unlike the two 
cases that follow, Sheffield’s bid was influenced more by experiences outside of the 
city than those within it. For example, the Garden Festivals in Liverpool, Stoke, 
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Glasgow, Gateshead and Ebbw Vale accompanied by Glasgow’s ambitions to become 
European City of Culture in 1990 and Manchester and Birmingham’s prospective 
Olympic bids motivated Sheffield’s leaders to probe more dynamic boosterist policies 
to tackle their own problems.  
 
Lawless (1990) suggests that what emerged in Sheffield in the late 1980s can best be 
described as a ‘growth coalition’ which appears to have much in common with the 
urban regimes highlighted in chapter three. In particular, Lawless identifies the SERC 
as resembling very closely the partnerships more commonly found in the United 
States, which were often local authority-driven and had a parochial approach to the 
diversity of their interests. In many ways Lawless’ growth coalitions represent 
primitive incarnations of what have subsequently been termed urban regimes.  
 
Further evidence to compile an assessment of whether Sheffield did form an urban 
regime around the World Student Games will be discussed in detail below, but prior 
to presenting the data it is important to outline the key signposts which might indicate 
a regime, or aspects of one. As stated previously, Mossberger (2009) points to formal 
and informal modes of collaboration between the private and public sectors, and the 
formation of the SERC would clearly support this. Harding’s (1994) study of urban 
regimes in the UK makes clear that urban regime theory can apply in settings even 
when a true regime is not present. His contention that the theory is useful in 
explaining the situation when old political values became untenable, when market-led 
reforms impinge on the institutional structures of local government seems directly 
relevant given the timing of the Sheffield bid within the broader context of UK 
politics. If Harding’s view of Manchester was that a regime emerged due to the 
Labour local authority being ‘ill-equipped to deal with the challenges it faced’ 
(Harding, 2000: 69) then this could also be said of Sheffield, especially as both 
Manchester and Sheffield were forced to detach themselves from their traditional 
industries. This seemingly strong evidence that the conditions for the creation of a 
regime are addressed in more detail below.  
 
Whether or not this was a growth coalition as defined by Lawless (1990) or displayed 
features of an urban regime, unlike many other cities with similar partnerships, there 
did not appear to be any guiding principles that governed this partnership nor a 
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concise strategy. Instead, Lawless (1990) refers to ‘visions’ which in reality were 
often overblown and exaggerated claims, many of which were evident in the rhetoric 
of the bidding team for the Games.  
 
5.2 A Pen Portrait of the World Student Games 
 
Prior to detailing the nature of the 1991 World Student Games, it is first important to 
address a point of terminology. It must be noted that the term ‘World Student Games’ 
is uniquely British and did not, and still does not, reflect the official name of the event 
in question which, since 1959, is officially recognised as the ‘Universiade’. However, 
since even the official documentation sent from the BSSF to Sheffield City Council 
uses the terms interchangeably, then the event will be referred to as the World Student 
Games throughout this chapter.  
 
The official history of the International University Sports Federation (FISU) outlines 
that since 1923 there have been several manifestations of what is now the World 
Student Games. The BSSF promotional material (BSSF, 1986a: no page number) 
states that: 
 
The beginnings of the World Student Games were modest. In 1923 a loose 
association of nations came together to organise an International 
University Sports Week in Paris. Thus began the pattern, which, with the 
exception of the War years, saw a biennial international gathering of 
student sport. By 1948 the Games had grown to such an extent that the 
need for an international body was recognised and, as a result, F.I.S.U. 
was formed in Luxembourg, with the 1949 International Student Sports 
Week staged in Italy. The Universiade as we know it today was first held 
in Turin in 1959, but even this has continued to grow both in scale and 
stature with every event. 
 
Specifically the event for which Sheffield was bidding was a large-scale, biennial, 
multi-sports event, which was second only to the Olympic Games in terms of the 
number of competitors. In 1991 this was the second largest sporting event ever to be 
held in the United Kingdom, after the 1948 Olympic Games, and although 
predominantly a sporting event, it took place alongside a cultural festival, which was 
designed to emphasise the diversity of its competitors and also a conference aimed at 
enhancing the study of sport (Smith, 1991). Official FISU figures indicate that around 
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3300 athletes and 1000 officials arrived in the city to participate in the Games, which 
were opened by the Princess Royal in an extravagant opening ceremony. The sporting 
events took place in a range of newly-created world class facilities including the Don 
Valley Stadium, Ponds Forge swimming complex and Sheffield Arena and whilst 
many sports lacked true world class talent some, such as basketball, drew the highest 
calibre of competitor. In basketball’s case, the team representing the United States was 
largely the ‘Dream Team’ which dominated the basketball competition at the 
following year’s Olympic Games in Barcelona.  
 
At the time of the Sheffield bid, the international governing body of student sport, 
FISU, did not play the leading role in host city selection that it does today. For 
contemporary bids, there are numerous inspections, workshops and presentations that 
potential hosts must endure. However, in the late 1980s the initial domestic selection 
was carried out by the national federation, in this case BSSF, with FISU inviting 
successful national candidates to a bidding process that usually coincided with a 
Universiade. To some extent, in the late 1980s, FISU were able to rely on the Eastern 
European and Latin American stalwarts of student sport to stage the Games and were 
also able to benefit from the financial success of the Los Angeles Olympic Games in 
1984, after which it was claimed by FISU that similar tangible rewards were on offer 
to World Student Games host cities as they were for Olympic host cities, specifically 
in the areas of tourism and inward investment (BSSF 1986a).  
 
A detailed chronology of Sheffield’s bid is included below and referred to throughout 
this chapter, yet the domestic bidding contest and decision-making processes at BSSF 
level have been under-researched, hence these are explored in some detail here. In 
addition, the circumstances surrounding Sheffield’s submission to FISU are unique 
and also give further attention. 
 
At the domestic level, bidding was initiated by a letter sent by BSSF to all local 
authorities in Britain, which invited cities to express interest in hosting either the 1991 
or 1995 World Student Games  (BSSF, 1986a) and initially, positive responses were 
received from a number of cities including Manchester, Liverpool, Edinburgh, 
Birmingham, London, Glasgow and Sheffield (BSSF, 1986b). Following lengthy 
consultation between the BSSF and potential cities the list was reduced to just two 
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interested cities: Sheffield and the recent hosts of the 1986 Commonwealth Games, 
Edinburgh. Both cities were invited to make their bid presentations on 11
th
 February 
1987 with the final decision made by BSSF delegates later that day. 
 
The criteria by which the bids were assessed were largely subjective and developed 
based upon extensive research by just one individual, Dr. Chris Lundy. His role was 
crucial in the emergence of the Games on to the agenda of the BSSF and in theoretical 
terms he seems adequate to fit the definition of a policy entrepreneur; however this is 
explored in more detail below. Of note here, though, is that Lundy’s criteria for the 
selection of the candidate city (BSSF, 1986c) were accepted without question by the 
BSSF, indicating the lack of a pre-existing set of criteria within the organisation for 
the evaluation of such bids.  
 
The delegates in attendance at the bidding contest were presented with a dilemma: to 
vote for the ‘safe’ Edinburgh bid, or to vote in favour of the sporting and regenerative 
legacy that Sheffield proposed. According to one former chair of student sport: 
 
Edinburgh came expecting to get the bid and Sheffield came with such 
enormous enthusiasm and energy that they swayed the…vote. The sensible 
choice was Edinburgh because everything was there and Sheffield had 
very little, but they were so enthusiastic and so much more committed to 
us whereas as Edinburgh seemed bored (Interview #9, 2010). 
 
The documented and verbal accounts of the bidding contest endorse this view that 
Sheffield was successful due to the energy and legacy-focus of the presentation, as 
opposed to the Edinburgh bid, which was termed by more than one respondent as 
‘arrogant.’ A member of the Sheffield bid team supported this view: 
 
to be honest, I think our bid was more professional. And it was enthusiasm 
really. Edinburgh thought they’d got it because they’d held the 
Commonwealth Games, they’d got a top athletic track, they got…too 
complacent. And we came with this concept of ‘help us rebuild a city on 
the back of using your event’ and we’d got these lovely models of what we 
were planning to do, how we were going to fund it and I think ours was a 
much more professional bid. And I think we knocked them out really 
(Interview #4, 2010). 
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Further notes to support these accounts are available in Appendix Two and clearly 
indicate that the Edinburgh bid was of a higher technical standard, yet the idealism of 
influential members of the BSSF ensured that the UK candidature was awarded to 
Sheffield in February 1987. Upon this success, the BSSF and the preliminary Sheffield 
organising committee worked closely together in the development of the UK bid, 
which was presented at the 1987 World Student Games in Zagreb.  
 
FISU, and its events, had traditionally been dominated by Eastern European and Latin 
American nations and there was a growing belief amongst UK student sport officers 
that the organisation had an unofficial anti-United Kingdom stance which was 
exacerbated under the leadership of Primo Nebiolo. However, due to extensive 
lobbying, by the time the Sheffield bid team arrived in Zagreb to make their 
presentation, most of the FISU Committee was backing the bid. Indeed, the extent of 
this lobbying was indicated by former member of BSSF. 
 
By the time we got to bidding in 1987 we found that other nations had 
chosen not to bid against us. It could be argued that we were pushing 
against such an open door that we’d got rid of all the position so what 
FISU were doing was lining up other nations not to bid against us but to 
bid for further games (Interview #7, 2010). 
 
Whilst appearing diametrically opposed to the rigid, formal bidding procedures 
associated with modern large scale events, Sheffield’s experience was that they had 
carried out such effective lobbying and the BSSF had made clear early in the process 
that the United Kingdom wished to submit a bid that by the time the presentations 
were due to be made, there was no international competition. Yet, despite this, 
Sheffield’s team made a presentation which is summarised below by two members of 
the bid team: 
 
The Bid was clinched for Sheffield by the most professional and dramatic 
presentation that any city had ever put on for the FISU Executive. The 
atmosphere in the room was electric with a team of dancers, a light show, 
well-rehearsed speakers, etc.  FISU had never seen anything like it 
(Interview #21, 2010).  
 
In a communist country... we took control of the meeting, only for half an 
hour, and put on a show that was effectively an opening ceremony in their 
conference hall. If you watch a sports event, people don’t just sit there still 
they look forwards and backward across a net, up and down a field, round 
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a track and we have to put on a show that is so lively that you don’t know 
where to look next. And I said you have completely failed if by the end of 
the presentation people haven’t taken off their translation headsets. I said 
the English has got to be so good they do not need translation. It’s got to 
be Shakespearean... quality, and it was (Interview #6, 2010).  
 
While offering fairly romanticised accounts of events in Zagreb, the second of these 
quotes is informative because it relates to two issues. Firstly, and this was a belief held 
by many on the bid team, that this bid represented a departure in the style of UK bids 
for these events. There was a conscious effort to avoid the colonial approaches of 
other UK bids and every effort was made by the team to appear humble. In this case 
they went as far as translating the bid document into Serbo-Croat to appease the 
domestic audience, despite this not being a formal requirement. The second 
development that is tentatively suggested in numerous accounts of the bid team is the 
potential role of this bid in the creation of a regime, or at least the formal consolidation 
of partnership. Several respondents suggest that the presence in Zagreb of the public, 
private and education sectors all working together to promote this event had a long-
lasting impact on the future operation of the local authority in Sheffield, as explored 
below.  
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Table 5.1 Chronology of Sheffield’s Bid (BSSF, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c; BSSF, 1987; 
Pickup, 1996; Roche, 1994). 
Date(s) Sheffield’s Timeline 
1982-1986 Provisional feasibility studies 
undertaken by Chris Lundy 
3
rd
 June 1986 BSSF Invitation discussed at Sheffield 
City Council Policy Review Sub 
Committee 
24
th
 June 1986 Decision taken regarding intention to 
submit a bid 
August 1986 Council’s Recreation Programme 
Committee authorised fact-finding 
visit to Zagreb 
September 
1986 
Preparation of bid discussed at Policy 
Review Sub Committee 
November 
1986 
Bid to stage the Games submitted 
10
th
 February 
1987 
Sheffield Bid successful in a 
competition with Edinburgh. 
Establishment of the World Student 
Games Sub-Committee 
June 1987 14
th
 Universiade in Zagreb. Sheffield 
makes presentation to FISU.  
October 1987 Visit of FISU Executive 
November 
1987 
Visit of FISU Executive, Sheffield bid 
officially confirmed.  
November 
1987 
SERC study identifies need for 
flagship projects in Sheffield 
Early 1988 Universiade (GB) Ltd formed.  
February 1988  SCC underwrites an overdraft of 
Universiade (GB) Ltd 
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5.3 Agenda Setting 
 
In accordance with the information above, and endorsed by Roche (1994), the chances 
of the World Student Games being hosted in Sheffield were minimal under the 
previous versions the of Labour-controlled local authority. However, the change in 
direction of the leadership as well as the activities taking place within the BSSF led to 
the conditions becoming suitable for a bid.  
 
Roche (1994) goes on to suggest that from Sheffield’s perspective, the broader 
reasons why a large scale sporting events could arrive on the council’s agenda were 
structural, political and sectoral. From a structural perspective, there had been global 
changes in steel production, leading to a massive reduction in employment in the 
traditional industrial base. According to Roche, this subsequently undermined the 
New Urban Left as their alternative economic policy, which was largely socialist, 
failed. Politically, central government further implemented public sector funding cuts 
and forced upon the city the Sheffield Development Corporation in 1987, which 
encouraged public/private partnerships. Finally, the sectoral influences behind change 
were the increasing incidence of using hallmark events for political and structural 
purposes in UK cities in the mid to late 1980s. 
 
Roche (1994) contends that a combination of the above factors contributed to the 
establishment of the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee in 1987 and, unlike 
Seyd’s (1990) view that the bid emerged out of the establishment of the SERC, Roche 
argues that the bid for the World Student Games was one of a few ‘fortuitous’ 
decisions that the city council had taken and were able to use this event to drive the 
sport, recreation and leisure theme of SERC’s regeneration agenda. That the decision 
to bid had been made independently of, and prior to, the establishment of the SERC 
and represented yet another coincidence in the formulation of the bid, is a critical 
observation and is explored more fully below.   
 
In order to trace the origins of the bid and its arrival onto the political agenda in 
Sheffield, it is first necessary to illustrate the development of the bid within the 
context of UK student sport and this can be largely attributed to one man, Dr Chris 
Lundy, who, according to senior representatives of the Sports Council ‘was probably 
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the one pushing hardest to bring the Games here’ (Interview #2, 2010). Lundy 
provides his own rationale for this below: 
 
the origins of the Games Bid were in reality personal ambition. A single 
minded, determined effort and hunger to reach the top, as it would be for 
any elite athlete, except for me the ‘medal’ was securing and successfully 
planning the event rather than competing in it. I had done a number of 
single sports championships, working up from Irish to world level, so the 
only challenge left for me was a multi-sports event (Interview #21, 2010). 
 
Lundy continues that while the specific origins of this World Student Games can be 
traced back to around 1982, the process by which the concept of the Games would 
appear on the student sport landscape could be traced back as far as the 1960s and the 
creation of the New University of Ulster (NUU). As a new athletic-focused university, 
the NUU set out a strategy of promoting and staging student sports events, which 
initially involved Irish championships, but soon progressed to world championship 
events such as the 1980 World Student Cross County Championships. Concurrently, 
the NUU were also developing multi-sports coaching programme and also a wider 
profile for managing events, as recognised by the election of two staff members to the 
British Universities Sports Federation (BUSF). Following a visit to the Mexico Games 
of 1979, Lundy was ‘convinced that the UK could do a better job’ (Interview #21, 
2010). 
 
However, despite his personal efforts, Lundy recognised that personal ambition was 
not enough to make it happen and that a broader rationale was required. In order to 
achieve this, though, two significant issues had to be addressed. The first of these was 
the relatively low profile of student sport in the UK and its tendency to operate in 
almost complete isolation from mainstream sport. The second issue was the lack of 
unity within student sport during the 1908s. Lundy points to the tensions, differences 
in funding and ‘jealousy’ between the bodies representing universities (BUSF), 
polytechnics and colleges. In essence, the bid for the 1991 World Student Games was 
used, in part, to address all of these issues and, according to Lundy, ‘to lift the profile 
of student sport in the UK, build closer links with sports governing bodies and build 
momentum towards the unification of student sport.’ In addition to these tensions, 
which would later be resolved through government interventions, a cultural change 
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was also taking place under the auspices of student sport, as indicated in this account 
by a former high ranking student sport administrator: 
 
[in terms of international student sport] we were not batting in the same 
playing field, we were still the ‘blazer brigade’. So, that was the culture, 
and then a guy called Dr Chris Lundy, and Chris was a kind of proactive 
motivator in this, saying this is a way forward. In fact, there was a strong 
Northern Irish contingent with Dr Alan Sharp, Dr David Eastwood and Dr 
Chris Lundy, who were all out of the University of Ulster really and 
interestingly, they were the ones who had this sort of strong desire to get 
student sport onto the map and they all happened to be at one institution. 
So, student sport bought into it. We pretty much had to raise the money 
and support for this ourselves so it came down to our own savings, 
reserves and we set about trying to influence FISU in order to persuade 
them that this was something that they should be doing as this had never 
been to Britain, this sort of thing, bar one or two world championships, I 
think at the time that was golf and cross country (Interview #7, 2010).  
 
The cultural change referred to here concerns a broad change in strategy in UK student 
sport, which was ultimately reflected in the ‘non-colonial’ bid in Zagreb. A move 
away from what the respondent terms the ‘blazer brigade’ which had its roots in 
colonialism, Oxbridge and tradition towards a more pragmatic and event-led approach 
occurred in student sport and the actions of a few more entrepreneurial actors elevated 
the World Student Games on to the student sport agenda. 
 
At local authority level, evidence of the presence of policy entrepreneurs is found in 
relation to the role of Councillor Peter Price, the chair of the Recreation and Leisure 
Committee, referred to as a ‘visionary’ by Seyd (1993) as his personal enthusiasm 
elevated sport and recreation onto the local agenda. Seyd (1993) continues that Price 
was the classic local political entrepreneur, as exemplified by his gathering and 
risking of political capital and support in order to reshape politics and create new 
sources of political power. Price himself explains the emergence of the Games on to 
the political agenda below: 
 
We were desperately trying to find a catalyst that would bring investment 
back into the city and at the time under Mrs Thatcher, no-one was 
interested in putting any public money in. It was just about this time that I 
got a request from the head of student sport at Sheffield [Polytechnic] 
asking about the possibility of hosting the Games. That was in my capacity 
as head of leisure you see, I just said “look, ‘course we would” not 
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dreaming how big it was I just thought it was students coming across 
because I’d never heard of it like anybody else had. But the more I learnt 
about it, the more it seemed to me that this could be a possibility that it 
could be not just for hosting the games, but as a means of attracting 
investment that could attract more and more events to the city and bring 
more visitors and make the Don Valley more attractive, you see, and I 
raised this to our policy (Interview #4, 2010). 
 
Here, Price refers to the report carried out by an independent consultancy company 
that pointed to the need for Sheffield’s regeneration, especially in the Lower Don 
Valley and the value of using a flagship event as its catalyst. The debate between 
Roche (1994) who claimed that the bid was coincidental and fortunately occurring at 
the time of this report and Seyd’s (1993) claim that the bid emerged from this report is 
important, but in terms of the arrival of the Games onto the local political agenda, this 
can be clearly associated with a small number of individuals, particularly Peter Price 
and Gerry Montgomery. The role of SERC was to identify the problems that needed to 
be overcome and to suggest possible solutions and in doing so they contributed to the 
creation of the conditions required for these two policy entrepreneurs to operate. 
 
In Montgomery’s case, he continues the theme of a series of coincidences that 
occurred in the elevation of the bid onto the local political agenda. At the time of the 
BSSF’s letter arriving at the Council, he was working as an officer in the Leisure and 
Recreation Department (he was Peter Price’s deputy) and his day-to-day 
responsibilities were the development of sport and leisure facilities within the city. In 
his own words, Montgomery explains the first coincidence: 
 
In 1987 the games were due to be hosted by Zagreb in the former 
Yugoslavia, so this is Summer of 86 we’re talking and I suggested to the 
council that we’d go and have a look at Zagreb and see one year out from 
the games what the issues were and what they’d done and so forth. Now, 
coincidence one is that my wife is Serbian and I speak fluent Serbo-Croat 
(laughter). So that helped ‘cause I went to Zagreb and was able to get 
contact with everyone really from top to bottom. Now, I got back from 
Zagreb and wrote a report to the policy committee of the council 
[suggesting] the only possible justification for us to bid would be as part of 
a rejuvenation programme in the city, bearing in mind the city was being 
ravaged by steel cuts, coal cuts and that at the time something needed to be 
done to correct this (Interview #3, 2010).  
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So, the first coincidence appears to be that within the local authority there was not 
only a sporting visionary (Peter Price) with some political leverage, but also another 
dedicated sporting advocate well versed in Serbo-Croat, who was able to use his 
linguistic skills to gather preliminary information.  The second coincidence, in terms 
of specific agenda setting, was the micro-political climate within the Council. 
According to one respondent ‘the Labour ruling party at that time had such a majority 
that they didn’t have to worry about the internal politics at all’ (Interview #9, 2010).  
 
Theoretically, the placing of the World Student Games on to the agendas of both the 
BSSF and Sheffield City Council initially appears to be in keeping with the 
assumptions of the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF), in that there appear to have 
been several coincidences (Houlihan, 2005) and the process lacked direction 
(Zachariadis, 2007). Apparent coincidences include Gerry Montgomery’s position in 
the Leisure and Recreation Department, his ability to speak Serbo-Croat and his 
professional background within the Institute of Sport and Recreation Management 
(ISRM). Beyond this, one can point to several key members of the bid team with a 
background in student sport, and the presence of a FISU executive member, Graham 
Solley, at Sheffield Polytechnic. Indeed, Graham Solley was heavily influential in 
advising UK cities on whether they should submit a bid to the BSSF.  
 
The MSF seems a plausible explanation of the emergence of the WSG onto the 
political agenda  in Sheffield largely due to the role of the bid in creating networks, 
communities and coalitions rather than the opposite. Investigating further, analysis 
using Kingdon’s three streams is also useful here, as all three seem to apply. The 
problem stream, which is usually populated by issues caused by crises or the changing 
scale of existing problems, is evident here in the political and economic problems 
facing Sheffield. The policy stream was dominated by the regeneration priorities of 
SERC and the particular amenability of sport, leisure and tourism as resources 
available to the organisation. Accompanied by the Cooper Lybrand study advocating 
the expansion of the leisure industry and the opportunities to tie the WSG policy in 
with other strategic developments, such as housing, these provided scope for creation 
of a launch window ready for an entrepreneur(s) to exploit. The launch window itself 
appears to have been provided by highly consequential coupling of logic and a less 
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cautious decision-making style (the politics stream), largely due to the desperation for 
a solution to the loss of manufacturing.  
 
In Chapter Three, it was argued that the success of policy entrepreneurs depends on 
their ability to find politicians that are receptive to their ideas and this was clearly the 
case in Sheffield. However, while it appears that the roles of Gerry Montgomery and 
Peter Price in Sheffield fit with the concept of policy entrepreneurs, caution must be 
taken in adopting this concept. At a superficial level, these individuals do seem to 
draw together Kingdon’s three streams and operated during a short-term launch 
window, but beyond being advocates for a single issue, such as mega events, they 
must also be considered to be power brokers and manipulators of problematic 
preferences (Zachariadis, 2007). The accounts of various stakeholders involved in the 
bidding process clearly indicate that Peter Price was able to mobilise the Labour 
council leadership and local political party, despite some initial resistance and that 
Montgomery was able to mobilise external actors in the shape of the Chamber of 
Commerce. Perhaps the clearest indication of their entrepreneurial behaviour is 
illustrated by their stated motivations for becoming involved within the bid, which can 
be summarised in both cases as demonstrating an evangelical commitment to sport 
and, to a certain extent, to Sheffield.  
 
As far as agenda setting in Sheffield is concerned, it is the contention of this thesis that 
the MSF is the most useful lens through which to explain this stage of the policy-
making process. However, the limitations of the model which were identified 
previously are pertinent. Houlihan’s (2005) criticism that the model lacks a detailed 
explanation of power must be explored, especially in relation to the apparently random 
process of agenda setting in Sheffield. Houlihan intimates in his critique that the 
coincidences highlighted by the MSF are rarely coincidences in the literal term and 
that they result from power relations in the policy setting. The lack of opposition to the 
bid in Sheffield, in the agenda setting stage, was mostly due to the desperation of the 
council to find a plausible response to the economic turmoil, but the power exerted by 
the local authority must not be overlooked. The ability of the policy entrepreneurs to 
force the Games onto the agenda was partially due to the lack of a powerful opposition 
and this is in keeping with Lukes’ view that a lack of expressed opposition does not 
necessarily indicate a consensus and often occurs due to structural power. This point is 
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developed in the later section which indicates that opposition and grievances were 
aired in the decision-making phase, suggesting that power was successfully wielded 
by the entrepreneurs in the early stages.  
 
The second concern with a qualified acceptance of the MSF is related to the 
‘coincidences’ surrounding the sporting backgrounds of the policy entrepreneurs. 
Commencing with Lundy, his ability to exert influence over the bid within the BSSF 
was certainly due to his personal drive and ambition, but this appears to have been 
facilitated by larger shifts in power within the student sport movement. Here, elements 
of both the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) and policy communities/issue 
networks appear to apply. In terms of the ACF, the change in the dominant values 
within student sport, reflected in the departure from the amateur values of the ‘blazer 
brigade’ does seem to have provided Lundy with the opportunity to forward his 
campaign to bring the Games to the United Kingdom. This change in ideology, 
identified by two former senior BSSF members (Interview #7, 2012; Interview #9, 
2010) in student sport could be explained by the emergence of a new coalition with 
more modern views and hence a change in policy core beliefs within the subsystem, or 
by a change initiated by the extrinsic influence of central government higher education 
reforms. In either case the explanatory power of the ACF should not be 
overemphasised here, but it does provide some scope to explaining the reasons for 
apparent random policy decisions.  
 
Within Sheffield the policy entrepreneurs, Price and Montgomery, must be subjected 
to further scrutiny. They clearly exerted power over the council, private sector and 
local Labour Party and did this due to their strong commitments to sport. Whilst not 
adhering to the principles of the ACF or policy communities within this phase, their 
actions can largely be attributed to the creation of a policy community and possibly an 
advocacy coalition later in the policy-making process, as discussed below.  
 
This sub-section indicates that, in keeping with the multiple streams framework, there 
were two clear dynamics at work in the emergence of this bid. Firstly, the conditions 
were right. This relates to all of the extrinsic forces at work in the city, ranging from 
the collapse of heavy industry, to Thatcher’s local government reforms through to the 
emergence of a regeneration strategy and within this the tentative dialogue between 
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the public and private sectors. However, without the actions of first Lundy and then 
Price and Montgomery the bid would not have occurred. The MSF seems best placed 
to describe this due to the apparent coincidences occurring, clear entrepreneurial 
behaviour and the originality of the policy issue, which permitted the entrepreneurs to 
operate freely.  
 
More generally, in order to bid for and deliver the Games, Sheffield’s Labour 
leadership were required to act in a municipally-entrepreneurial manner (Seyd 1993) 
and enter direct competition with other cities for mobile capital by establishing a 
distinctive city brand. Previously, and globally, these outputs of municipal 
entrepreneurialism had typically been garden festivals, conventions or shopping 
malls, but in Sheffield’s case it was firmly based around sport and tourism.  
 
5.4 The Decision Making Process 
 
Roche (1991) claimed the council felt it unnecessary to do large-scale systematic and 
independent market research to establish realistic private-sector financial interest. 
However, this is an easy critique. The suggestion from the research seems to be that 
the levels of desperation and lack of experience of these events along with a lack of 
guidance centrally could all be used as reasons for this.  The decision-making process 
was largely opposition-free due to Labour’s strong majority and the path dependent 
nature of the bid. Once the decision had been made and accepted by BSSF, there was 
little scope for withdrawal.  
 
At around the time of the bid, there was a significant change in the relationship 
between the public and private sectors in Sheffield. This was in part due to the new 
approach of the Labour Modernisers, but was also reflective of a new attitude within 
the Chamber of Commerce. While previously, an observer had noted that there would 
be ‘more dialogue between General Rommel and General Montgomery that there was 
between the public and private sectors in Sheffield’ (Interview #1, 2010), the 
incumbent chair of the Chamber of Commerce noted in more detail: 
 
[for] a number of it years it was head to head opposition because there was 
very little political opposition in Sheffield. The Chamber of Commerce 
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and Chamber of Trade were horizontally opposed to the elected Labour 
group and there was very little cooperation and I made it my pledge during 
my year in office that we would talk to the people who were duly 
nominated as councillors and democratically elected (Interview #1, 2010). 
 
In essence, this meant that private sector joined the local authority and student sport in 
appointing someone with policy entrepreneurial intentions to lead the bid and also 
contributed to the development of conditions supportive of the idea of the bid, a point 
endorsed by Critcher (1992) who contends that the Games were chosen as the focus of 
regeneration in Sheffield because the timing was ‘right.’ A senior officer from 
Sheffield City Council continues: 
 
It was the coming together of two, maybe three, policy initiatives. A need 
to do something with the Lower Don Valley, a need to do something 
creative with the partnership between the private and public sector and 
then (pause) an evangelical commitment to sport, personified by Gerry 
Montgomery…it was opportunist (Interview #6, 2010).  
 
Politically, the initial decision to bid for the games was made by the Labour-led local 
authority. Since Labour had such a strong majority on the city council, opposition 
here was unlikely and the decision was a formality, however the process of garnering 
support more broadly within the Party was more difficult. Price recalls his experience 
of attempting to convince the local Labour Party to support the bid: 
 
there was a major debate within the Labour Party. I had to take it to the 
district Labour Party to talk about investment. Of course, there’s a big 
debate about sport, you know, it’s this slippery thing and [they] want real 
industries in Sheffield, so there’s that major debate going on... about what 
economic regeneration meant and was it real jobs or part-time jobs it 
would create?  So there was that major debate, political debate going on in 
the background (Interview #4, 2010). 
 
This alludes to a much greater ideological issue concerning the role of sport within the 
left of the Labour Party, which can be traced back to the 1930s and the establishment 
of the National Workers Sport Association, with its declared aim to transfer the 
control and promotion of sport and recreation to working class organisation and to 
specifically focus on the provision of amateur, participatory sport (Jones, 1988). 
Whilst sport rarely emerged as a significant political issue in the Labour Party, this 
assumption regarding the nature and value of sport, one with its rhetoric firmly 
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embedded in participation and far away from any utilitarian function, had endured 
until at least the 1980s along with other tenets of the socialist ideology that were 
forged in the inter-war period.  
 
Despite initial scepticism, the local party was convinced to support the bid and it was 
taken to Council. Gerry Montgomery suggests that wider support within the Labour 
Party was achieved due to the close links between the bid and the issue of housing, 
which was pertinent in Sheffield at the time. He states: 
 
the local Labour Party were supportive[they had] about a 50 member 
majority out of the 60 members so they were riding high at the time, but 
the party itself were very supportive and I think housing again played an 
important part in that because it was a big issue of the day. The major 
internal political objection came from the Liberals, there was only one 
Tory on the council, he was a very nice man, but he didn’t really have any 
great influence (Interview #3, 2010).  
 
He continues, claiming that Peter Price ‘was useful politically, he was very 
highly regarded and liked, so he was the nice face of it.’   
 
Whether the effort to garner support from the local Labour Party occurred before the 
official rubber-stamping of the policy within the council is unclear. However, what is 
certain is that traditional top-down or bottom-up models of policy making are not 
sufficient in explaining the development of the World Student Games bid.  Following 
from the exploration of the MSF above and despite its apparent pre-occupation with 
agenda setting, it can again be contended that this framework can partially explain the 
decisions that were made in Sheffield, mostly due to the lack of any contrary central 
government policy, and due to the momentum gathered by Price and Montgomery in 
the agenda setting phase. According to Zahariadis (1999) policy entrepreneurs make 
conscious choices to ‘drip feed’ actors through the other phases of policy making in 
order to protect their interests. While these covert intentions were not clear in 
interviews with either of the two Sheffield-based policy entrepreneurs, this concept is 
worth exploring. It has already been established that Price and Montgomery had long-
standing commitments to sport and both made it clear that they had strong desires for 
the bid to succeed. It would therefore be logical to suspect that their recruitment of 
other actors, especially the Chamber of Commerce, was strategic in the sense that they 
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did not provide full details as to the Council’s intentions or to the potential costs of 
hosting. This point is supported by the former head of the Chamber who reported that 
he felt deceived in the aftermath of the Zagreb presentation. This alludes precisely to 
Zahariadis’ claims that the MSF can explain events beyond agenda setting, but often 
entrepreneurs deliberately skew the overt elements of the process to disguise issues 
that might generate fear amongst key actors. However, it remains unclear whether 
there was a deliberate attempt to deceive actors and the more likely conclusion is that 
any perceived deceit was due probably to the lack of experience of key policy-makers 
and also a lack of central guidance.  
 
The ACF seems of little value in explaining this phase of the process in Sheffield, 
largely due to the absence of any existing coalition within the city and also in student 
sport. While it was suggested above that the emergence of a new coalition may have 
been partially responsible for the emergence of a bid on the agenda of the BSSF, the 
sport sub-system was immature in the late 1980s and cannot be said to have influenced 
decisions. However, the utility of policy network theory is a little greater here, yet not 
comprehensive in explaining decision-making.  
 
The evidence collected would suggest that any central government policy in relation to 
hosting large-scale events was absent in the late 1980s, hence policy community 
theory is largely redundant. Sheffield was neither involved in central policy 
discussions on bidding and was certainly not part of a community formed by the 
government to deliver the Games. Instead, issue networks provide a suitable lens 
through which analysis can be carried out as the groups involved in the decision-
making process clearly differed in their ideology, hence the contention over the 
leadership of Universiade GB Ltd (see Appendix Three). It is plausible that events in 
Sheffield represented some characteristics of an issue network, which would 
eventually become a policy community, or even a regime-like entity, after the Games 
due to the development of a specialism in delivering sports events and the eventual 
compatibility with central government policy, the latter of which will be dealt with in 
the final sub-section. 
 
Gaining official backing was not only a priority for those within the Leisure and 
Recreation Department at the council, but also the BSSF. According to a former senior 
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member of the federation their vision, and prerequisite, for a successful bid was that ‘it 
had to have the local authority’s backing’ and thus, as far as they were concerned, the 
council executive were critical decision-makers.  
 
In order to gain official council backing, the support of its chief executive, David 
Blunkett, was required. In part, this was achieved due to the prominent role in the 
early bid discussions of Clive Betts, who would later replace Blunkett as the council 
leader, but also due to the close links between the bid and other important areas of 
policy, such as housing. According to Montgomery, [Blunkett] was an influence, if 
he’d have said “no, we’re not doing it” we’d have got kicked into touch.’ His support, 
though, was forthcoming, largely due to the links to the council’s ambitious housing 
policy and also because the bid became interlinked with other areas of policy, such as 
the building of the Meadowhall retail complex. According to Gerry Montgomery: 
 
I think the World Student Games was one of the most influential factors in 
getting Meadowhall off the ground because planning was a real problem. 
The planning department was really against the development. I think 
partially because it was the east end and the air pollution and ground 
pollution... and also they were concerned about the shopping in the city 
centre which there are still comments about today. What the games did, 
it’s not that it influenced the decision to build Meadowhall, but it 
influenced the timescale by which it would happen because we wanted to 
have it open for 1990 given the Games was in 1991 (Interview #3, 2010). 
 
The links to regeneration policies, such as the building of the Meadowhall complex, 
were important, but perhaps the most important policy issue in the early decision-
making process was that of housing. Not only were links to housing instrumental in 
gaining Blunkett’s support, but the housing strategy in Sheffield had shown that links 
between the Council and central government were not impossible, the redevelopment 
of housing became a central legacy of the Games and the Housing Department 
provided the first bid leader. 
 
The Housing Department had submitted plans to build 4000 new council houses in 
Sheffield, which required an annual contribution of £25million from central 
government. As expected, this plan was met with some resistance from the Secretary 
of State at the Department of the Environment, Nicholas Ridley, and resulted in legal 
claims and counterclaims between the Council and government along with some 
 153 
 
industrial action in Sheffield. Despite the animosity a deal was agreed as, according to 
a senior actor within the Housing Department, ‘the scheme hadn’t upset the Secretary 
[of State] as much as had been thought’, hence the Housing Department, and its 
leader, gained considerable clout within the local authority. The result of this was that 
within one day of the deal being signed to build the new houses the Housing Director 
was approached to lead the fledgling bid team. His rationale for accepting was that, 
coincidentally, he’d taken a keen interest in the international politics of student sport 
whilst an undergraduate and he felt compelled to ‘see what had happened since [he] 
left university’ (Interview #8, 2010).   
 
At city level, once official council backing had been gained in June 1986 some wider 
consultation took place to attract support from the business and education sectors. 
This occurred in two phases, which can best be defined as occurring before and after 
the bid made to FISU in Zagreb in 1987. The issues surrounding the latter of these 
phases are explored in detail in the following sub-section, with the time period 
between June 1986 and June 1987 as this still concerns decision-making, albeit on a 
wider basis than in the local authority. Indeed, given Labour’s majority within the 
council, this represented the most significant form of scrutiny of the bid and despite 
Labour’s control of the local authority, general opposition to their policies was 
frequent. 
 
The challenge for the local authority-based advocates of the bid was to recruit 
influential support from the wider community. Since this was a student sport event 
and one member of FISU’s executive was based at Sheffield Polytechnic (now 
Sheffield Hallam University), gaining support from the education sector was 
relatively straightforward. However, this did not apply to the business community, as 
indicated below by a former leader of the Chamber of Commerce: 
 
Yes, you’d never do anything in Sheffield without opposition to it. Some 
of the older people thought we were wasting our time, that we’d never do 
anything with these people. They just couldn’t see further than their own 
little tool companies. Anyway, it happened, the Chamber of Commerce 
agreed to support the bid. I became a member of the Universiade Board 
along with [names associate] who became my successor as president of the 
Chamber of Commerce. We threw a lot of enthusiasm into it. It very 
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quickly became obvious that [initially] only Gerry Montgomery was fully 
behind it, but soon everyone wanted to support it (Interview #1, 2010). 
 
In this first, pre—Zagreb, phase of decision-making the bid team (in particular Gerry 
Montgomery) were successful in attracting wider support for the concept of the bid.  
However, while the bid served to foster some long-awaited unity between the public 
and private sectors in the city, the aftermath of the presentation in Zagreb was far 
more fractious. The education sector became embedded partners in the delivery of the 
games in terms of accommodating and catering for athletes, but tensions emerged 
between the local authority and the business community and were expressed through 
the (mis)management of the company formed to organise the Games: Universiade 
(GB) Ltd.  
 
There are several thorough accounts of the demise of this company (for example, 
Roche, 1993) and while this was an important issue concerning the operation of the 
Games, it is more relevant here due to the apparent squabbling for power between the 
public and private sectors, which was perhaps indicative of the lack of a clear strategy 
for hosting these types of events. This is an illustrative point and the role of the games 
in bringing together a long-lasting partnership between the sectors should not be 
underplayed. This said, two particular issues concerned the business community. 
Firstly, the appointment of the city’s Housing Officer as chair of the bid committee in 
the early stages and secondly the carrying over of the bidding costs (circa £1milion) to 
Universiade (GB) Ltd, which meant, in effect, that the company was formed with a 
large initial debt. The dissatisfaction of the business community is reflected by the 
leader of the Chamber of Commerce below: 
 
So we set up a company with £1m debt. The result of all that was that we 
said we didn’t think that [Housing Officer] was an appropriate person to 
see it through and they agreed with us so we went through a process of 
interviewing and appointed a chief exec of some calibre in my view, 
[names chief executive]. [His] background was in marketing (Interview 
#1, 2010). 
 
The appointment of the new Chief Executive of Universiade (GB) Ltd., who was a 
personal associate of the leader of the Chamber of Commerce, was not without 
contention within the local authority and the events that led to his dismissal (see 
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correspondence in Appendix Three) are another indicator of disagreement over the 
precise rationale of the Games and the lack of clarity over roles within the bid team 
and organising committee.  
 
The infancy of any bidding policy in Sheffield, and nationally for that matter, was 
also reflected within the absence of wider consultation/planning. This was not atypical 
of early bids, but it is in keeping with Roche’s criticism of Sheffield that the bid was 
reactive. However, on closer inspection some significant research was undertaken 
prior to deciding to bid. In 1988 Price and some colleagues visited Philadelphia and 
‘one or two other cities’ (Interview, #3, 2010) that had gone through similar economic 
turmoil due to the collapse of the motor industry.  The Cooper Lybrand report, which 
endorsed tourism and leisure as possible rescue routes for the city’s economy was 
commissioned due to the findings emanating from this visit. 
  
The visit to the United States provides a curious insight into theoretical explanations 
of the decision-making process in Sheffield. It may well just be another coincidence, 
but the timing of the visit in the mid-1980s coincides with the emergence of the Urban 
Regime Theory (URT) in academia, a theory that was based upon the experiences of 
American cities during this precise time period. While Price and his team saw the role 
sport, and in particular stadia, could play in revitalising a city, they would have also 
witnessed the style of governance within these cities, especially the formal and 
informal links between the local authorities and business communities. Indeed, the 
willingness of the Council to recruit private sector support for the bid marked a step 
change in decision-making in Sheffield. The key point here is not that the bid for the 
WSG emanated from the creation of any de-facto urban regime, but the decision-
making process contributed towards the creation of a local government with some 
very apparent urban regime-like characteristics. In contrast to Manchester the 
contention of this chapter is that in Sheffield it was the bid that led to the creation of 
this ‘regime’ rather than vice-versa.  
 
Regimes were broadly defined by Fanstein and Fanstein (1983) and Petersen (1981) 
as mechanisms by which city governments bridge the gap between public interest and 
business interests and Stone (1989) continues that Urban Regimes were stable groups 
with a sustained role in decision-making processes. In Sheffield, the prominence of 
 156 
 
the business community, particularly the Chamber of Commerce, in decision-making 
indicates a regime-like quality, despite the fragile relationship between leading public 
and private actors. Stone’s contention that, in urban regimes, business interests come 
to the fore and that they equip politicians with the ability to govern, not just hold 
political power, seems pertinent in Sheffield and possibly suggests that regime theory 
provides a more plausible theoretical explanation for policy-making. In these early 
decisions it certainly appeared that there was a strong desire to engage the private 
sector and the legacy of this would appear to inhibit explaining the creation of the bid 
team through network theory. This will be explored more fully in the sub-section 
below which concerns the legacy of decisions and the exploration of whether a form 
of urban regime was created during and after the Games.  
 
5.5 Relationships with other bodies 
 
Since the relationship between the bidding city and the BSSF and FISU has been 
covered at length above, this section will entail discussion of the relationship with two 
other bodies: central government and the Sports Council. While the aim of the thesis 
is to examine the policy process leading up to the bid, consideration here must be 
given to the holistic roles of both of these bodies in relation to the Games in order to 
analyse their respective stances on the Games. 
 
National government urban policy in the late 1980s inspired large events, not all 
sporting, in a number of de-industrialising cities (Roche, 1990). There was some 
evidence of civic boosterism, rising land values, restoring self-confidence and the 
promoting of a dynamic approach by decision-makers, but largely these events ran at 
a financial loss, or broke even at best (Roche, 1994). While this points to some 
government intervention, it should be stressed and is borne out in chapter two, that at 
this stage government did not have a specific national policy for these events, nor a 
national policy for de-industrialising cities. This lack of a supportive policy, lack of 
alternatives for cities and the recent success of the Los Angeles Olympics meant cities 
were tempted to bid for these events and often did so hastily and with little public 
consultation. Hence, Sheffield’s team undertook too little research into the potential 
cost of the event, too little wider consultation and the partnership acted in haste 
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(Roche, 1994), yet with very little direction, no experience and the desperate 
economic circumstances of the city perhaps they had no choice. If national 
government’s lack of policy for these types of events and de-industrialising cities 
allowed Sheffield the freedom to explore a large scale sporting event, then it could be 
argued that their definitive policy interventions in the areas of local taxation and the 
Sheffield Development Corporation forced Sheffield’s hand.  
 
As indicated above, national government had no direct strategy for either student 
sport or large scale sporting events in the late 1980s, hence no direct support was 
either forthcoming or expected. In addition, the ideological disparity between 
Thatcher’s (and then Major’s) Conservative Government and Blunkett’s Council 
meant there was a great deal of mistrust on both sides, with an undercurrent that the 
Games could be used for political purposes by both sides. 
 
The official position of Thatcher’s Government was that they ‘supported’ the bid, but 
there would be no central money available to assist in the operation of the Games. The 
formal support included a quote by Thatcher in the bid document, in which she stated: 
‘This will be the largest sports event ever held in Britain. It will be a major boost to 
the local economy. I’ve been impressed by the energy and enthusiasm the local 
organisers are showing’ (Universiade GB Ltd., 1988).  This apparent moral support 
was echoed by her Minister for Sport, Colin Moynihan: 
 
Universiade is so significant to the world’s youth movement, to the 
development of sport and ultimately to producing the start of tomorrow 
who, hopefully, as many have in the past, go on to win Olympic medals 
(Universiade GB Ltd, 1988).  
 
However, these supportive tones were not appreciated within the bid team, members 
of which had varying opinions, ranging from the desire for further financial assistance 
from central government to a suspicion that government was not only not supporting 
the Games, but a deliberate attempt was made to undermine them in order not to allow 
the Labour dominated Council to be seen to achieve success. 
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There is no surprise that the members of the bid team and organising committee drawn 
from the local authority were deeply suspicious of central government’s intentions, 
and their view is best expressed by Price: 
 
Thatcher’s government tried to stop [the Games]. In fact the reason we had 
to set up an external body [was] because they’d blocked the city council 
using funds and we set up the Sheffield Trust, we had a top legal advice 
from London on how we could get around the government restrictions and 
what we did was we set up the external trust (Interview #4, 2010). 
 
When pressed on central government support, all members of the bid team who had 
direct or indirect affiliations to the Labour Party reacted initially with strong negative 
views. However, on reflection most then revised their opinions. For example, despite 
Prices’ strong view above, he then went on to acknowledge the positive supporting 
role of Michael Heseltine whose involvement resulted in some indirect funding linked 
to the broader regeneration objectives of the Games. The positive reports of 
Heseltine’s involvement were frequent amongst council-based respondents.  Upon 
further questioning even Price’s view of Thatcher softened somewhat: 
 
In fact, I mustn’t be too hard on her, she did send us a letter backing the 
bid. It was just something simple like “on the behalf of my government I 
would like to wish Sheffield the very best” something like that. Of course, 
I’d put a lot of pressure on Number 10 to give us that support. She had to 
really because it was a British bid by then not a Sheffield bid and it would 
have looked bad throughout the sporting world if Britain weren’t backing 
it. So, we had to have some sort of letter from the government giving their 
backing, but other than that we didn’t get a penny really (Interview #4, 
2010). 
 
Thatcher’s stance on the Games appeared to be that she offered verbal and moral 
support largely because this was expected of her. No direct financial support was 
offered, although she did contribute to the bidding documentation and also a 
promotional video. This somewhat neutral stance appears to sit in stark contrast to that 
of her successor, John Major, who was perceived by the organising committee to 
acting in a manner which was deliberately detrimental to the Games.  
 
It is crucial here to outline that the following discussion represents the perceived views 
of the organising committee within Sheffield to Major’s Government and that it was 
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not possible to validate these claims. However, they do indicate the problems 
associated with a lack of any explicit central policy to support bidding (not being 
supportive of bidding is in itself a policy), which sets the World Student Games in 
contrast to the proceeding case studies. The view of those closely involved in the bid 
was that Major refused to support the Games and that there was a perception that 
Major was concerned that a successful Games would reinforce the Labour position in 
Sheffield, hence it was felt indirect attempts were made to undermine the bid.  
 
A former leader of the organising committee, not connected to the Labour Party, 
summarised his feelings as follows:  
 
my interpretation was that there was a strong undercurrent of attempts to 
undermine the Games. But, it was going so well that John Major sent a 
message that I had to put up on the electronic scoreboard and it was booed. 
The Minister of Sport came up on the Monday (one day after the opening 
ceremony. [My view was] Margaret Thatcher thought it was going to be 
good for the country so she backed it, so did [Sebastian] Coe. Coe then 
decided to become a politician and at the time of the bidding, he was 
trying to get elected in Cornwall and his reason I believe for not going to 
the opening ceremony was that he was going down to his constituency in 
the afternoon. My view is that there were a group of people, and I think I 
knew who they were, not necessarily the government and Major, but a 
group of people decided to use the Games to undermine the strong labour 
position in South Yorkshire (Interview #6, 2010). 
 
This view carries a little more credence due to the respondent having no formal links 
to the Labour Party and having no strong connection to Sheffield (he was recruited 
from BSSF and returned to his former post after the Games). He points to several 
letters from central government, including Major (see for example, Appendix Four) 
that reject official invitations to the opening ceremony, all of which claim that the 
senior politicians in question were otherwise engaged and this included the Minister of 
Sport. Many of these figures had been in South Yorkshire in the days leading up to the 
opening ceremony, but were unable to extend their visits for varying reasons. Many 
within Sheffield felt that the government also applied pressure to the BBC not to 
screen the event, despite a very positive meeting between the BBC and organising 
committee.  In summary central government appeared to take a watching brief to the 
Games and there was political suspicion on both sides and a perceived refusal by 
Major’s Government to endorse the Games.  
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In the Sheffield case the role of the Sports Council was relatively limited, despite 
providing financial support of around £2.5million. Indeed, when pressed on the role of 
the Sports Council in supporting the bid some members of the bid team used 
exceptionally strong language, indicating that the lack of support here was more 
irritating than the expected lack of support from central government. Examples 
include describing the Sports Council’s role as contributing ‘bugger all’ (Interview #6, 
2010) and suggesting that a former leader was ‘full of bullsh*t’ (Interview #8, 2010) 
were common among several respondents. This represents the level of expectation of 
those in Sheffield and perhaps strengthens their view that there was considerable 
naivety concerning the available support.  
 
Gerry Montgomery was one of the many critics of the Sports Council. His view was 
that tacit support was forthcoming and the Council sought only to gain associative 
prestige from a successful Games, whilst covertly arguing against a UK bid.  He also 
points to his own personal success in organising the Games, and that his company was 
commissioned to organise several proceeding World Student Games and that this 
reflected the absence of any significant Sports Council expertise in these types of 
events.  
 
However, the views of those in Sheffield are not necessarily supported by former 
members of the Sports Council and BSSF. According to one senior figure who was 
involved in both organisations:  
 
As we got into the sport delivery side of things, the governing bodies, the 
Sports Council became very involved in helping us deliver the sport. 
Where there were ways of funding legacy, that was being supported, so 
there was about £4m invested by the sports council in equipment legacy 
and the equipment is still in use today in this country, like portable 
basketball courts and the fencing piste. So yes, there was support, there 
was personnel, there was financial and there was helping in terms of 
political support. The governing bodies got heavily involved in senior 
committees (Interview #2, 2010). 
 
These somewhat competing interpretations seem to indicate a lack of understanding in 
Sheffield of the scope of the Sport Council and reinforce the notion that, in 
desperation, they had not fully accepted what they had bid for. A senior former 
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member of the Sports Council confirms that initially they were not supportive of the 
bid, but also that once the decision had been made the supported both financially and 
operationally.  
 
5.6 Legacy in terms of decisions 
 
The 1991 Universiade successfully demonstrated Sheffield’s ability to stage a large 
scale sporting event, despite heavy and long term financial losses, and provided a 
focal point for many of the successful regeneration projects within the city. It also 
raised Sheffield’s profile as a destination for both sporting events and tourism and had 
a significant impact on the local economy, as described by a former leader of the 
Chamber of Commerce,  ‘for quite some time afterwards the whole city boomed. It 
was more beneficial to the chamber of trade of course, but we had a huge number of 
hotels in Sheffield since the games because with all the facilities we have there is 
always something going on.’ In addition, a minor legacy was left in terms of event 
organisation, with Gerry Montgomery’s subsequent company playing a leading role in 
organising the 2002 Manchester Commonwealth Games as well as other Universiades 
as FISU recognised the template of the Sheffield Games as blueprint for a successful 
event. However, while these were important legacies for the city, the purpose of this 
sub-section is to explore the legacy of the Games not in terms of finance or sport, but 
instead to analyse the legacy of decision-making processes that occurred in the early 
stages. 
 
In general terms, the policy legacy was one of consolidated public-private partnership, 
which for sport meant a two-tier approach ‘with an increase in consumer rights for 
those who could afford to pay private sector or near private sector rates, with some 
lower level welfare rights…for others who do not have the financial resources to 
benefit from consumer choice’ (Henry, 2001: 227). In essence, the sporting legacy for 
the city was an array of new leisure facilities managed by a private company with 
older facilities managed by the local authority, a significant departure from the 
perceived ‘socialist republic’1 politics in the previous decade to the Games. 
                                                 
1
 During the 1980s the term ‘Socialist Republic of South Yorkshire’ was commonly used in the 
national press to describe the councils of Sheffield and surrounding towns, which remained dominated 
by left wing ideology and for a short time resisted the advances of Thatcherism.  
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The local public-private partnership held up well during and following the Games. 
However, the approach was not without its critics. One councillor resigned in protest, 
saying 
 
the council has been dragged into the Thatcher myth that the future lies in 
tourism and recreation. We should be playing to the traditional strengths of 
a working-class city not to the false future that Sheffield is a sports centre. 
We have partnerships with the private sector which need properly 
defining, because at the moment we have politicians playing at being 
businessmen and businessmen playing at being politicians. The World 
Student Games sums it all up (Sheffield Star, 18
th
 June 1990).  
 
These protests, largely on ideological grounds, were a likely consequence of the 
partnership in Sheffield due to the mutual mistrust between the two sectors, but also 
the support for such partnerships from central government.  
 
The new partnership that emerged during the bidding process for the Games was far 
removed from the culture of blame that had existed in Sheffield for much of the 1980s. 
A combination of the vision of key members of the Council, including Peter Price and 
Clive Betts, along with the desperate economic climate and changing attitudes of the 
private sector broke down existing barriers to cooperation to the extent that the trust 
set up to operate the sports facilities in Sheffield still exists to this day with the 
operation of the facilities run by a private sector company, but with a sizeable public 
subsidy for adhering to Council policy.  
 
From the perspective of the private sector, the ideological shift that occurred can be 
attributed to the change in leadership, but this occurred due to the growing inclusion of 
non-steel-making representatives into the Chamber. The former leader describes this 
transition below: 
 
I was probably one of the first people not from the steel industry to have 
an active say, I worked for [names company]. I then had a senior vice 
president [names associate], slightly younger than me, but had the same 
view as me with regards to elected councillors, we then had another junior 
vice president who was from without the steel industry.  Nowadays, 
generally speaking, not just because the decline of the steel industry 
because there is still plenty of it, but the election of the president of the 
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Chamber of Commerce comes from a much wider field and I think that in 
itself did the trick in part (Interview #1, 2010). 
 
So, there was not only a shift in ideology and personnel within the Labour Party, but 
also a concurrent and similar shift within the Chamber of Commerce which resulted in 
an increased likelihood of partnership working. The new approach is summarised by 
the former leader: 
 
Me publicly saying to 500 people in Cutlass Hall that I was not going to be 
confrontational, that I would discuss things rationally with David Blunkett 
and explain things from a business perspective, and that’s what we started 
to do. People took that on board and now the relationship between the 
council and private sector is as good as it’s ever been. Not because it’s a 
liberal council, but even when labour was in power they’d been far more 
prepared to discuss things than previous (Interview #1, 2010). 
 
Theoretically, this can be viewed in two ways. Firstly, it further supports the concept 
that the Multiple Streams Framework can explain the development of the bid. What is 
alluded to above is a process by which ‘conditions’ became ‘right’ and created an 
opportunity for the policy entrepreneurs to exploit. However, under this framework 
this would have been a short term window in which to operate and the longevity of 
this partnership appears to contradict this. Indeed the emergence of a central bidding 
strategy in the 1990s also indicates that forces were at work which would contribute to 
this ‘launch window’ becoming semi-permanent in a national context. 
 
The permanence of the policy legacy in Sheffield and the long-term focus on sports 
policy would suggest the emergence of an advocacy coalition as a result of the Games. 
The formation of the Sheffield Trust and the private companies to run the sports 
facilities after the games indicate the presence of a set of actors with shared beliefs, 
surrounding the importance of sport, with beneficial resources that were capable of 
transforming their beliefs into policy. The outcome of this was that sports events have 
remained high on the political agenda in Sheffield despite numerous changes in 
personnel within key positions. Of course, this could also represent the path dependent 
nature of hosting these types of events, that cities are then typecast as ‘hosts’.  
 
Intrinsically, the partnership working to stem from the WSG also permeated the inner-
workings of the local authority. Several respondents noted the protracted manner of 
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the policy-making process within the local authority prior to the Games, but also noted 
the efficiency which enabled several of the regenerative polices, such as Meadowhall, 
to be delivered continued in the long term.  
 
Legacies of the policy decisions in Sheffield were also extrinsic to the city. Based on 
Sheffield’s experiences it was no longer considered appropriate to bid for large scale 
sporting events without overt political support at a local and central level and 
regeneration seemed a viable proposition on the back of sporting events.   
 
5.7 Conclusions 
 
Henry (2001) provides a useful starting point for concluding how the World Student 
Games were able to arrive on the political agenda and also why the broader political 
change was possible. Henry indicates, and this chapter has supported, that change 
occurred due to numerous conditions caused primarily by shifts in the global economy 
and steel production, a rift within the local Labour Party caused in part by the strained 
relationship between the local authority and central government and the subsequent 
emergence of a group of post-Fordist thinkers to whom the role of sport and leisure in 
regeneration was acceptable.  
 
The most logical starting point for the discussion of regime presence in Sheffield is 
Henry and Paramio-Salcines’ (1999) work which was explored in some detail in 
Chapter Three. In their work, Henry and Paramio-Salcines point to the presence of a 
symbolic regime in Sheffield, certainly in the aftermath of the World Student Games, 
and indicate that the Games provided the project around which the regime was able to 
form.  
 
The recognition by all parties that the council and businesses needed to work together 
was made formal by the formation of the SERC, which, along with the reports carried 
out by independent consultants pointed to the need for a flagship project to act as a 
catalyst for regeneration. Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) indicate that the 
formation of the bid, from the city’s perspective, was largely a bottom-up initiative 
stemming directly from the objectives of the SERC, the Cooper Lybrand Report and 
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the public-private partnership. To an extent, this is accurate, but it does present a 
somewhat linear and rational approach to the bid, which was not reflected in the data 
collected from interviewees. In addition, this view also seems to ignore the work 
carried out at the national sporting level. These factors certainly made Sheffield more 
receptive to the concept of the Games, but does not support the view that the bid was 
generated at city-level.  
 
This aside, the public-private partnership in the city and the events surrounding the 
World Student Games did support the presence of a symbolic regime. Henry and 
Paramio-Salcines (1999: 656) claim that the ‘[s]ignificance of symbolic politics in 
Sheffield in the mid-80s seems undeniable.’ Indeed, this regime adhered very closely 
to Mossberger and Stoker’s (2001) model. However, the problems of utlising an 
American concept within a UK context are evident here. Notably, the arrangements 
between the partners were relatively stable and membership of the regime was wise, 
however, these arrangements were in their infancy and membership was not as wide 
as typical in American regimes.  
 
Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) comment further on the usefulness of Stoker and 
Mossberger’s model of symbolic regimes in explaining events in Sheffield and note 
that in terms of the quality of the coalition, and relationships with the wider political 
environment there is strong evidence that a regime existed in Sheffield, albeit without 
the support of central government, that would normally be expected for such a 
regime. 
 
This chapter addresses the concerns that were expressed by Critcher  immediately 
following the games. He suggested that ‘there is another narrative, which may never 
be written, about what went on behind the closed doors of the significant decision-
makers’ (1992: 193). Despite rigorous attempts to uncover this ‘story’ it is accepted 
that the identification of any kind of ‘truth’ is unrealistic. The partly anti-
foundationalist assumptions informing this research outline that while triangulation of 
interview data and official documents has been undertaken, the reality is socially 
constructed and specific to the context of Sheffield. For instance, while the 
commitment to sport of Price and Montgomery is unquestioned by their peers and 
official documents support their apparent beliefs, the extent to which they 
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manipulated the process for their own personal gain rather than in the interests of 
sport cannot be accurately gauged.  
 
As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, and in preceding chapters, the 
likelihood of one of the meso-level frameworks providing a comprehensive account 
of policy making is remote. However, each one is examined here and those elements 
of the frameworks that do offer some insight are explored.  
 
The bid team in Sheffield, comprised of the public, private and educational sectors, 
clearly represented a network of some kind and thus the utility of issue networks and 
policy communities must be considered. Issue networks, considered by King (2009) 
not to have played a prominent role in the United Kingdom are an interesting starting 
point for analysis as their key components: a large number of participants; the lack of 
stable relationships and loose ideological bonds (Rhodes 1988) did seem to typify the 
Sheffield bid team, as evidenced by the fractious relationship between the public and 
private sectors prior to and during the bid. However, in order for this approach to 
apply, Smith (1993) maintains that these usually emerge as manifestations of prior 
policies, which would weaken the utility and applicability of this explanation. 
 
The alternative to network theory, policy communities, presumes that policies are 
more reactive rather than anticipatory (Richardson 1982) and initially at least would 
appear to be applicable to this case. However, Rhodes (1988) asserted that 
communities exist when there is stability, continuity and independence from the 
general public, but only the latter two applied in Sheffield, and then only in terms of 
what remained after the Games. It was speculated above that this theory could help to 
explain the heavy sport and tourism based policies that dominate Sheffield at the 
current time, but does little to explain how the decision to bid was arrived at. The 
most pertinent element of the policy communities theory that potentially helps 
illuminate the development of the bid in Sheffield is provided the view that 
communities are often a source of resistance and a means by which local authorities 
can increase their autonomy. This certainly seems to apply in this case, although only 
in relation to central government. The actual result of the bid in Sheffield was a 
reduction in autonomy for the local authority due to the increased centralisation of 
bidding policy. The major problem in using this framework is that the pluralist model 
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that forms its foundation presumes that the forces of coercion and gentle pressure are 
in operation. However, in Sheffield in the late 1980s the system was highly 
adversarial at the political level and interest groups, especially those connected to 
sport, lacked the resources required for them to become active members of the 
decision-making process.  
 
Similarly, the advocacy coalition framework offers little explanation due to a lack of 
relevant advocacy coalitions within Sheffield at this time. It was tentatively suggested 
above that the legacy of the Games was the creation of either a policy community or 
advocacy coalition in the area of sport and also that something resembling a coalition 
had emerged in student sport, but the theory offers little in the way of understanding 
the decision-making process.  
 
Alternatively the multiple streams framework does provide a useful framework by 
which to understand the decisions. Not only are there three very evident policy 
entrepreneurs, but since the main criticism of the approach, that it focuses too heavily 
on agenda setting, is the key reason why it is so useful here. As no national or local 
policy existed in relation to large scale sporting events, the agenda-setting phase was 
the most important in the development of the bid. In addition, the other main criticism 
of the MSF, that it ignores power relations, is countered with the view that if this did 
occur, it was a deliberate approach adopted by the entrepreneurs to recruit support for 
the bid. Hence, it does appear that this framework is the most useful for understanding 
decision-making within this case study.  
 
Complementing this theoretical insight into the decisions made to host the Games, 
regime theory, in particular symbolic regime theory, provides a useful lens through 
which to view the organisation of the city partnership. While regimes in their truest 
American sense cannot exist in UK systems, enough similarities were noted to 
advocate the existence of something that be said to be regime-like.  
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Chapter Six: Manchester’s Bid for the 2000 Olympic Games 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a continuation of the previous case study by exploring 
Manchester’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games. The intention of this case study is to 
explore policy-making in a similar post-industrial city to Sheffield, but at a later stage 
of central government policy to both sport and events. The expectation with this case 
study was that support from the Sports Council and central government would be 
more apparent in this bid, hence reducing the power available to the actors in the city.  
Since this bid was part of Manchester’s Olympic ‘journey’ which also encompassed 
bids for the 1992 and 1996 Olympic Games, the early stages of the analysis focus on 
the agenda setting and decision-making for the first bid, with the later sections 
exploring the relatively unique urban governance setting that occurred by the time of 
the 2000 bid. Indeed, it is argued that it was in part the bidding process that helped 
shape the local political domain in Manchester in the latter part of the twentieth 
century.  
 
Similarly to the previous and following case studies, research was carried out in two 
phases: document research and semi-structured interviews with key actors involved in 
the early stages of the bid(s). However, given that Manchester’s Olympic bids have 
been subject to vastly more academic scrutiny than the other case studies, the chapter 
draws most heavily upon academic studies.   
 
6.2 The Political Context of Manchester 
 
As detailed below, Manchester’s Olympic intentions commenced in the short 
aftermath of the successful Los Angeles Games and at a time when the style of local 
politics within the city transformed. This section explores the culture of decision-
making within the city both before and during the bidding processes. 
 
In a similar fashion to events in Sheffield, Manchester was also a victim of a severe 
decline in manufacturing in the 1980s. In the period 1975-1985 approximately 20,000 
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local manufacturing jobs were lost (Harding, 2000). In response to this, the City 
Council adopted a somewhat defensive strategy which, in part, was intended to 
achieve the eventual return of Manchester to a leading place in global manufacturing 
and sat opposed to the free market philosophy of the Conservative Government and, 
according to Quilley (2000), the government’s hostility to manufacturing.    
 
Harding (2000) contends that the political regime in the early 1980s was ill-equipped 
to deal with the challenges facing them and they were eventually replaced as a result 
of a coup within the city’s Labour movement in 1984. More generally, local 
government was under attack at this time from both sides of the political spectrum. 
For the right, it was seen as wasteful, bureaucratic and inefficient (Adam Smith 
Institute, 1989), whereas the left deemed it patronising, insensitive and inflexible 
(Gyford, 1985). As occurred in several other Labour-dominated cities at this time, a 
new group of well-educated municipal socialists took power, in this case led by 
Graham Stringer. Initially, this group alienated the business community and took a 
stance which relied heavily upon political symbolism, especially in terms of opposing 
central government on public sector and trade union grounds (Harding, 2000). It is 
also argued that during this period the private sector was ‘redefined as the opposition’ 
(Quilley, 2000: 604). However, in 1987, they were forced to make radical changes to 
this policy (Quilley, 2000) to a stance that Cochrane et al. (1996) described as ‘after’ 
rather than ‘post’ Fordist. Cochrane et al. (1996) explained that the fiscal crisis of the 
national state had led to a move away from the politics of production and reproduction 
towards a ‘new’ urban politics which was much more elusive.  
 
The initial response to deindustrialisation in Manchester was one informed by local 
socialism (Quilley, 2000). The main emphasis of urban redevelopment policies was to 
reverse the damage inflicted by Thatcherism, usually through political, not economic, 
resistance. Quilley (2000) contends that the ultimate failure of the socialist strategy in 
Manchester in the early 1980s was the rhetorical assumption that responses to the 
national and local economic crises could be politically informed rather than 
economically informed. Policy documents claimed to develop a radical strategy for 
employment and contained considerable rhetoric promoting a socialist economy at the 
local level. In essence, between 1984 and 1987 strategic thinking in Manchester 
subordinated economic to politics; ‘the overriding priority was to use the council as a 
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base for the wider struggle against the Tories’ (Quilley, 2000: 604). However, in 
terms of success, the municipal socialism experiment in Manchester achieved very 
little, certainly compared to other cities such as Liverpool and Sheffield and despite 
efforts by Stringer to model Manchester’s recovery on that of Sheffield, the results of 
the 1987 General Election ended the socialist project in Manchester.  
 
Many Labour councils throughout Northern England had presumed that a Labour 
victory in the 1987 General Election was inevitable and hence took on these 
confrontational stances in the mid-1980s. However, upon Thatcher’s re-election in 
1987, which pulled the rug out from under the experiment in municipal socialism 
(Cooper, 1994) there was a new realism, which concluded that this symbolic 
resistance to central government was futile (Harding, 2000) and that economically, 
Manchester’s experiment with municipal socialism had achieved very little (Quilley, 
2000). This led to an adoption, in Manchester, of more central government-friendly 
models of economic policy, which often involved partnership working and deliberate 
informal networking with local businesses, Quangos and government officials. The 
replacement of the ‘New Urban Left’ (Cox, 1995) was a direct response to three 
phenomena: the failed resistance to Thatcher’s assault on local government; a 
contraction of Labour’s traditional core constituency; and a need to broaden the 
party’s appeal and the national economic crisis (Quilley, 2000).   
 
Aside from the 1987 election, it was felt by many that policy indigestion, further 
ideological problems (Quilley, 2000) and bureaucratic diversion reduced the impact 
of a whole range if interventions that had looked very radical on paper (Cooper, 
1994). The result was that over the next three years the administration began to 
promote a new, entrepreneurial model of development. Instead of outright resistance 
to central government the Council took on a stance of critical cooperation (Quilley, 
2000), which accepted property-led urban regeneration schemes and also the central 
government imposed Central Manchester Development Corporation.  
 
Specifically, the new approach was represented by two new schemes: City Pride and 
City Challenge. Both schemes were based on place marketing and attempted to 
encourage urban regeneration through developing a new ‘script’ (March, 1994) within 
the city. City planners were provided with a new vocabulary espousing Manchester’s 
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desired new image as postmodern, cosmopolitan and post-industrial (Quilley, 2000). 
Flagship projects under these schemes included the expansion of the city’s airport, 
building of the G-Mex exhibition centre, expansion of the Metrolink tramway and 
general redevelopment of the Northern Quarter in the city. Quilley (2000) points to 
the irony the of the1996 IRA bomb in Manchester acting as a catalyst for the 
redevelopment of the city, but that the speed and imagination with which the city 
planners acted was a logical expansion of what the city had been doing for the 
previous ten years.  
 
While this suggests a sudden empowerment of the business community, it was not 
necessarily the case. In Manchester, while business leaders were becoming more 
involved in development initiatives, there was confusion within this sector , which 
also created an opportunity for a self-selected group of key individuals from the 
business community take leadership and gain influence. Peck and Tickell (1995) 
referred to these individuals as the ‘Manchester Mafia’2 and noted that their activities 
were seldom conducted through official channels, such as the Chamber of Commerce. 
Peck and Tickell (1995: 57) also claimed that the members of this ‘mafia’ were easily 
identifiable as they ‘were on Bob Scott’s Olympic Committee’ and included the 
managing directors of companies in the fields of construction, broadcasting and 
banking.  
 
As a result of the Council’s willingness to engage with the private sector and heavy 
emphasis on economic development (Cook and Ward, 2011), which also saw a pattern 
of secondments from industry, it became more adept at winning resources in 
competition with other local authorities. The ‘Manchester Mafia’ were also 
instrumental in leading ‘boosterist’ events throughout the city in conjunction with 
Stringer’s strategy that was dependent on creating an entrepreneurial city which was 
more understanding of the competitive demands of globalisation (Quilley, 2000). The 
consequence of these events was that Manchester was seen as ‘the apotheosis of 
partnership in the eyes of the Government’ (Harding, 2000: 66). 
 
                                                 
2
 Peck and Tickell’s (1995) reference to a ‘mafia’ was to explain the power achieved in the city by a 
small group of individuals and the relative autonomy with which they were able to operate. There is no 
suggestion that this referred to violent or criminal aspects of other ‘mafias’. 
 172 
 
It is widely noted (Harding, 2000; Cochrane et al., 1996; Quilley, 2000; Cook and 
Ward, 2011) that the project, which perhaps best symbolised the change in local 
politics in Manchester, from idealism to pragmatism (Quilley, 2000), was the bid for 
the 2000 Olympic Games. This event triggered unprecedented levels of 
intergovernmental and private and public sector cooperation. The bids were part of a 
general strategy of place marketing that aimed to (re)connect Manchester to the global 
economy and promote itself (Cook and Ward, 2011).  
 
 
 
 
6.3 Manchester’s attempts at bidding for the Olympic Games  
 
6.3.1 The Olympic Games 
 
The Olympic Games for which Manchester bid were different in nature to those 
Games that had gone before and during Manchester’s three bids the bidding process 
changed considerably. Firstly, for the 1992 Games, the Summer and Winter Olympic 
Games, which had previously been held in the same year, were staggered to so that a 
form of the Olympics was held every two years. This was mainly carried out in order 
to spread out the Olympic movement’s cash flow and also meant that the IOC 
members were under constant lobbying from candidate cities (Hill, 1996). Secondly, 
due to the increasing scope of the Games, it was decided that from the 2000 edition 
onwards the host city would be selected seven years in advance, rather than the 
previous six years.  
 
The scale of the Olympic Games has transformed rapidly since the movement’s 
rebirth in 1896. Detailed chronologies of the Olympic Games are plentiful in 
academic work (see for example Toohey and Veal 2006; Horne and Whannel, 2012) 
and they have continued to expand in scale and reach following the 2000 Games. 
However, the Games for which Manchester bid in 2000 saw 10,651 athletes from 199 
nations competing in 31 sports, sub-divided into 300 events. This was supported by 
46,967 volunteers and reported by 16,033 members of the media (IOC, 2012). The 
bids for the 2000 Olympic Games also included bids for the 2000 Paralympic Games, 
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although this was not a formal requirement of the IOC until 2001 and instead was 
resultant of a precedent set in 1988 in Seoul where the Paralympic Games were held 
in the same host city as the Olympic Games.  
 
The process for which bids were solicited and scrutinised for Games during this 
period is outlined in Table 6.1 below. 
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Date Manchester’s Bid Notes 
1
st
 July 1991 IOC issues a circular to National Olympic 
Committees (NOCs) to submit bids. 
 
15
th
 April 1992 Bid submitted. Bids are submitted by NOCs and limited to one candidate per country. 
23
rd
 May 1992 IOC briefs candidate cities. Candidate city manuals are distributed which comprise a ‘Manual for cities 
bidding for the Olympic Games’ and a ‘Candidature Guide’. Cities also 
provided with guidance on promoting their bids worldwide. 
1
st
 February 1993 Bid Committees submit their bid files and 
pay the IOC a guarantee deposit of 
$100,000.  
Twenty three themes covered in these files ranging from customs 
procedures to environmental issues. 
Guarantees of government support included in the files. 
Deposits to be returned to unsuccessful cities.  
March-April 1993 IOC Enquiry Commission carries out 
inspection visits.  
The commission comprises four IOC members, three ISF representatives, 
three NOC representatives and one member of the IOC Athletes’ 
Commission. 
June 1993 IOC Enquiry Commission submits its 
report to the IOC Executive Board.  
The report is also sent to all IOC Members by the end of June 1993 
June-September 
1993 
IOC Member Visits Each city is permitted to invite each of the IOC members for a single visit 
to its city. 
23
rd
 September 
1993 
Host city selected at the 101
st
 IOC Session 
in Monaco.  
Each city given a 45-minute slot to present its bid.  
The final round of voting saw Sydney awarded the Games after beating 
Beijing by 45 votes to 43. 
Table 6.1 The Bidding Process for the 2000 Olympic Games. Adapted from Hill (1994) 
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It is noteworthy that this bidding procedure has undergone significant change in 
recent years, resulting largely from the Salt Lake City scandal in 1998. An 
investigation by the IOC (IOC, 1999a; 1999b) into the awarding of the Winter Games 
to Salt Lake City found wide-scale corruption within the bidding process and that 
members had voted for the successful city in return for a range of benefits. These 
included direct cash payments, medical expenses, places at American universities and 
large payments for travel (Toohey and Veal, 1999). As a result of these examples of 
corruption and IOC President Samaranch’s view that ‘the system is not working’ 
(Korporaal and Evans, 1999: 3), significant changes were made to the bidding 
process.  
 
The changes were symbolised by the creation of an ethics commission to oversee all 
future bids and there were strict limits applied to members’ travel. More specifically, 
a change to the bidding process meant that visits by individual IOC members to 
candidate cities were abolished. While these changes occurred significantly later than 
the Manchester bids, it is important to draw attention to the bidding climate that 
existed prior to this scandal and within which the Manchester bid team were 
operating, due to the changing requirements of the bid team in lobbying for support.      
 
 
6.3.2 Manchester’s Olympic ‘Journey’  
 
As Hill (1994: 1) states ‘the politics of Manchester’s bid for the Olympic Games of 
the year 2000 cannot be understood without reference to [the] two earlier…bids’. The 
sections below indicate that the bid for the 2000 Games was a continuation of the 
process that began in the mid-1980s, which is summarised here. 
 
Manchester, along with London, had originally expressed their intention to bid for the 
1992 Olympic Games, but were heavily beaten in the BOA’s selection process by 
Birmingham. The BOA, and the IOC, considered Birmingham’s bid to be technically 
excellent (Hill, 1994), although it had very little support from central government and 
it was eliminated during the first round of IOC voting. At the 91
st
 IOC session in 
Lausanne, where the 1992 Games were awarded, the most senior member of the 
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government to represent the bid was the Minister for Sport, whose lack of seniority 
was considered to be inappropriate by the IOC (Hill, 1994).  
 
The domestic competition for the 1996 Games saw the BOA switch their support to 
Manchester, ahead of Birmingham, as the private sector-led bid was considered to be 
slicker and had better support from central government (Hill, 1994). However, despite 
a higher level of support from government, the bid was eliminated in the second 
round. 
 
Immediately following the failure of Manchester to win host city status for the 1996 
Games, Sebastian Coe announced his intention to submit a bid for London for the 
2000 Games. This was also met by an immediate decision by Manchester to resubmit 
a bid for the same Games (Manchester City Council, 1990). These two bids were to 
divide UK sport and highlight its fragmented organisation in the late 1980s/early 
1990s and also the absence of a central bidding strategy. After an unusually bitter 
campaign the BOA indicated that it would hear presentations from both cities, but 
reserved the decision on whether to submit a UK bid at all to a later date. Manchester 
triumphed over London, mainly due to severe ideological splits in London’s team and 
a fear from the BOA that they may risk ridicule by again switching their allegiance 
(Hill, 1994). Bob Scott, Manchester’s bid leader, claimed that part of their success 
was due to playing the ‘regional card’ (Interview #22, 2011), in recognition that this 
pandered to the already divisive relationship between the BOA and Central Council 
for Physical Recreation (CCPR, now the Sport and Recreation Alliance)
3
. However, 
Manchester was again beaten at the 101
st
 IOC session in Monte Carlo, although the 
bid did reach the third round of voting and finished with more votes than both Berlin 
and Istanbul.  
 
6.4 Agenda Setting 
 
According to Cook and Ward (2011) and Law (1994) the origins of Manchester’s 
Olympic bidding process can be traced back to a story appearing in the UK media that 
claimed Mrs Thatcher and her Sports Minister, Neil McFarlane, were impressed by 
                                                 
3
 At this time the CCPR was seen as the more federal of these two sports organisations, while the BOA 
was considered to be London-centric (see Hill, 1994; 1996).  
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the Los Angeles Games of 1984 and thought that London should consider bidding.  
The authors contend that Bob Scott, also impressed, decided to consider a Manchester 
bid and that day set about building a bid committee. In Scott’s own words: 
 
The Manchester bid for the Olympic Games began during the Los Angeles 
Games of 1984 and I was listening, my car broke down with my children 
inside and we listened to Terry Wogan speaking from a radio van near a 
car park in Los Angeles leading up to the opening ceremony and it just got 
me thinking about why I had never ever heard of a British Olympic Bid, 
ever? I in fact discovered that there had been some discussion in London 
some years before, but it had never really broke the surface. I then began 
thinking… (Interview #22, 2011). 
 
In keeping with Kingdon’s claims about the coincidental nature of the policy arena, 
Scott continued to illustrate the circumstances surrounding his apparently sudden 
receptiveness to this issue: 
 
[19]84 was a very important period in my life. I had opened the Royal 
Exchange theatre, I’m the theatre man. I had taken over the Palace and by 
1984 I had taken over the Opera House, so I was now Mr Theatre in 
Manchester, so in 1983 for the first time, maybe 1982, I was made 
Mancunian of the year for my work in theatre. So, that meant for me there 
was nothing much more to do in theatre in Manchester, I had ran them all. 
The second thing is that I am mad about sport, but my passion for theatre 
and sport is the same thing, I see them both from the spectator’s point of 
view, I am the ultimate groupie in theatre and sport and there are many 
crossovers between the two. It doesn’t matter if it’s the World Cup, the 
Ashes, the Commonwealth Games, the Olympics, I’m into all of that. I’m 
also the son of a diplomat so I have an international view of the world and 
am interested. I spent 15 years in Manchester having intended to be there 
for two years, as it were. I had done, and been recognised for what I did 
and it came to, not an end, but somewhat of a high point and I was looking 
for something else to do and what with was my other passion in life, it was 
sport and what is bigger than the Olympics? And here was something, you 
know, I can’t take over cricket, I can’t take over football, I can’t become 
chairman of Manchester United, but I could, it seemed, make a bid for the 
Olympic Games (Interview #22, 2011). 
 
While Scott’s assertions that he was a sports enthusiast enjoying a lull in his career at 
the time of the successful 1984 Olympic Games support the interpretation that he was 
a policy entrepreneur operating in a chaotic system, the above quote provides further 
evidence for analysis. Due to his success in re-launching Manchester’s theatres he was 
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able to accumulate a great deal of good will amongst policy makers, which almost 
certainly afforded him the freedom to pursue the Olympic Games.  
 
Bob Scott was considered to be a ‘buccaneering free spirit’ (Cochrane et al., 1996: 
1321) and the apparent ease with which he was able to place an issue such as the 
Olympic Games onto the political agenda supported the contention that he was akin to 
a policy entrepreneur. When asked about their understanding of the origins of 
Manchester’s Olympic Bids, all but one of the interviewees supported the view that 
the ‘story’ commenced with Scott and most went on to note that his ‘charisma’ (also 
noted by Cochrane et al., 1996) was partially responsible for his success. However, 
Scott’s claim that this issue emerged from a ‘clear blue sky, with nobody looking for 
it’ (Interview #22, 2011)  differs somewhat from the account of a former leader of the 
local authority, who claimed the origins were more complex and that the bid was part 
of a wider strategy: 
 
Well, it goes back a long way actually to 1981. The city had decided it 
needed to regenerate itself and to get more business and jobs coming back 
to the city [we] decided at the time…that we’d get PR consultants to come 
in and advise us. So we sent out a campaign called ‘Manchester, right at 
the heart of things’ and that basically was the focal point of regenerating 
business areas of the city, it was the sort of thing that happens now but in a 
different way, there were lots of things that were organised. That was the 
origins of it. And the comment was made that we should be looking for 
some kind of large scale event that would not only help boost Manchester 
but the whole of the region, the Greater Manchester area. And it was 
thrown down at a meeting in County Hall in 1981 that we should go for 
something like the Olympics. Now, everyone thought this was a rather 
[pause] one-off type of thing and rather jokingly put it on one side 
(Interview #23, 2012).  
 
This meeting did take place, but the minutes were vague (Manchester City Council, 
1981) and hence it cannot be verified that the Olympics were mentioned. However, he 
continued: 
 
  
What then happened is, the Palace Theatre in Manchester was owned by 
Norwest Holst. We had a private meeting with [the chairman] one day and 
he actually brought the subject up. This was Bob Scott’s boss. He made the 
point to us there that the city should go for something like the Olympics if 
we wanted to put the city on the map and of course because Norwest Holst 
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was a building contractor, it didn’t pass us by that they were interested in 
helping us to develop that along the line [laughs]. So it was taken away, it 
was discussed. The whole problem was that we were going through a lot of 
political turmoil at the time [so] it was put on the back burner and not 
mentioned again (Interview #23, 2012). 
 
This account does differ from the ‘official’ view of Scott’s blue sky inspiration, but it 
also suggests two further points for discussion. Firstly, due to the manner in which the 
bid committee was drawn together, largely from what can be termed an urban regime, 
representatives from traditional local organisations, such as the local authority and the 
Chamber of Commerce felt a degree of unease at the new way in which political 
matter were dealt with in the city. This was exacerbated during the Olympic journey 
and is dealt with further in the following section. Secondly, the political turmoil 
referred to above to some extent created a space within which Bob Scott was able to 
operate. It would appear a common theme that exists throughout all case studies in this 
thesis is that the bids emerged at times of uncertainty in local politics. One respondent 
mentioned that Bob Scott had ‘picked up the Olympic ball whilst we were all looking 
around for answers [to regeneration]’ (Interview #26, 2012).  
 
At a surface level of analysis, it would seem that the Multiple Streams Framework 
(MSF) again provides a useful starting point for the analysis of this stage of the 
bid’s development. Scott clearly acted in a manner associated with policy 
entrepreneurs and was able to influence and shape the policy agenda within the 
city. At the time of the first bid, the absence of local and national strategies to deal 
with both deindustrialisation and sports events afforded him this freedom. 
However, the absence of a clear politics stream brings the usefulness of the MSF 
in to question. A problem stream, relating to the dual effects of deindustrialisation 
and a lack of a clear focus to oppose Thatcher’s central government, was certainly 
evident. In addition, the policy stream, which was partially represented by the 
development of the three Olympic Bids was emerging, but the politics stream 
which is so evident in the following chapter does seem to be absent in 
Manchester.  
 
Hence, while Scott’s behaviour is consistent with that expected of a policy 
entrepreneur, the MSF is only of limited value in explaining the acceptance of the 
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bid onto the political agenda and is perhaps best complemented by a consideration 
of urban regime theory and this is best considered in the following section which 
focuses on decision-making.  
 
6.5 Decision Making 
 
Given that local authority records indicate that the decision to bid for the 2000 
Olympic Games was a continuation of a process that commenced in the 1980s 
(Manchester City Council, 1990), this section explores the way in which Bob Scott 
was able to attract initial and on-going support for the Manchester bid.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the elevation of the bid onto the political agenda, Scott 
drew together a private sector-led themed coalition of the city’s ‘movers and shakers, 
not only those interested in sport, but also in urban regeneration’ (Cochrane et al., 
1996: 1322). This happened with remarkable speed, as Scott notes below: 
 
So, I had been doing some thinking and thought ‘right’ I had been talking 
to several people so that morning and at ten to eight the first thing I did 
was phone the editor of the Manchester Evening News  and I asked him 
‘what time do you go to bed you know, with the paper?’ He said 11am was 
really the last time, so I explained the story to him and said that 
Manchester is going to bid for the Olympic Games… So he said ‘who is 
going to be on the committee?’ and I said ‘that’s what I am going to tell 
you at 11 o’clock’ because I didn’t know that. So I said, ‘ by the way, 
you’re on the committee aren’t you?’ he said ‘yes, fine’ so between eight 
and eleven I got hold of a very impressive group of people including the 
vice chancellor, the chief constable, the bishop…several major figures 
from the private sector and the leader of the city council and he and I laid 
down the ground rules which was that Manchester would bid for 92 and it 
wouldn’t cost him a penny, I would raise the money for the bid, so he 
backed it (Interview #22, 2011). 
 
This again refers to the ease with which he could operate within Manchester and 
reinforces the suggestion that a void had been created by ideological and structural 
shifts in the local authority. However, it also points to the existence of a regime-like 
entity in the city.  
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Unlike both Sheffield and Glasgow, the probability is that around the time of 
Manchester’s bids for the Olympic Games and culminating in their bid for the 2000 
Games, something more permanent and ideological than an issue network existed in 
the city. While overtly Scott indicates that this group was put together following the 
placing of the bid onto the political agenda, in reality this group of people was already 
in existence. Scott referred to them as the ‘great and good’ of Manchester (Scott, 
quoted in Business Life, 1994) and also ‘players who felt easy with million-dollar 
games, achievers not talkers’ (Hill, 1992: 106). 
 
Whilst taking issue with term ‘Manchester Mafia’ one respondent described these 
people: 
 
[T]he way in which [Bob Scott] was a leader, in my perception, was that 
he was well connected and used his followers very well… There were 
certainly such people, they were prominent. They were today’s men, they 
were impressive and they influential because they were running 
something big and doing it well, rather than because they were a Mafia 
(Interview #25, 2012). 
 
The quest for ‘movers and shakers’, with Bob Scott’s charismatic leadership led to 
comparison with the nineteenth century industrial ‘Manchester Men’ but also 
suggested a more contemporary image, drawn from the United States, of urban 
regimes and growth coalitions (Cochrane et al., 1996).  
 
This regime involved a hierarchy of new business and partnership network leaders 
that had emerged in recent years and at the core were a group of elite individuals, all 
of whom sat on Scott’s bid committee (Peck and Tickell, 1995). These men, and they 
were all men, appeared on the boards of various committees and took decisions on the 
future of the city. They occupied a range of organisations, including the Olympic Bid 
Committee, the Training and Enterprise Councils and Urban Development 
Corporations, that sat on the fringes of the state. Amongst these organisations there 
was a ‘collective ambition to do something for the area’ (Cochrane et al, 1996: 1323). 
 
Scott’s relationship with the City Council, specifically with Graham Stringer, was 
crucial in that the City Council had to be the official bidders, but this presented the 
potential for political discussions and processes that Scott was keen to avoid. To 
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resolve this it was decided that while the Council would officially front the bid, it 
would not contribute any funding towards it. This meant that each sector could be 
convinced of its importance and hence not provide any opposition to the bid. Scott 
explains his approach below: 
 
My relationship with Graham Stringer was absolutely fundamental to the 
way it worked. It was ‘Bob, I’m in your shadow, but sometimes I need to 
be out front, when we’re talking to the city council, when we’re talking in 
local government terms.’ So what we made the bid feel like was a kind of 
relay race where there was a batton, where we made a partnership where 
we made the BOA and the city council, support the bid team. They each 
had their kind of out front moments. If we were talking to government and 
John Major wanted to say something positive about the bid, then the 
limelight for him and the same for the city council. Don’t forget Tory PM, 
Labour Council, you know. That’s where I was important, because I know 
that Graham Stringer thinks I’m a socialist and John Major thinks I’m a 
Tory. But, I don’t even know what I am (Interview #22, 2011).  
 
Scott was able to make each sector ‘feel’ important and this was represented in the 
interviews conducted for this study. While many could see that Bob Scott was the 
figurehead, interviewees from the Council still claim that this was a council-led bid 
while private sector figures say it had very little council involvement. This is a 
reflection of Scott’s political manoeuvring.  
 
While Scott had benefited from Graham Stringer’s eventual pragmatism, it was 
initially difficult to get full civic support for the bid. This was eased somewhat by 
Scott’s ability to enthuse senior council officials with his charisma (Interview #26, 
2012) and his promises that ‘he had the contacts and the chutzpah to lead it’ (Interview 
#26, 2012), but much of the work of gaining council support had to be carried by its 
officers. 
 
Unsurprisingly, there was very little opposition to the bids throughout the Olympic 
Journey and this was in part due to the style of Bob Scott’s leadership and the 
effective wielding of power by the regime. The lack of political opposition was 
mostly due to the absence of a heavy financial burden on the Council and is 
considered by a former council leader: 
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No, and it’s strange you should ask that because yesterday I was talking to 
the formal leader of the Conservatives in Manchester and mentioned I was 
talking to you and the one thing he said was that we were all interested in 
the regeneration of Manchester and through his influence as well, we 
actually got to meet ministers who we normally would have got to meet. 
So there wasn’t a lot of opposition to it (Interview #23, 2012). 
 
This sentiment was echoed by a previous chief executive of the Chamber of 
Commerce, who noted: 
 
Not in the Chamber certainly and not in the business community. If there 
was a difference between these two, then I was failing. There were 
individuals with personal opinions, however, no. No significant 
opposition. I would have been sensitive to that because if there were a 
number of businesses that were not in favour I would have been worrying 
about how far we should have been pushing it and how far we reported to 
the rest if the world that there was some opposition. There was nothing 
like that, I never had to face that issue. The opposition I remember, I don’t 
even think it was opposition, it was the usual naysayers who thought it was 
daft and a waste of money and they were reinforced as we got to 
understand the IOC a little bit more and the horror stories, they might have 
been right (laughs) (Interview #25, 2012). 
 
The almost unanimous support for the bid was considered by some to be an ‘eerie 
sensation’. The Guardian (8th September 1993) reported that by the time of the 2000 
bid, opposition was not obvious and had to be sought. Cochrane et al. (1996) went on 
to contend that this reflected both the deep seated enthusiasm for sport in the city, and 
also successful campaigns waged in the local media by the bid leaders. Scott refers to 
the lack of opposition and alludes to the media management below: 
 
I expected every moment for the door to be slammed in my face and for 
the people to say ‘f*** off, you must be joking’ you know. Instead of this 
they said ‘yeah, what fun, yeah, yeah, great’ because it was both a national 
effort, but it started as very much a local effort putting Manchester on the 
map and one of the things I did very early on in the process of putting the 
Olympic Bid together was to write two very long articles in The Guardian 
comparing Manchester demographically and in all kinds of other terms to 
Los Angeles (Interview #22, 2011). 
 
There are similarities here with the other two case studies. Opposition appeared to be 
quelled by two phenomena: the effective management of the media in order to 
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conceal decisions from public scrutiny and a fast-tracked decision-making process 
that meant any opposition groups were unable to mobilise until it was too late.  
 
The point about Manchester’s predisposition to sport here is also important. Two 
interviewees claimed that part of the reason the Olympic bid was so readily accepted 
was due to the successful brand of Manchester United Football Club and a view that 
‘sport was good for regeneration’ (Interview #23, 2012; Interview #25, 2012). Due to 
this, the Olympic bid was never subjected to the political forces that would usually be 
expected with projects of such expenditure (Cochrane et al., 1996).  
 
6.6 Relationships with other bodies 
 
A key aspect of Manchester’s bids were that they were presented as private sector-led, 
that had achieved strong public sector support (Cochrane et al., 1996) and, as 
mentioned above,  this rhetoric was clearly influential in attracting public sector 
support from both central and local government. Following consideration of the 
decisions made by the City Council above, this section explores in more detail the 
relationship between the Bid Committee and central government, the private sector 
and sports organisations.  
 
Over the course of the Manchester bids, and culminating in the bid for the 2000 
Games, government attitudes changed considerably. During the 1980s under Thatcher 
there was only weak support for the idea of the bid, however under John Major this 
changed (Law 1994). He gave full support for the bid and agreed to underwrite the 
costs should Manchester win. This was considered important for two reasons. Firstly,  
agencies of government were able to give actionable advice and open support for the 
bid and secondly finance arrived from Westminster to support regeneration plans. Bob 
Scott provided a summary of his perception of changes in central government 
attitudes below: 
 
One of the things I pleaded with the Sports Minister and the BOA back in 
1985 was what is their attitude towards bidding for the Olympics? They 
replied ‘we have no position’. To which I said ‘if one of these cities gets 
the Olympic Games’, you are going to have a bill… and a legacy 
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problem’. There was this complete absence of a government policy 
(Interview #22, 2011). 
 
Scott’s observations fit with the findings in Chapter Two of this study and further 
explain why he was able to operate with such freedom. Not only were conditions 
within the city favourable for his entrepreneurialism, but this was also reflected in the 
absence of a national policy on bidding. He continues to elaborate on the changing 
attitudes within government: 
 
I had good luck and bad luck. The bad luck was Mrs Thatcher. She had no 
feeling for sport whatsoever. But… I persuaded the Duke of Westminster 
to arrange an interview with [her]. The sole purpose then was to get a 
really senior British minister to come to Tokyo with us in June 1990, I 
think. And, so we got an interview, we had an hour with [her] in which she 
grilled us…there was this wonderful moment when I said ‘it would be 
wonderful to have yourself’ and she said ‘absolutely out of the question’ 
so I said that’s fine, so I said ‘can we have the foreign secretary?’ she said 
‘I should think Douglas [Herd] is far too busy’ and then she did this 
wonderful thing, she said ‘I know who would do this wonderfully 
well…dear Tom King’ and I said ‘I’m sure Tom King would do it very 
very well, but it would be sending out the wrong kind of message if we 
take the Defence Secretary’ and she gave me such a sharp look [laughter] 
‘yes, I see what you mean’. Anyway, it all turned around in the end and the 
person who came was Chris Patten (Interview #22, 2011).  
 
 
This again provides an insight into the slow recognition at Westminster that the UK 
would perhaps need to establish a policy for such events. Patten was prominent in 
both this and the previous case study and, according to Bob Scott, was  
 
the first senior minister in the government to realise that they didn’t have a 
policy. He did spot that the government was not taking it seriously and he 
was partly responsible for informing the next Tory government, John 
major’s government, that actually id they wanted to be serious about the 
Olympics that they had to help Manchester (Interview #22, 2011).  
 
 
Again, the change in government attitudes towards sport in the 1990s is documented 
in Chapter Two, but the impact of this on Manchester’s experiences is useful. In 
contrast to his experiences with Thatcher, Scott’s account of his dealings with Major 
with respect to the 2000 bid is more positive: 
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When I took the team again we didn’t know what they were going to say, 
what kind of reception we would get. When we got there, there was John 
Major flanked by four cabinet ministers: Michael Heseltine, Ken Clarke, 
Chris Patten and David Mellor and I thought to myself as I sat down, they 
haven’t come here to tell me to f*** off. One of things I did and I love 
doing, was because I knew the under secretary Robin Butler, who is very 
sport minded, he decided he didn’t know enough about the Olympics and 
bidding. He got together 8 permanent secretaries and I gave them dinner at 
The Athenaeum and we gave them a seminar in the size of the Olympics 
and what it would mean…A combination of John Major and Robin Butler 
began to take Olympic bidding seriously. This doesn’t meant to say that 
they thought Manchester would win, but that they thought they’d better 
find out something about it (Interview #22, 2011).  
 
 
It is certainly apparent that the attitude of government was changing and possible that 
this was caused by the change in personnel in Downing Street. However, it is unwise 
to view this solely as a change in top-down policy. Locally, Manchester’s City 
Council was embracing central government policy and acting in a more 
entrepreneurial and responsive way. As Law (1994) suggests, at the beginning of the 
process the Labour authority spent much of its time attacking government and tried to 
ignore, avoid and subvert policies. This is supported by a former Council leader who 
stated ‘you’ve got to remember we were under Margaret Thatcher, we’d gone through 
a difficult period and the last thing I think she wanted was to be seen to be favouring a 
city that had shown a lot of opposition’ (Interview #23, 2012). By 1993 they had 
come to terms with the Conservative government. This could also explain the 
softening of central government’s approach to the Manchester bids.  
 
In a similar fashion to the relationship with central government, the role of the private 
sector was also complicated. This, in part, was due to the new circuits of power in the 
business community not being linked to the traditional institutional bases of the 
Chamber of Commerce (Cochrane et al., 1996).  
 
During the bidding processed, the Chamber of Commerce and City Council 
established a more positive working relationship and, although the role the Olympic 
Bids played in this is debatable, the process of strengthening the ties between the 
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public and private sectors does seem to have been influential in promoting the bid. A 
former leader of the Chamber of Commerce explains: 
 
When I arrived there was very little dialogue, no relationship. That was 
because when arrived it was yesterday’s men, they were Tories and they 
hated the idea that the city had suddenly gone Labour. The Labour 
authority, who were quite new, had started off in a mad phase. They had 
painted everything red and got rid of the Queen’s portrait and it was 
designed to make an impact. With my guys that I inherited it made all the 
wrong type of impact. So they had no respect for each other at all. If I was 
the city I would have had no respect for the chamber as it had none of the 
type of people that we did in the end get leading it. So, there was no 
relationship really, certainly no useful one (Interview #24, 2012).   
 
Recognising this, the respective chief executives of both the Council and the 
Chamber set about encouraging more visible partnership working and bringing in 
more of the ‘right kind of people (Interview #25, 2012). The paradox here was that 
what made these people ‘right’ was their entrepreneurialism and forward thinking 
dispositions. So, in bringing in these new people aimed at fostering a positive 
working relationship between the council and the chamber, both of these institutions 
were ultimately bi-passed in the decision-making process by those men they had 
encouraged in to the city. This was met with some resentment from a former 
Chamber leader: 
 
I would like to think that if the bid had been dreamed up five years later, 
towards the end of my time in the city it would have started with a very 
early visit to the chamber or even started within the Chamber, but that’s 
just my dream about how I wanted to position my organisation. It’s not a 
regret at all really, in reality it was driven by the people who drove it and 
we looked for and found a supportive role we could take which added 
some value and was consistent with our purpose in life.  We felt a bit 
dissatisfied with being on the sideline saying hooray because we wanted to 
be a leadership organisation, but at the same time it was difficult to see 
how we could join in (Interview #24, 2012). 
 
The absence of national policy for events was reflected in the role of sports 
organisations in the 1980s and early 1990s. Bob Scott starkly draws attention to their 
absence in the early stages: 
 
I went to the London telephone directory and looked up the word Olympic, 
but there was nothing, so I looked up the word British, which shows that I 
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hadn’t even heard of the British Olympic Association. And there it was, 
the British Olympic Association, so I phoned them up and asked for the 
person in charge. They said ‘do you mean Mr Palmer?’ and I said, ‘I’ve no 
idea’ so he said, so ‘which Mr Palmer, Charles or Richard’. So he put me 
through to Richard Palmer and we had a wonderfully surreal conversation. 
He had seen this piece in the Guardian, he knew nothing about it, but he 
said if Manchester had decided to bid then good luck (Interview #22, 
2011). 
 
As detailed in Chapter Two, over the course of Manchester’s bids, the British 
International Sports Committee (BISC) did develop its expertise in supporting 
bids for large scale sports events, but until the advent of the National Lottery in 
1994, which occurred too  late to affect even the 2000 bid, sports organisations 
were not empowered with the means to affect the early stages of bids. This is 
despite some existing good will from these organisations towards potential hosts.  
 
6.7 Legacy of the Bid 
 
The most obvious and tangible legacy to Manchester’s Olympic journey was the 
city’s success in hosting the Commonwealth Games in 2002. Cook and Ward (2011) 
claim that Manchester continued to think big and used the accumulated expertise and 
private sector buy in to bid for the Commonwealth Games. Bob Scott (Interview #22, 
2011) explained that they ‘couldn’t let their hard work got to waste’ and that by this 
time they were a ‘hardened and powerful bidding unit’ which went on to ‘slaughter’ 
the opposition. Ironically, the main opposition to Manchester in 2002, due to the 
absence of an international competition, was Sheffield. Interestingly, in researching 
the legacy for the previous case study one respondent mentioned with some bitterness 
that Manchester had beaten Sheffield due to ‘lies’ they told to the government 
(Interview #3, 2010). From Scott’s perspective, it was because Manchester used its 
experience of dealing with the government, whereas Sheffield’s weakness was that 
they were only championed by sports organisations (Interview #22, 2011).  
 
From this sporting perspective, Manchester appears to occupy a central and pivotal 
position in the United Kingdom’s development of a bidding strategy and it also 
provides clear links to Sheffield 1991 and Glasgow 2014 (as discussed in the next 
chapter) as it was at the 2002 Commonwealth Games that Glasgow’s bid began. In 
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terms of national bidding strategy, while the technical aspects of Manchester’s bid 
were applauded, United Kingdom Olympic bids were suspended until it was 
eventually decided that only a London could be successful, a thought that concerned 
members of the Manchester Bid Committee. Asked if he had any regrets, Scott 
mentioned that he would have liked to have ‘changed the name of Manchester to 
London’ (Interview #22, 2011).  
 
As mentioned above, in the mid-1980s there was very little contact between public 
and private sectors and they were very suspicious of each other. By 1993, they were 
not only working together, but seeking further opportunities to do so. This resulted 
from both sectors ‘growing up’ (Interview #24, 2012) and recognising what their role 
should be. The Council became more entrepreneurial and pro-active in its approach to 
development and the and the private sector became more involved (Cook and Ward, 
2011). This is outlined by a former chief executive of the Chamber of Commerce: 
 
Central government was not playing a political card and was recognising 
that they had to do something for the cities. Local government learning not 
to play its political card. They were assuming the responsibilities of their 
role and taking on the solutions to Manchester’s problems. The business 
community was getting itself organised and was moving forward with new 
leadership and  mobilising the vast mass of business as opposed to 
individuals and enabling business to work together with local government, 
central government and Europe for that matter. It was a coming together 
(Interview # 25, 2011). 
 
The role of the Olympic bids in facilitating this should not be overplayed, but it does 
seem to have provided a catalyst for these changes that were already taking place in 
the city. Two interviewees referred to the Olympic Bids as representing a ‘rallying 
cry’ (Interview #23, 2012; Interview #25, 2012) for the city and that it helped people 
‘face in the same way’ (Interview # 25, 2012).  
 
Increasing the self-confidence of key individuals and the public at large appears to 
have been a significant outcome of the Olympic bidding process, despite its ultimate 
failure to secure the Games.  Interviewees referred to ‘putting us on the map’ 
(Interview #22, 2011) and ‘getting people to think in a positive way’ (Interview #25, 
2012) and this is echoed by Cochrane et al. (1996: 1322) who claimed that the bids 
resulted in the generation of civic pride amongst residents and that ‘in preparing for 
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the Olympic Games, Manchester had a reflected glimpse of its nineteenth century pre-
eminence. It rather liked what it saw.’ 
 
The final area in which the bids can be seen to have left a tangible legacy is in terms 
of development. As a result of the new feelings of positivity in the city and 
cooperation between the public and private sectors the city was able to draw in 
government funding for a range of redevelopment projects (Law, 1994), most notably 
in the Eastlands area of the city that hosted the Commonwealth Games. It is noted in 
Chapter One that the quest to host large scale sports events is often based upon 
regenerative motives, but here Manchester was able to attract funding for its 
regeneration despite failing to win the right to host.  
 
6.8 Conclusions 
 
While the political context of Manchester might appear similar to that in Sheffield, 
Quilley (2000) claims that there were many key differences. Notably, that while 
council leaders such as Blunkett left Sheffield in the mid-1980s to help initiate what 
would become ‘New Labour’ Graham Stringer did not depart Manchester for 
Westminster until 1997. Quilley goes on to argue that this was because ‘only in 
Manchester can it be claimed that the project of the Municipal Left resulted in some 
significant transformations of the city’ (2000: 602). The reason this was achievable 
was mostly due to the aforementioned ‘Manchester Mafia’ which would seem to most 
strikingly resemble an urban regime.  
 
Harding et al. (2012) continue that Manchester was relatively unique in terms of 
industrial cities in that it was able to experience an economic Renaissance formed 
upon the horizontal links built with central government and the vertical links built 
between local government, business and communities. Harding et al. (2012) continue 
that the regime formed during the mid-1980s, which has remained stable for at least 
25 years, is also largely responsible for the city’s resurgence. This regime formation 
occurred in the mid-1980s at the same time the first Olympic bid team was put 
together and while this original team was more an issue network than an urban 
regime, this did mark the starting point what Harding et al. (2012) describe as 
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Manchester’s regime. Indeed, it could logically be argued that unlike in Sheffield and 
Glasgow, which both were both successful in their bids, Manchester’s regime’s 
longevity could have been due to its failure to win the right to host the Olympic 
Games. As experienced in the other two cities, the initial issue networks were broken 
up in order to achieve a successful delivery of the events, often with a great deal of 
animosity amongst those initially responsible for developing bids. Without this 
success, Manchester’s regime was insulated from these outside pressures.  
 
According to Cochrane et al. (1996) Manchester’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games 
best symbolised the changes in urban politics in the city, due the process of these 
changes relying on a great deal of self-interest, opportunism and effective 
organisational leadership, which were mostly embodied by Bob Scott. Aside from 
Scott’s role in the city, further evidence to suggest the presence of something regime-
like is provided by a departure from traditional bureaucratic planning procedures in 
favour of faster, less-democratic decision-making as emphasized by the automatic and 
instance decision to bid for the 2000 Games after the previous failures.  
 
It is also apparent that the initial Manchester bid for the 1992 Games came about 
when the underpinning values of the Dual State Thesis was at work: a clear division 
of labour between local and central government. However, by the time the bid for the 
2000 Games was submitted, this had been replaced by a mix of neo-liberal and 
corporatist rhetoric (Cochrane et al., 1996).  
 
Manchester’s continued failures to win the right to host the Olympic Games certainly 
resulted in the successful bid for the 2002 Commonwealth Games and this is best 
explained by the concept of policy learning. The successive bids allowed 
Manchester’s team to learn a great deal about the process, to improve the bid 
documents and gain increased backing (Law, 1994). Over the course of the bids, 
Manchester’s bid committee became well-organised, professional and highly 
knowledgeable. Not only had it become acquainted with the shadowy processes of the 
IOC, but it had also established itself within Manchester at the apex of the city’s new 
governance structure (Cochrane et al., 1996).  
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It was indicated above that, like the other two case studies, the MSF has some use in 
explaining elevation of the original bid onto the political agenda in Manchester. Most 
striking in this case is the overt policy entrepreneurial behaviour demonstrated by Bob 
Scott in the early stages of bid development. However, the ease with which Scott was 
able to collate a bid team (according to him within a few hours) points more towards 
the existence of a regime-like entity within the city prior to this. While it can 
reasonably be argued that a UK version of an urban regime existed in Manchester in 
the late 1980s/early 1990s, the MSF still has some utility in explaining the 
development of the bid from a sports policy perspective. 
 
The chaotic and reactionary manner in which the success of the 1984 Los Angeles 
Olympic Games impacted upon the most senior sports administrators in The UK 
clearly provided a launch window in which Scott could operate. This launch window 
was supported, but not widened (like in Sheffield) by the local political situation 
within the city. However, unlike in Sheffield, this was represented by an embryonic 
regime and not such a great desperation for a policy to combat deindustrialisation.  
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Chapter Seven: Glasgow’s Bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter takes Glasgow’s Bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games as its focus in 
order to explore the policy-making process in a contemporary bid for a large scale 
sporting event. In order to contextualise the bid process, the discussions during the 
very early stages of the bid, between 2002 and 2003, are outlined along with more the 
macro-level processes in Scotland regarding independence and devolution. In 
accordance with the rationale for selecting the case studies, this bid was selected as it 
formed during a time of more centralised and sophisticated sport and event policy 
from a UK Government and UK Sport perspective, yet had the added complication of 
an extra level of national government.  
 
The chapter draws on primary research carried out in two phases: document research 
and semi-structured interviews carried out with all leading actors involved within the 
early agenda setting and decision-making process. These insights will provide the 
opportunity for further exploration of policy making theory and also a platform for the 
growing body of literature that concerns the management of these Games.  
 
7.2 The Political Context of Glasgow 
 
Glasgow’s history can be characterised as one of reinvention (Foley et al. 2012) and 
its heritage ‘is an industrial city of world renown ravaged by economic restructuring, 
deindustrialisation and population change’ (Booth and Boyle, 1993: 22). Through 
manufacturing and ship building the city transformed itself from a site of poverty, into 
a leading example of industrialisation in which its growth was comparable to only 
Rome and Venice and led to its unofficial status as the ‘second city of the Empire’ 
(Foley et al., 2012). However, the city was devastated by the global depression of the 
1930s and the following decades saw gradual and sustained economic decline. For 
instance, manufacturing fell by 45% between 1971 and 1983 (Tucker, 2008) and the 
city failed to attract additional service sector employment. Due to this, and the social 
problems connected with economic decline, the city became known as what Maver 
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(2004) refers to as a ‘no mean city,’4 one which suffered the typical after effects of 
post-industrialisation, but has more recently been able to reinvent itself again as a 
place of culture and leisure. This section explores in more detail the latter of these 
transformations and the shedding of the ‘no mean city’ image.  
 
Tucker (2008) intimates that Glasgow’s successful bid to become the European 
Capital of Culture (ECOC) in 1990 provided the trigger for the transformation away 
from the ‘no mean city’ image, although he acknowledges that the process for this 
commenced in 1982/3, a view supported by Foley et al. (2012), with the Glasgow 
Miles Better campaign. This was an attempt by Glasgow’s city leaders to boost 
tourism and it was largely successful. Between 1983 and 1988, tourism in the city 
increased from 700,000 visitors in 1983 to 2.2 million in 1988 (Tucker, 2008), 
resultant partially from a re-organising of the city’s layout and transport infrastructure 
and also the hosting of the Garden Festival in 1988. From this, further sporting and 
cultural opportunities were exploited, including: the ECOC in 1990; the opening of 
the Glasgow Royal Concert Hall in 1990 and the Gallery of Modern Art in 1996; 
winning the UK City of Architecture and Design in 1999; becoming a UK National 
City of Sport in 1996 and European Capital of Sport in 2003; hosting the UEFA 
Champions League Final in 2002 and the UEFA Cup Final in 2007 and most recently 
winning the right to host the 2014 Commonwealth Games.  
 
According to Mooney (2004) Glasgow has become the benchmark for other de-
industrialised cities to follow as it was the first to develop a regeneration programme 
that was led by ‘culture’. Attracting tourists was a key component of the revisioning 
strategy within the city, which began with the ‘Glasgow Miles Better’ campaign in 
1983, with the initial wave of regeneration culminating in the awarding of ECOC in 
1990. Throughout the 1980s culture was used to help refashion the city, although 
Mooney (2004) notes that there was also a strong economic rationale to the 
redevelopment. In part the strategy, and events that stemmed from it, were aimed at 
increasing tourism, but also in rebranding the city as a place to work and live.  
 
                                                 
4
 No Mean City was the title of a 1935 novel which depicted extreme gang violence in Glasgow in the 
post-World War One period of deindustrialisation. While the novel was considered sensationalist by 
critics, the term ‘no mean city’ and its violent conations became a well-used expression within 
Glasgow and  by outsiders to describe the city.  
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Initially, the regeneration strategy proved successful as attendances at museums, 
theatres and galleries increased and Myerscough (1991) estimated a net economic 
return of between £10.3m and £14.1m from the ECOC alone. However, while there 
was some economic success in the early 1990s, critics (Tucker, 2008; Wishart, 1991) 
argued the social issues affecting the city, such as the low life expectancy of residents 
in the east end (Matheson, 2010) and poor housing, remained. Further critics (Booth 
and Boyle, 1993; Paddison, 1993) claim that the place-marketing occurring in 
Glasgow simply resulted in the sidelining of social issues, rather than the curing of 
them. Indeed, Paddison (1993) goes further to suggest that the ECOC in particular 
merely created an ‘image reality gap’ which needed to be overcome as many of the 
working class within the city felt that the cultural programmes were irrelevant to 
them. It is noteworthy, then, that upon the platform laid down by the Glasgow Miles 
Better campaign and the ECOC the cultural programmes took on a far more sporting 
identity, perhaps in an attempt to engage those residents who felt excluded from 
‘culture,’ especially given the deep-seated role of sport, particularly football, amongst 
Glasgow’s population. Tucker (2008) goes further to suggest that while the cultural 
programme, including the ECOC, was not a long-term success, it certainly facilitated 
the bid for the Commonwealth Games and provided another opportunity for the city’s 
leaders to reach the populations most in need.  
 
Underpinning these developments was a broader desire amongst the city’s leaders to 
use place-marketing as an economic tool to aid regeneration with culture, sport and 
image formed the core of this strategy (Tucker, 2008). Summarising the section in 
Chapter Three, place marketing is essentially ‘the effective use of marketing strategies 
to in order to sell cities’ assets to international markets’ (Foley, et al., 2012: 122). In 
Glasgow’s case, an attempt was made to increase the city’s reputation as a city of 
consumption through a focus on events. This event focus was cemented in the 2000s 
by further rebranding to the point that Glasgow was considered a ‘safe pair of hands’ 
in terms of hosting (Foley et al., 2012). Mooney (2004: 328) goes further to suggest 
that ‘Glasgow is widely acclaimed as the benchmark for other deindustrialised or 
“second cities” to follow’ and this is largely accredited to the long-term planning of 
city leaders. This sits in sharp contrast to the example in Sheffield where the event 
was the trigger for this type of reinvention, not the culmination of a long term process.  
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At the local level, policy-makers in Glasgow had clearly embarked upon a strategy 
that initially appreciated the intrinsic legacies of events, but later replaced this with a 
more sophisticated understanding of the instrumental rewards that could be attached 
to them. This largely mirrors the approach of the UK national government. However,  
following devolution in 1999, the new Scottish Parliament set culture high on the 
political agenda, although initially this did not result in anything other than keeping 
the sector ‘vibrant’ (Orr, 2008). Indeed, there is a clear argument that at national level 
(Scottish, not United Kingdom) the symbolic intrinsic benefits possible through 
hosting a large scale event, sporting or not, were of high value to the fledgling 
Scottish Government. Orr (2008) cites several examples of active promotion of the 
arts, museums and general ‘culture’ immediately in the aftermath of devolution.  
 
From the perspective of the Scottish Government, culture and sport played an 
important role in promoting a sense of Scottish identity post-devolution (Orr, 2008) 
and, as is argued below in more detail, the generation of Glasgow’s bid for the 2014 
Commonwealth Games fit within both the Government’s quest for the intrinsic 
benefits associated with sporting and cultural events, such as the expression of 
national identity, and Glasgow City Council’s move towards the more instrumental 
use of events. On the subject of the former, it is no coincidence that the 
Commonwealth Games was selected as it is one of a very few multi-sport events in 
which Scottish athletes represent Scotland, not the United Kingdom, and an event for 
which the Scottish Government could work collaboratively with a Scottish national 
governing body, Commonwealth Games Scotland (CGS), and not a ‘UK’ one, Jarvie 
and Thompson (1999) identify a long-standing relationship between the Scottish 
nationalist movement and sport and the common use of sporting rhetoric of those 
campaigning for devolution. Even though there was a great deal of uncertainty 
surrounding the administration of sport in Scotland at this time, the government 
committed heavily to the CWG, which supports an intrinsically motivated approach at 
a national level, rather than an instrumental one. It should be noted here that the 
Scottish Government and Scottish nationalism are not necessarily synonymous. The 
bid decision was made by the Labour-led Scottish Government and, while it was later 
replaced by a Scottish National Party (SNP) led government, any natural nationalistic 
disposition of the Scottish Government should not be overplayed. Indeed, Keating 
(2010) argues that the creation of the Scottish Parliament was more a result of a 
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modernising process in British politics to replace the out-of-date Scottish Office than 
it was a result of pressure from the nationalist lobby.  
 
Following devolution in 1999, sport became a devolved function of the Scottish 
Executive. However, UK-wide cooperation was still required in the areas of anti-
doping and preparing elite athletes for Olympic and Paralympic Games. The initial 
issue concerning bidding for events is that while sport was a matter for the Scottish 
Executive, UK Sport maintains the remit for hosting large (non-Olympic) events. 
Aside from blurring the lines in terms of the mega/major event definitions, this case 
study illustrates further problems in the sport policy system in the UK in that both 
central Westminster government and the Scottish Executive can legitimately lay claim 
to holding the responsibility for an event such as the Commonwealth Games.  
 
Since devolution, sporting rhetoric has been more abundant in Scottish politics 
(Houlihan and Lindsay, 2013) yet the rhetoric has not been matched by a universal 
adoption of a sport policy nor matters of sport being accommodated within a single 
department of the Scottish government. Scottish sports governing bodies, including 
sportscotland, have received autonomy from the Executive, but this has come at the 
expense of any real influence in sport policy. The result of this has been the 
overwhelmingly health-focussed rationale behind sport policy, which has been largely 
driven by the Executive. Indeed, much of the rhetoric concerning the Commonwealth 
Games bid was health-related. This case study presents further problems in terms of 
analysing policy as the additional level of government makes the policy arena slightly 
unclear. Not only do the Commonwealth Games create uncertainty over whether it is 
a Scottish or British concern, but devolution has mean that there is much more 
potential for policy change in sport to be driven by the Scottish Executive, due to the 
relatively weak position of the sports lobby in Scotland (Houlihan and Lindsay, 
2013).   
 
7.3 A Pen-Portrait of the Commonwealth Games  
 
What is today known as the Commonwealth Games began in 1930 in Hamilton, 
Canada. Initially called the British Empire Games, its identity has transformed in 
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conjunction with Britain’s imperial decline. Hence, in 1950 it became the British 
Empire and Commonwealth Games, in 1970 the British Commonwealth Games and it 
took on its current name in 1978 (Foley et al., 2012). The 2014 event in Glasgow is 
expected to attract approximately 5000 athletes and 2000 officials from 71 nations 
that represent 30% of the global population (CGF, 2011). In accordance with other 
large scale sporting events, the last twenty years has witnessed increased numbers of 
nations bidding for the event and therefore the bidding process (see table 7.1) has 
become more competitive (Foley et al., 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 199 
 
Date CGF Bidding Process Glasgow’s Timeline Notes on the Process 
July-August 2002  Lord McConnell, Bridget McConnell and 
Louise Martin attend the 2002 
Commonwealth Games in Manchester. 
 
30
th
 July 2002  Decision taken by Scottish Government 
and CGS to bid. 
 
March 2003  Feasibility Study undertaken by Scottish 
Sports Minister 
 
May-August 2005  Formal declaration of intention to bid  
31
st
 October 2005 The completion of bid guidelines and 
candidature file and circulation of these 
to all CGAs. 
  
24
th
 February 2006 Deadline for CGAs/Candidate Cities to 
notify CGF of intention to bid. Fax copy 
of Candidate Procedure acceptance. 
  
March 2006- 30
th
 
April 2007 
A Candidate City support programme is 
offered to all bid cities/CGAs. Details 
will be provided to all Candidate Cities 
after 10
th
 March 2006 
 Bids submitted by Glasgow, Abuja 
(Nigeria) and Halifax (Canada). 
10
th
 March 2006 Payment of Candidate City Fee for 
assessment and support and lodgement 
of original copy of Candidate Procedure 
Acceptance 
  
10
th
 March – 31st 
March 2006 
Distribution of details of electronic bid 
formats.  
Pre-emptive presentation carried out by 
Glasgow on March 12
th
 2006.  
The Glasgow team then began lobbying 
individual nations well in advance of the 
formal submission of the bid.  
 
9
th
 May 2007 Bids are to be lodged by this date, i.e., Glasgow submitted on 1
st
 May 2007.  Halifax withdrew from the contest 
Table 7.1. A Chronology of the Bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games (adapted from CGF [2008] and www.glasgow2014.com). 
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in accordance with the Constitution 6 
months prior to the 2007 General 
Assembly (this does not preclude a bid 
being formally lodged sooner). 
Candidate Cities will need to allow time 
for progressive loading of electronic 
documents to be fully compliant with 
this deadline.  
on 8
th
 March 2007. 
June/July 2007 The CGF Evaluation Committee 
formally reviews confirmed bids. 
  
9
th
 September 2007 CGF Evaluation Commission Report 
published.  
  
9
th
 October 2007 Deadline for any updates to be issued 
by Candidate Cities in response to the 
Evaluation Commission Report 
  
9
th
 November 2007 CGF General Assembly in Sri Lanka 
awards the right to host the 2014 
Games.  
 Glasgow won the vote, by 47-24. 
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The following section provides the starting point for the critical analysis of the 
decision to bid, however brief consideration is given here to the circumstances 
surrounding the ultimate success of Glasgow’s bid in the domestic and 
international competition. The consideration of these successes is vital in 
providing a basis by which decisions in the early stages can be understood.  
 
As well as Glasgow, the city of Edinburgh submitted a bid to be considered as the 
representative of Commonwealth Games Scotland (CGS) following an open 
invitation sent from the governing body to all local authorities in Scotland. The 
chair of the CGS (Interview #10, 2011) summarised the reasons for Glasgow’s 
success: 
 
Glasgow has built a reputation over the past twenty years as a city that 
has invested heavily in sport, both in terms of facilities but also in terms 
of sports development, but also had put together a good track record of 
major events and Edinburgh, probably, still had the legacy of the 
facilities built for 1970 and 1986, but in comparative terms over the past 
20 years as the go ahead city in terms of sport. 
 
This opinion, from a voting member of the CGS not only explains the reasons for 
the success of Glasgow’s bid in the domestic competition, but also acts as an 
endorsement of the cultural and sporting policies within the city over the previous 
thirty years. Edinburgh had clearly been the ‘go to’ city in Scotland for these types 
of events and had hosted the Games in 1970 and 1986, but it seems that since the 
re-invention of Glasgow’s cultural policy in the 1980s that this balance of power 
has shifted. The responses in both Interview #10 (2011) and Interview #11 (2011) 
claim that it was Glasgow’s investment in events and sport that were the primary 
reasons for the bid’s success in the domestic competition, although both also point 
to the negative legacy of Edinburgh’s 1986 Games5, as a lesser possible reason for 
the decision. In a striking resemblance to the World Student Games in 1991, 
members of CGS also intimate that the Edinburgh bid, whilst professional, also 
relied heavily on their experiences of hosting in 1970 and 1986, rather than 
presenting a forward-thinking bid based upon regeneration.  
                                                 
5
 The 1986 Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh were beset with problems. An African boycott in 
protest at British attitudes towards South African apartheid significantly reduced the number of 
competitors. In addition, the event ran at a significant financial deficit which was exacerbated by 
the boycott’s effect on attracting sponsorship.  
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Once the CGS had voted ‘strongly in favour of Glasgow’ (Interview #10, 2011) a 
feasibility study was carried out in order to ascertain the likelihood of Glasgow 
being a credible candidate city, both in terms of its capacity to host and also its 
potential strength in the candidature process. The formal announcements from the 
CGS and Scottish Government were made in the summer of 2005 and the official 
intention to bid was lodged with the CGF in advance of the February 2006 
deadline, along with declarations from Abuja, Nigeria and Halifax, Canada, 
although Halifax withdrew in advance of the official bid submission deadline of 9
th
 
May 2007. 
 
However, again in a striking similarity to Sheffield’s bid for the World Student 
Games, the Glasgow bid team took the opportunity to make a pre-emptive strike 
and embark upon a marketing campaign for their bid throughout 2005 and during 
the Melbourne Games of 2006 (Interview #11, 2011; Interview #12, 2011), even 
before an official decision had been made to bid. This effort to gazump the official 
process was led by Louise Martin, a key administrator in Scottish sport and the 
secretary of the CGF. According the CGF’s chair, her role was critical to the 
ultimate success of Glasgow’s bid over Abuja. He commented: 
 
I think it was quite an astute move to gazump the process, and why not? 
I think it created a lot of awareness of Glasgow and Scotland and how 
committed they were to the bid. Now, they didn’t do anything formal, 
but I remember the whiskies going around (laughs)… I think that 
certainly helped and then the consistent messaging afterwards never 
backed off. You know, “we’re going to deliver a great Games” [and] 
that manifested itself through the bid process, through the evaluations by 
our members that consistent message. [Louise Martin’s] leadership, 
engagement and involvement in the process was crucial to that for them, 
given her role in Scotland, as chair of the bid, but an advantage being 
that she was well known to all the members as well (Interview #12, 
2011).  
 
This move was particularly important given the increasingly competitive nature of 
the bidding process. The initial bid director summarised these changes: 
 
 
Manchester [in 2002] didn’t bid against anyone. The next time, for the 
games in Melbourne there was no competition and then the next Games, 
there was a competition between Delhi and Hamilton in Ontario, 
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Canada. And, this is an exaggeration to say, you’d write on the back of 
an envelope that “ we’d like to host the Commonwealth Games”. It 
wasn’t much more than that, it was very, very superficial (Interview 
#15, 2010). 
 
As a result of the increasing attractiveness of bidding for the event and some 
problems experienced with perceived inconsistent procedural messages given to 
bidding cities in terms of in the competition for the 2010 Games, the CGF aligned 
their bidding procedure much more closely with that for the Olympic Games.  
 
The similarities between Sheffield and Glasgow continue with senior figures in 
sport in the city also being represented in senior positions in the relevant governing 
bodies. Indeed, it could be argued that the lack of this type of figure counted 
against Manchester in their Olympic bids. By having an ISF member, who is well 
respected by other members of the ISF, on the bid team appears critical in 
engineering a successful bid. This point can be strengthened by the awkward 
relationship between Princess Anne and IOC members during the Manchester bids 
and also the apparent ambivalence towards current English representatives in 
FIFA.  
 
Following the successful marketing campaign, Glasgow defeated Abuja in the 
CGF vote by 47 votes to 24. Aside from the pre-emptive strike, the chair of CGS 
has commented that there was a two stage process to securing this victory: the first 
being the technical competence of the bid and the second being ‘winning the hearts 
and minds of people’ (Interview #10). On the former, several interviewees claimed 
that the technical and political capabilities of the bid leader was crucial in 
developing a strong bid, which was highly commended by the CGF’s Evaluation 
Commission (CGF, 2007). Louise Martin, however, was considered to be 
important for the latter given her position and that she knew all of the voting 
members of the CGF personally
6
 and was able to feed back their likely expectation 
of a strong bid to the bid team (Interview #10, 2011).  
 
                                                 
6
 As well as her role in the Bid Team for the 2014 Commonwealth Games, Louise Martin served 
on the board of CGS between 1995-2007, as chair of SportScotland between 2007 and 2011 and 
honorary member of the CGF from 2007 onwards.  
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Another aspect contributing to Glasgow’s success over Abuja, was an apparent 
reluctance by CGF members to award the Games to a host that might be deemed 
‘high risk’. The context of the competition for the 2014 Games was held at the 
same time that fears were beginning to emerge surrounding Delhi’s capability to 
deliver the 2010 Games (Interview #12, 2011). The decision then to award the 
games to Glasgow as it represented a ‘safe pair of hands’ suggests that the 
rebranding of the city had been successful and was even more remarkable due to a 
long standing feeling in the higher echelons of the CGF that the ‘Games needs to 
go to Africa at some point’ (Interview #12, 2011).  
 
7.4 Agenda Setting 
 
According to Gratton and Preuss (2008) the decision by Glasgow to bid for the 
2014 Commonwealth Games was a legacy of the 2002 Games in Manchester and 
this is supported by a consensus amongst interview participants. However, there is 
little consensus as to the reasons why the success of these Games became relevant 
to Glasgow, despite a ‘fit’ with the event strategies at the national and regional 
level and the opportunity to advance the existing economic policies within 
Glasgow were compelling factors. Unlike the previous case studies, there was no 
evidence that the relevant domestic governing body, in this case the 
Commonwealth Games Council for Scotland (CGS), had any pre-existing 
intention to bid for the event.  
 
Within this context the origins can be placed more locally in the hands of two 
individuals: Louise Martin and First Minister Jack (now Lord) McConnell. Louise 
Martin referred to her account of the origins of the bid and an event which took 
place whilst attending the 2002 Games in Manchester:  
 
Jack McConnell and I were having breakfast and he got hooked up on 
the whole thing. Jack and I were together having breakfast and I just 
said I wished we could do something and he looked up at me and said 
“what do you think? Is it possible?” And I began to think it was. The 
Manchester Games were magnificent and so we said “right, let’s go for 
it and try” (Interview #11, 2011).  
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This message of inspiration is supported by McConnell’s own recollection of 
events that morning: 
 
Well, the origins lie in a night in Manchester at the Commonwealth 
Games in 2002. I was attending the games in support of the Scottish 
team in my first year as First Minister and it was clear the event had 
been a massive success in terms of legacy and for sporting role models 
and enthusiasm. On one of the evenings I was there was a conversation 
between me and my wife, who was working in Glasgow at the time, 
but also subsequently with Louise Martin… and it was one of those 
moments when I said “well what about [Scotland]” and she said “well 
let’s go for it” (Interview #14, 2011). 
 
 
What had impressed these two figures was the success of the Manchester Games 
both on and off the track. Scotland’s athletes achieved their highest medal haul at 
a Commonwealth Games since Edinburgh in 1986 as a result of a change in 
strategy in Scottish sport. The positive feelings surrounding Scottish sport and the 
immediate and projected benefits of hosting the Games to Manchester were 
evident (Carlson and Taylor, 2003). However, as noted above, while a new 
strategy existed for the funding of elite Scottish athletes, there is no evidence that 
this was matched by any pre-existing desire to attempt to host an event on the 
scale of the Commonwealth Games. Indeed, Louise Martin, a former chair of the 
CGS and senior member of the Scottish Sports Council (SportScotland) 
commented that her peers were ‘a bit sceptical’ (Interview #11, 2011) when she 
first reported her enthusiasm to consider a bid. This is supported by the current 
chair of the CGS and board member since 2003, who stated that he ‘got the 
impression that because we had the Games in [19]86 and they weren’t a great 
success, for a number of reasons… it was not on the radar until 2002’ (Interview 
#10, 2011).  
 
Given that no previous strategy to bring this event to Scotland existed, these two 
individuals were able to operate as policy entrepreneurs. In accordance with the 
Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) a launch window had been provided by a 
combination of the policy, problem and politics streams. In Scotland’s and 
Glasgow’s case the politics stream was clearly represented by the supportive 
national mood, shortly after devolution, for opportunities to express Scottish 
identity: something that could be achieved through hosting this event, one in 
 206 
 
which Scotland competes as an individual nation and not as part of a United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland team.  
 
Aside from this general sentiment, the politics stream was manifested in the 
establishment of Event Scotland in 2001. While sporting events on the scale of the 
Commonwealth Games had not been considered before, the rationale behind the 
creation of this body clearly contributed to the attractiveness of such an event to 
the Scottish Government, and in this case its First Minister, Jack McConnell. 
McConnell himself explains this below: 
 
[in 2001] we had launched Event Scotland, which was our new agency 
to boost the attraction of a whole variety of events, from music and 
cultural events through to sporting events and large scale conference 
events, to Scotland. In the previous year there had been a failed, then 
successful bid for the Ryder Cup. A couple of months before I became 
First Minister in November 2001 there was a failed attempt to get the 
Ryder Cup in 2010. We had the consolation prize of getting it for 2014 
and in my first month as First Minister I continued with a bid for the 
Euro 2008 international football championships and that bid failed I 
think for a variety of internal football political reasons. So, there was 
an atmosphere around of us wishing to have international events 
coming to Scotland (Interview #14, 2011). 
 
The politics stream, represented by a national amenability to events, especially 
sports events, in order to express Scottish identity was accompanied by a problem 
stream at the national level of the precise image that Scotland wished to present to 
the world and at the local level by the continuing deindustrialisation of the East 
End of Glasgow. An event strategy had been established at both levels and 
focussed heavily on sport, but as Tucker (2008) outlines above, this strategy had 
not yet reached certain deprived areas of Glasgow. The failure, to date, of the 
regeneration policies in aiding the poorest and most deprived areas of the city 
meant that to some extent the bid for the Games was a ‘leap of faith’ in that it did 
not guarantee regeneration in this area. This is explained by a member of the 
organising committee who was also a Glasgow City Councillor: 
 
Well, [the bid] fit within a long term plan for the East end of the city, 
you know, deindustrialisation and all of that. There’s a need for 
regeneration of the city in general, but in particular the East End and we 
thought that if we could get the Commonwealth Games this would help 
enormously. I think it’s fair to say this was opportunistic in the sense 
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that folk wanted to see regeneration in the East End for many years and 
a thought that if we had this sporting event here then we could achieve 
that so much faster (Interview #13, 2011). 
 
Views such as this were typical of most interviewees in that while the actual 
benefits of hosting were not overtly evident, that the positive rhetoric associated 
with it was convincing enough to support the bid, especially given that previous 
attempts to regenerate this area of the city through an event strategy had been 
unsuccessful. This does not represent the same desperation that occurred in 
Sheffield, but certainly questions the extent to which this event was initially seen 
as a definite solution to the problem.  
 
It was a combination of the problem and politics streams that permitted the policy 
entrepreneurs, who were at this stage McConnell and Martin, to drive the policy 
stream, which was the drawing up of the bid, to the agendas of the Scottish 
Government, Glasgow City Council and various sporting bodies in Scotland. 
However, similar to the previous case studies, their respective motivation to 
achieve this and their ability to do so were resultant of their personal and political 
circumstances.  
 
Politically, Jack McConnell and his fledgling Scottish Government needed a 
flagship project onto which they could express Scottish identity and this coincided 
with the timing of the bid. Another apparent coincidence was his attendance at the 
Manchester Games in 2002 and the good performance of the Scottish team. 
However, while appearing as coincidences, there is no doubt that McConnell had a 
predisposition in favour of events due to the establishment of Event Scotland, but 
also in terms of sport as his wife was Chief Executive of Culture and Sport in 
Glasgow City Council. This was further enhanced by his apparent personal interest 
in sport as expressed below: 
 
[I remembered], as a youngster, the impact of the 1970s Games in 
Edinburgh. I was 10 at the time and I didn’t attend the Edinburgh 
games, I lived on one of the islands a long way from Edinburgh, but I 
remember the image of those games and the way in which it interested 
my generation of school kids in sport and the horrific memory of 
Edinburgh in 1986 had been, had the almost opposite effect (Interview 
#14, 2011). 
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Even though the coincidences that seemed to occur in this case, the MSF and 
especially the concept of policy entrepreneurs is convincing in explaining the 
placing of the Commonwealth Games onto the agenda in Glasgow and Scotland. 
In Chapter Three it was noted that Zahariadis (2007) identified policy 
entrepreneurs as being not simply advocates of a particular cause, but instead 
powerbrokers with the means to manipulate problematic preferences. In Sheffield, 
the ‘entrepreneurs’ were certainly advocates of sport and events, but in Glasgow 
these advocates had both political and personal interests in this event and the 
power by which to drive the bid onto the agenda. Not a single interviewee claimed 
that it was anyone other these two individuals that was responsible for the origins 
of the bid and Martin herself, when questioned on who was the driving force in the 
early stages, commented: 
 
I hate to say it, but yes, I was. Only because I’m passionate about sport 
and passionate about the Commonwealth Games and I know what it 
can do for people and it’s such a friendly Games and the size is right 
for Scotland too, we could never hope to host the Olympic Games, 
we’re just not big enough (Interview #11, 2011).  
 
Indeed, not only did the interviewees agree with the origins of the bid, but all were 
able to recite the anecdote of McConnell’s and Martin’s enthusiastic conversation 
in a Manchester hotel. 
 
Hence, unlike in Sheffield, there were advocates with a sporting and hosting 
predisposition, but also with the power and contacts to act upon the ‘launch 
window’ provided by devolution and Glasgow’s long-term plans for regeneration. 
The following section investigates how the third stream of the MSF, the policy 
stream, was operationalised and how further partners were recruited to aid the 
decision-making process.  
 
7.5 Decision-making processes 
 
The theories outlined in this thesis, which are examined in more detail below and 
in the subsequent chapter, provide an explanation of why and how this 
opportunism was able to be operationalised into a bid, but in order to complete the 
narrative, the focus must first be shifted towards the means by which these key 
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figures were able to recruit support firstly within Glasgow City Council and 
secondly amongst the wider political and sporting organisations.  
 
In order to develop the third policy stream, gaining support for the bid, the 
existing entrepreneurs firstly recruited more actors who would act in an 
entrepreneurial manner, but in effect comprised an issue network. Key actors were 
sought to form this community from within the city council, the chamber of 
commerce and sports organisations. Louise Martin explained: 
 
  
 
So, we set up a bid committee and I chaired it and [names Chief 
executive Officer] was the CEO, a really, really good team of using 
Glasgow staff and those externals that we knew were working at 
Sportscotland had the expertise that we knew were needed. It was a 
case of we’re all in it for the same thing: in it to win it and everybody 
had their own role to play and they had to do it. (Interview, #11, 2011). 
 
The network that was drawn together, therefore comprised people known to the 
policy entrepreneurs and who were likely to have been selected due to their 
ideological pre-disposition towards sport/the Games. Below, the eventual break 
up of this network is explored along with the resentment felt by some members of 
this suggesting that while networks are by definition temporary, some members 
did not think their roles would be.  
 
In terms of the council, there were numerous actors involved in the early stages, 
notably the council’s chief executive. His involvement stemmed from a meeting 
with McConnell and Martin shortly after their visit to Manchester. Following their 
conversation his assumption was that McConnell was keen to promote the bid in 
order as ‘from his point of view he was thinking how well the games could be a 
platform for the Scottish parliament or Scotland to get greater exposure’ 
(Interview #16, 2011), however, he also stated that while the Commonwealth 
Games had never been a specific part of Glasgow’s regeneration strategy, it 
aligned itself very closely to the existing tourism and event strategies. 
 
Several other interviewees claimed that Martin, McConnell (and his wife) 
returned from the Manchester Games excited by the prospects of a Scottish bid 
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and several also claim that a significant reason for their support of the bid was this 
infectious enthusiasm. However, many of the same interviewees also 
acknowledged that the concept of a bid for the Commonwealth Games aligned 
itself neatly with existing strategies in a number of areas.  
 
Issue networks are a useful analytical framework through which the development 
of the bid progressed in the early stages, following the work carried out by the 
policy entrepreneurs. This network, which had representation from the Scottish 
Government, CGS and Glasgow City Council, was overtly created in order for the 
bid to be put together and the policy entrepreneurs were relying on the respective 
specialisms, or resources, of all members. Hence, members of this network were 
recruited dependent on their access to resources, thus fitting with Smith’s (1993) 
model. In particular, the Scottish Government was reliant on the issue network for 
the organisation of the event. This reliance was both in terms of the funding that 
Glasgow City Council could provide for the event to take place and also the 
attractive track record of Glasgow’s event bidding strategy, which reduced the 
potential losses and embarrassment these would cause. The other resources that 
were required mostly concerned sports specialism and these were ‘bought-in’ by 
recruiting experienced professionals such as Derek Casey, who had previously 
held senior positions in several UK sports organisations. The final area that 
suggests this was an issue network is the resistance encountered once outside 
actors were brought in that had not contributed to the early planning stages, which 
is discussed below. 
 
From the Scottish Government’s perspective, the creation of Event Scotland and 
quest for a devolutionary ‘project’ were compelling reasons for the bid to arrive 
on the agenda but also provide some of the motive behind almost universal 
support. Jack McConnell claimed that he received ‘great support’ from his 
cabinet, albeit identifying that there was some dissent initially: 
 
As with any of these things there were doubters. There were doubters 
over cost there were doubters because of the difficulties over the 
previous twelve months there were doubters on whether we could win 
the bid and make it a persuasive case, there were doubters based on 
Edinburgh 1986 which coloured people’s opinion (Interview #14, 
2011).  
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Despite these early concerns, the bid timeline depicting the development of the bid 
presented on Glasgow 2014’s official website (www.glasgow2014.com) claims 
that the starting point of the decision-making process occurred on 30
th
 July 2002 
with a joint decision by the Scottish Parliament and the CGS to bid. This fits with 
the unanimous recollection of all respondents that Martin and McConnell returned 
from Manchester enthusiastic to bid, but given that this ‘decision’ took place only 
a week after the Manchester Games had commenced and that it was not reported in 
either the local Glasgow press or wider Scottish press (the first the idea of bidding 
tentatively suggested here was 17
th
 November 2002) it is more likely that this did 
not represent an actual official decision, more a desire to explore the possibility of 
bidding. This interpretation is further supported by the feasibility study on a 
Scottish bid not taking place until mid-2003 and that the formal decision by the 
Scottish government to support the bid did not occur until August 2005. 
 
The support of the Scottish Government was forthcoming, not only due to the 
quest for a devolutionary project, but also because of the party political situation in 
Scotland at the time. In accordance with the previous two case studies, a Labour-
led council resided in Glasgow, but unlike Manchester and Sheffield, this was 
accompanied by a Labour-led Scottish Government (and the Labour Government 
in Westminster), hence many of the issues with gaining national executive support 
that occurred elsewhere were not relevant in Scotland at this time. Observing the 
development of the bid in the early stages, the initial bid director commented that 
it was natural that the Government would support an idea presented by its leader 
and also tentatively suggested that the Labour links between the Scottish 
Government and Glasgow City Council made planning the bid and recruiting 
political support relatively straightforward (Interview # 15, 2010). He also 
provided a useful insight into the decision-making process and those responsible 
for the development of the bid in the early stages: 
 
In the early stages you had the Chief Executive of the City Council. He 
was the city treasurer before he became chief executive so very much 
an accountant's mind, I suppose, [pause] and what became the early 
pattern for Glasgow was a triumvirate between the three organisations. 
So you had Jack McConnell leading the Scottish Government, Louise 
Martin the Commonwealth Games Council for Scotland and [names 
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Council Chief Executive] the leader of Glasgow City [Council]. The 
leader of the city council around that time was [names Council leader], 
he was the elected leader so they were at all the early discussions. It 
was those three organisations that have largely driven forward the idea 
of bidding for the games which eventually they decided to do in 
[pause] early 2005. 
 
 
The recruitment of support from within the council was largely led its former 
leader, who, unlike many of the other actors involved, noted that there was 
opposition to the bid in the early stages and that he was largely responsible for 
allaying the fears of opposition groups. He explained that this process commenced 
with dissenting voices in the Labour party in Glasgow and then continued with 
opposition parties. His rationale was as such: 
 
I was determined that when we formally agreed that we wanted to bid 
in 2007 that in the three months leading up the submission, I was 
determined that we had no opposition, that we convinced people that 
this was apolitical (Interview #20, 2012). 
 
The timing of the Council leader’s intervention was important in helping to 
understand the use of power within this context. Opposition voices were identified 
very early in the process and ‘educated’ as to the benefits of the bid to the city. 
The Council leader claimed that most of the opposition was on financial grounds 
and fears were allayed with the use of extensive technical data (Interview #20, 
2012). This was clearly a successful exercise given that there was such little 
formal opposition to the bid. Indeed, his lobbying was so quick and effective that 
several other members of the bid team claim to have never been aware of any 
opposition.  
 
Aside from successful lobbying by senior Council representatives, many of the 
key positions within the bid team were awarded to existing officers within the 
council. One of these officers outlined his rationale for supporting the bid: 
 
I mean everything we did on the bid linked into the wider strategies of 
the city. For example, the decision to host the facilities in the East End 
of the city went through a lot of discussion, but we decided to go for a 
new build phase for this rather than using student accommodation 
because of the overall regeneration plans for the east end of the city. A 
Gateway Regeneration Agency has subsequently been established to 
take on the Dalmarnock area where one of the new sports facilities is 
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being built, the area where the motorway extension and the games 
village which is a large piece of housing regeneration were all part of a 
huge strategy to regenerate that part of the city… So at the very outset 
the opportunity was seen to use the games as a vehicle for some of the 
key regeneration strategies (Interview #18, 2011).  
 
Locating existing strategies and encouraging council officers to buy into the 
project, which was achieved by outlining the relevance of the Games to their 
existing work (housing, transport, leisure and culture) was a distinct success of 
both the Council’s leaders and many of the interviewees highlight the lack of any 
opposition to the bid in these early stages.  
 
Once council support had been achieved, attention switched to recruiting support 
from the private sector, although this did not occur until after the success over 
Edinburgh in 2004. In comparison to the two previous case studies, especially 
Sheffield, private sector support was more forthcoming, partially because of the 
sector’s role in Glasgow’s event strategy since the Garden Festival. The continued 
economic benefit from previous events and perceived economic benefit from the 
Commonwealth Games were key reasons why this support was received without 
difficulty. The former chair of the city’s Chamber of Commerce provides her 
rationale for supporting the bid below. 
 
It was economic, it was all about delivering economic value. These 
events are really important in terms of what they can deliver for the 
local economy of Glasgow and the national economy of Scotland. 
When I got involved…it was identified that having business 
engagement from a very early stage was vital (Interview #17, 2011).  
 
Once private sector support had been assembled, the early bid team, that was 
largely an issue network, set about attracting national support through a website 
that that encouraged Scottish residents to sign up in support of the bid. However, 
in keeping with a trend of bids for such events, no wider public consultation took 
place. In addition, a detailed search of both national and local newspaper archives 
reveals very little awareness of the development of the bid at either national or 
local level in the critical period between 2002-2004. By the time newspapers had 
reported the bid, and opposition groups mobilised, most of the important decisions 
had already been taken. 
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Indeed, it could be argued that there was no significant public opposition in the 
early stages. This would explain why all interviewees from the policy community, 
aside from Jack McConnell, reported that there was virtually no opposition 
evident. One officer noted: 
 
Funnily enough, no. I noticed that was one of your questions and I’ve 
been trying to rack my brains. One [pause] the whole bid process was a 
very happy affair, very little opposition and we won the vote quite 
decisively (Interview #18, 2011).  
 
This comment was typical of interviewees and represents either the absence of any 
real opposition in these early stages or the ability of the community to present a 
sterile and convenient version of events. In reality, it is likely that a combination of 
these occurred, but given the lack of the type of desperation evident in Sheffield, 
winning the vote and attracting wide public support was probably the result of 
Council-led effective lobbying. However, the absence of opposition as reported in 
the press during 2002-2004 did not reflect total support for the bid. A vociferous 
anti-Games campaign was run alongside the organisation of the Games since 2006, 
but was possibly formed and mobilised too late to have any real impact until the 
important decisions had already been made. 
 
The leader of the most prominent opposition group claimed that local opposition 
was prevented in these early stages partially due to the close relationship between 
the ruling Labour Council and the local press. He explained: 
 
Glasgow is a real machine-politics town - I’m originally from the 
USA, and it reminds me of places like Chicago, where the same party 
has been in power for ages, there is a very close relationship with the 
local press, and there is a lot of boosterism from local elites.  While 
proportional representation in council elections has lessened Labour's 
hold on the council, they still run it (Interview #19, 2011). 
 
These insights, while merely the opinions of someone with an admitted scepticism 
towards the Games, do help to explain why the press was apparently so slow to 
publish stories concerning these important decisions until after they had been 
made. He continued: 
 
The former leader was very big on neoliberal projects like the 
Commonwealth Games, while at the same time pursuing aggressive 
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school closures, and the creation of "arm's-length organisations". He 
was a real rising star in the New Labour project, and getting the 
Commonwealth Games was touted at the time as a great coup for 
Glasgow.  Any opposition was disorganised - basically, individuals 
expressing opposition… Glasgow City Council never really goes 
looking for support - they float plans in the local news, like the 
evening times, which usually just reprints council press releases as if 
they're news stories.  Most Glaswegians take the attitude that the 
council will do what they like and there's not much point in opposing 
these things (interview #19, 2011). 
 
 
The final aspect of the decision-making to be explored took place among the 
sports organisations and concerns the development of the official bid and the roles 
played by key individuals from the CGS and the bid team. These sports 
organisations also provided key members of the early policy community.  
 
It was stated above that from a sporting perspective the bid for the 
Commonwealth Games was set within the framework of change. Scottish sport 
had undergone a significant restructuring, partially due to devolution, but also due 
to what Louise Martin described as a ‘disastrous’ performance at the 1998 
Commonwealth Games in Malaysia (Interview #11, 2011). This demonstrates to 
some extent the importance of the Commonwealth Games in Scotland and the 
new approach paid dividends in Manchester with the Scottish team exceeding 
expectations in terms of its medal tally, which in part was responsible for 
providing the enthusiasm of McConnell and Martin.  
 
The pivotal role of the Commonwealth Games did not, however, mean that the 
board of the CGS was initially supportive of a bid. Louise Martin noted that she 
met with initial scepticism from both the CGS and the CGF, with colleagues 
suggesting that the negative experience of Edinburgh in 1986 would be held 
against another Scottish bid (Interview #11, 2011). Martin, though, was able to 
recruit the support of the CGS, albeit they also insisted on a feasibility study 
taking place, and agreement was reached within weeks of the Manchester Games 
that Scotland would bid for the games. 
 
Following this approval from the CGS and Scottish Government and the success 
of Glasgow in the domestic competition, a former chair of Sport England was 
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appointed to oversee the development of the bid up to and including the CGF vote 
in 2007. He provides an interesting outlook on his interpretation of the 
organisation of the bid upon his arrival: 
 
 
Well, in 2005 they had decided they were going to bid… I think it 
would be fair to say that during the first part of 2005 the Glasgow bid 
was not very good… there didn’t seem to be any clear leadership about 
how this was going to be successful. I was involved slightly because 
[pause] every time they wrote a fairly important report, I was asked to 
comment on it or edit it by some people I knew in the City Council so I 
suppose I was able to become more critical as time was moving on. So, 
Glasgow knowing this was struggling to put something together and in 
the Autumn of 2005 was struggling quite badly. What they decided to 
do was set up a bid committee, which is quite normal. So the bid 
committee was made up the three organisations, the Scottish 
Government, the Commonwealth Games Council for Scotland and 
Glasgow City Council and at that time they were  looking for a chief 
executive and I was approached to see if I would be interested in doing 
this…I came on board in January 2006, or sometime around that 
(Interview #15, 2010). 
 
The bid director’s performance in this role was unanimously praised by all 
interviewees, most of whom appreciated his experience and expertise in sporting 
matters. The head of the CGS claimed that ‘[he] was fantastic for us because he 
was the bid team leader and he is and was then a very professional person and 
pulled together a very professional bid’ (Interview #10, 2011). Jack McConnell 
noted that his main attribute was his knowledge of the politics of sport, which he 
claimed was instrumental in the success of the bid (Interview #14, 2011). 
 
The appointment of this bid director completed the issue network, which was 
brought together to secure the Games. Later in this chapter, the breaking up of this 
network is outlined along with the tensions that accompanied this. However, the 
focus now shifts to the roles of two organisations that have not been mentioned in 
any great detail to date, UK Sport and the UK Government.  
 
7.6 Relationships with other bodies 
 
It is claimed above that the bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games represented a 
key opportunity for the Scottish Government to make a statement in terms of 
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national identity. However, given the complicated nature of the organisation of 
sport within the UK and the slight ambiguity over the mega/major event status of 
the Commonwealth Games, UK-wide institutions were involved in the bid, albeit 
in supporting roles. This subsection explores the respective roles of the UK 
Government, UK Sport and Scottish sports and non-sports organisation in the 
development of the bid.   
 
All interviewees were asked to describe the extent to which the UK Government 
was involved in the development of the bid and their responses ranged from no 
knowledge of any involvement to acknowledging a minor role. Upon being asked 
if the UK Government played a significant role in the bid, the bid director 
provided a useful starting point for this analysis: 
 
Not really. Two things: one was the fact that the Scottish Government 
wanted more independence so this was seen as a Scottish Bid from 
government and government in the UK. And the other reason to keep 
London quite distant was because Manchester had had the Games in 
2002, we had to show that this was a Scottish bid in the voting process. 
At this time, the government… offered the support of the Foreign 
Office and things like Customs and Excise, but apart from that, there 
was very little direct involvement (Interview #15, 2010).  
 
 
His view that the UK Government played a minor role was echoed by the majority 
of all respondents who agreed that the branding potential for Scotland and the 
vague status of UK-wide agencies in a devolved Scotland were the main reasons 
for this. The building of a Scottish-centred rhetoric in the development was clearly 
important, as indicated by an interviewee from Sportscotland: 
 
In Commonwealth Game terms, we don’t consider ourselves as British 
as it’s the only time in a multi-sports event that Scotland gets to 
compete on its own. It’s a fair question though, as whilst we were 
aware of that as being a potential barrier for some people to vote for us 
it wasn’t part of what we felt. We didn’t feel the need to make 
ourselves more Scottish as we had a very good host city, a financially 
excellent bid. Of course, we did stress the Scottishness of it, but it 
wasn’t about differentiating between Manchester and England, it was a 
little similar to the argument going on now about Scottish 
independence, it’s about making the argument on positive grounds 
rather than negative grounds. It’s a Scottish bid because that’s what we 
are in the Commonwealth Games (Interview #10, 2011). 
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It is telling that aside from little direct involvement being offered, little was 
sought by the bid team. Since the success of the bid there have been repeated calls 
from within the organising committee for further lottery funding, but requesting 
any further funding from Westminster was problematic in the context of the 
ambition to strengthen Scottish national identity associated with the bid. Jack 
McConnell provided a useful summary of thinking at this time: 
 
Well, at that time they [UK Government] were in the early stages of 
the bid for London 2012 and they didn’t really have a locus in sport in 
Scotland and because the Commonwealth Games team in Scotland is 
not a UK team it was probably one of the sporting institutions that the 
new devolved Scottish government could easily relate to… 
Westminster were always supportive behind the scenes, it was very 
important because Manchester had had the games that this was seen as 
a Scottish bid, not a UK bid. If it was seen as a UK bid it might have 
failed, it was seen as a Scottish bid and our emerging relationship with 
the Scottish team, which had a group of role models the Scottish 
government wanted to support when I was First Minister and those two 
factors were important for a direct relationship with the Scottish 
government and it alone (Interview #14, 2011).  
 
Upon the establishment of a devolved government in 1999, new debates 
surrounding the role and rationale of UK national sports organisations emerged. In 
addition to this, Foley et al. (2012) claim that the city leaders in Scotland began to 
deliberately align the rhetoric of their policies, such as this bid, to existing 
strategies at national level, including the health and wellbeing agenda of the 
Scottish government, in order to extract further funding. This is not surprising 
given the identity issues discussed above and that the Scottish government had 
agreed to fund 80% of the cost of the Games. The chief executive of Glasgow 
City Council clarified the role of the government in the early stages of the bid: 
 
The deal was that for the bidding process, we [the Government and the 
Council] met the cost of about £5m 50/50. For the cost of the games 
we negotiated an 80/20 split with the Scottish Government (Interview 
#16, 2011).  
 
The prominent role of the Scottish Government in the early stages was outlined in 
the previous section, especially with reference to Jack McConnell’s policy 
entrepreneurialism. However, while navigating the party political situation in the 
early stages of the bid was easy given that Labour held power in Westminster, 
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Holyrood and Glasgow, this dynamic altered during the course of the bid. Despite 
the change in leadership of the Scottish Parliament from Labour to the Scottish 
National Party (SNP), no interviewee noted any weakening of support for the bid. 
This perhaps reflects the requirement of IFs that bids have to have all-party 
support within potential host nations, but also is of little surprise given that the 
Labour administration were replaced a Nationalist government, which would be 
even more ideologically prone to the promotion of national identity through such 
a project. The 2007 election involved a great deal of party political debate along 
ideological lines and one of the original policy entrepreneurs, Jack McConnell, 
was displaced as first minister, yet in terms of the organisation of the bid, little 
changed. This was certainly the view from within sport, as outlined first by Louise 
Martin: 
 
Six months out from the bid we had a change of government. We went 
from labour to SNP and I guarantee no-one in the commonwealth 
would have noticed that we had a change of government, it was so 
smooth. Anyway, I take my hat off to them that it worked like that 
(Interview #11, 2011). 
 
This opinion was endorsed by a senior representative of Sportscotland: 
 
Well, there’s a couple of things because we’ve just had another 
election, but I’ll start with the first one. In May 2007 we’d just handed 
over our bid and a week or so later there was a Scottish election and 
Labour lost power and the SNP came in as a minority administration. 
We obviously had some concerns about what it meant. We knew we 
had all party support because we got that at the start of the bid as 
always happens, but I was really heartened when I first heard Alex 
Salmond speak which was actually when the CGF evaluation 
commission were in town a few weeks after he came into office. He 
stood up without any notes and gave a 10 or 15 minute speech at a 
formal dinner, which was actually bang on the money, you know, 
nothing has changed, if anything this SNP government were even more 
behind the games, so this was a clear message to give and to be honest 
this was also the reality, it wasn’t saying one thing and doing another. 
Even with all the other things he had to do when coming into power, 
he was definitely behind the bid to bring the CWG to Scotland 
(Interview #10, 2011). 
 
Hence, the lack of opposition in the decision-making phase extended to the 
development of the bid. The careful planning of the bid and the refusal to open it 
to wider consultation, which is typical, appears to suggest that public support was 
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not a priority concern for the bid team. This was certainly the case for the original 
entrepreneurs in the agenda setting phase and for the issue network in the 
decision-making phase, however the level of public support for the Games has 
been openly celebrated by the very actors that did not consult the public until after 
the key decisions had been made. More than two million people, which represents 
roughly 40% of the Scottish population, signed-up to a ‘Back the Bid’ campaign 
in order to convince the CGF member that this was a united and popularly 
supported bid. The sophistication and management of the wider public are a key 
feature of this bid and sits in stark contrast to the two previous case studies.  
 
Aside from a lack of direct involvement from DCMS, the role of UK Sport in the 
development of the bid was also considered to be minimal by the main 
protagonists in Glasgow’s bid team. Indeed, upon being questioned on UK Sport’s 
role, the bid director responded ‘No! [laughs]…it was felt we should keep it quite 
distinct. Of course the other thing about UK Sport that is confusing is the extent to 
which their remit goes into Scotland for major events’ (Interview #15, 2010).  
However, while this view, perhaps reflects more the unwanted symbolic 
attachment of the bid team to UK-wide institutions as well as the unclear rationale 
for this body in Scotland, it does not reflect the reality of UK Sport’s involvement. 
A representative from Sportscotland commented: 
 
My understanding is that they partly funded the cost of the bid. I know 
Event Scotland put some money in and they ended up spending about 
£5m. My understanding is a chunk of that came from UK Sport. Since 
then Event Scotland has had a close relationship with the UK Sport 
mega [major] events team, to the extent that I now chair a sub-
committee within the Glasgow 2014 company and there is 
representation there from UK Sport. There is no formal funding 
relationship and there probably won’t be. There’s a lot of things needs 
to happen between now and the games in terms of test event so we’ve 
got them involved for that (Interview #10, 2011). 
 
These insights appear to correlate with the current strategy of UK Sport with 
regards to these types of event (as explored in Chapter Two) in that significant 
funding is absent, but UK Sport work closely with these organising committees in 
order to develop further event hosting expertise and also to benefit from any 
investment made. Indeed, Louise Martin also pointed to ‘backing’ from UK Sport 
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and her ongoing relationship with them in the lead up to the Games (Interview 
#11, 2011).    
 
Given Louise Martin’s formal roles in Scottish sport, notably with the CGS and 
Sport Scotland, these organisations were clearly involved in the bidding process, 
albeit with restricted roles given their limited budgets. The bid director again 
provided an interesting account of the Sportscotland’s position: 
 
This is interesting. I think they had the same issue as the sports council 
had 20-odd years ago, that although they had lottery funding they 
didn’t have enough to make a substantial investment in the facilities 
which were required in Glasgow, so there was some investment, but 
fairly small, so I think Sport Scotland suffered in the same way we had 
in the sports council, not having a strong role in the bidding process. 
They were there but more as observers rather than people who were 
influential or fully involved (Interview #15, 2010). 
 
Theoretically, this would appear to further support the entrepreneurial element of 
the MSF in helping to explain where power was situated within the early bid team. 
This would also seem to reject the advocacy coalition framework as a sensitising 
tool as while Sportscotland were clearly in favour of the bid, they did not have 
access to adequate resources to enable them to participate when the opportunity 
arose. A very similar account can be made for the CGS, as their current chair 
suggested: 
 
It was made very plain all along that the CGS would choose the 
domestic competition, our board would choose which of the cities 
would go forward and that was absolutely our decision. At the point of 
that decision was made we decided that we did not have the financial 
resources, nor were we big enough to run the games on our own 
(Interview #10, 2011).  
 
Recruiting support from the private sector was an additional objective of the 
policy entrepreneurs and the chair of Glasgow’s Chamber of Commerce became a 
member of the original issue network. Unlike Sheffield, and more overt than in 
Manchester, the existing relationship between the private and public sectors was 
cooperative. The Chair of the Chamber commented: 
 
The chamber of commerce and the city council already worked closely 
together. It’s a very strong economic partnership that already existed 
and still exists today in the city. Now [we are] still working very 
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closely with the organisation of the games with the delivery of the 
legacy, so all the business organisations were involved in the Games 
but the Chamber of Commerce…was the interface and the catalyst 
which acted as the conduit of the feedback of information, of updates, 
the buy-in of generating support, creating awareness, feeding the 
information back to the bid team within the Council and I was actually 
sat on a number of the bid working groups (Interview #17, 2011).  
 
She continued that the basis of this partnership was economic and that in 
redefining their strategy in a period of deindustrialisation, Glasgow’s leader had 
identified the driving role the private sector could play in creating jobs and 
attracting investment, which in turn facilitated the social programme obligations. 
Hence, it could be argued that Glasgow bid team represented an issue network 
within an event-focussed regeneration policy community.  
 
7.7 Decision Legacy 
 
The legacies of the decisions in the previous case studies were largely centred 
around the use of the event to create a bidding legacy and the adoption of totally 
or partially new working relationships between the public and private sectors. In 
Glasgow’s case the event represented a culmination of sorts of a pre-existing 
event strategy, but this strategy has intensified with the specific and successful 
targeting of world level and world tour level events. Jack McConnell articulated 
this solidification of Scotland’s event strategy: 
 
It showed people that we were serious. There was some doubt the 
previous winter because the Ryder Cup bid had been mixed in its 
success and because the Euro 2008 bid had been both controversial and 
really quite unsuccessful, there was some doubt about whether we 
were committed to these events but also some doubt about our ability 
to actually win the decisions for the events…It has been a springboard 
for alerting the world to the fact that Scotland is a place with good 
facilities, not necessarily for Olympic scale events…but for those 
second tier events…Scotland’s available (Interview #14, 2011).  
 
In terms of Glasgow, a similar message was conveyed by a senior representative 
from Sportscotland: 
 
Glasgow sees its 20% investment as part of a strategy to bring in more 
events. There’s the World Gymnastics Championships in 2015, the 
world junior cycling championships will take place next summer. 
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Glasgow has positioned itself as a city that wants to bring as many 
international sports events as possible because it sees the economic 
benefits of that and the promotion of the city as a tourism destination. 
This is nothing new, Glasgow has been working on that pretty hard for 
the last 20 years, even longer, they see this as another plank in that 
strategy. It’s about economic benefit for them, they think they are 
going to get massive economic benefit and the signs are that they will 
(Interview #10, 2011). 
 
A strong relationship between the public and private sectors had been key to 
Glasgow’s strategic response to deindustrialisation and the creation, or 
readjustment, of this type of working prompted primarily by the bid, as witnessed 
in the previous case studies was absent. Instead, the bid for the Commonwealth 
Games served to bolster this already strong partnership. The chair of the city’s 
Chamber of Commerce during the early stages of the bid identified the strong 
business focus of the early discussions and claimed that the development of the 
bid ‘created a level of business involvement that had probably not been possible 
before’ (Interview #17, 2011).  
 
While there were no real legacies of the bidding process in terms of the broader 
working patterns of the private and public sectors in Glasgow, the interviews did 
reveal a relevant sub-plot concerning the break-up of the issue network and 
possible resentment felt by some members to ‘outsiders’ being recruited to the 
organising committee.  
 
In a noteworthy similarity to events in Sheffield, upon securing the Games, the 
issue network was broken up and individuals from this network were replaced by 
civil servants and event professionals, largely from outside of Glasgow. This is 
typical of all large scale sporting events, but evaluating the feelings and 
experiences of those individuals permits a greater understanding of the concept of 
issue networks and their temporary nature. 
 
Several of the interviewees occupy positions on the board of the organising 
committee, but none were represented at executive level. Upon being questioned 
about any regrets with regards to the process the Chair of the Chamber of 
Commerce claimed: 
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I think possibly afterwards, after you win it, I would probably say we 
could have been more involved in the company when it got set up. I 
think what then happened is the team that won the games isn’t then the 
team that goes on to do the implementation and I think there’s possible 
been a loss of the learning across the base because what then happens 
is a limited company is formed and it tends to be filled with sports 
delivery experts that are brought in from outside the city. I think 
possibly, we could have ensured that we had dealt with that in the early 
stages although we are rectifying that now (Interview #17, 2011). 
 
This type of regret occurred in Sheffield and also in Glasgow. Rhodes (1988) 
points to the temporary nature of issue networks, but also suggests that they have 
limited ideological bonds. In this case, some members of this network had clearly 
developed an attachment to ‘their’ project and resented handing it over to these 
outsiders.  
 
In Sheffield, this resentment was directed towards one individual, as detailed in 
Appendix Three, and culminated in his enforced resignation. In Glasgow, it was 
more indirect, and although the chief executive of the new board eventually 
resigned from his post under different circumstances
7
, when asked about his role 
interviewees either refused to discuss him or made mildly disparaging remarks. 
This is evident in the representative from Sportscotland’s response statement that 
‘after the winning the Games it was a real feel good factor, but afterwards you go 
through a bit of a lull, like we did with appointing the new chief executive’ 
(Interview #10, 2011). Throughout several interviews respondents used highly 
positive language to describe the work of the three original bid leaders: 
McConnell, Martin and the Bid Director, but their tone was more negative when 
referring to the work of the new organising committee.  
 
7.8 Conclusions 
 
The bid was used primarily to achieve the goals of place-marketing, urban 
regeneration following deindustrialisation and economic restructuring (Matheson, 
                                                 
7
 The Chief Executive of the organising committee, John Scott, resigned his position in 2011 
following an admission of breaking rules relating to the receipt of gifts and hospitality from a 
potential supplier. Scott was previously considered the ‘ringmaster’ of British sports events (STV, 
2011) and was the architect of UK Sport’s first hosting strategy. Interviews were carried out 
around the time of his resignation hence respondents were not keen to speak about him, but several 
intimated resentment at the replacement of the original bid leader with Scott.  
 225 
 
2010).  There existed in Glasgow a clear link between the regeneration already 
taking place in the city, the policies of the Scottish government and the 
Commonwealth Games. Below, attention is paid to the analytical frameworks that 
help illustrate how the decisions were made that facilitated the bid.  
 
As tentatively suggested above, the MSF is a convincing analytical tool to 
understand the rise of the bid on to the national (Scottish) and local political 
agendas. There is little doubt that Jack McConnell and Louise Martin acted in an 
entrepreneurial manner and that the three streams that these actors were required 
to couple were all evident. Indeed, the manner in which they acted fits Zahariadis’ 
(2007) model of the MSF very closely in terms of policy entrepreneurs and its 
usefulness here is furthered by Houlihan’s (2005) claim that the MSF is 
particularly useful in explaining agenda setting when there exists potential for 
opportunism, often created by high levels of organisational fragmentation. Here, 
this fragmentation was created by both a devolved Scottish government, which 
was developing a new national strategy for sport and events and the rethinking of 
UK Sport’s and DCMS’ remits within Scotland. While the MSF seems a highly 
relevant analytical framework for understanding the actions of the early bid 
advocates, its utility is limited to illuminating the agenda setting phase of the bid 
and not the decision-making process, for which other theoretical perspectives are 
required.  
 
With regards to network theory, the most convincing analytical lens would appear 
to be that of issue networks. However, similarly to the MSF this model is not 
wholly sufficient in explaining all aspects of the development of the bid. Referring 
back to Rhodes’ (1988) key indicators of an issue network: large number of 
participants, the lack of stable relationships and loose ideological bonds, not all of 
these were evident here. There were certainly a large number of participants in 
this network, but many members were selected by the entrepreneurs due to their 
ideological predisposition: one in favour of hosting this type of event. Due to this, 
and the power that the policy entrepreneurs were able to wield in selecting like-
minded people to comprise this network, this theory is not as convincing as it was 
in explaining events in Sheffield where the loose ideological bonds between the 
initial bid team were highly evident.  
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This latter issue, the targeting of ideologically predisposed persons to form this 
network suggests more an advocacy coalition than an issue network given that 
Sabatier and Weible (2007) claim that the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) 
assumes that actors seek out other actors with shared beliefs or potentially 
beneficial resources in order to translate these beliefs into policy. This most 
closely reflects the recruiting of the bid team in Glasgow, but the utility of the 
ACF beyond this is not convincing, mostly due to the very short lifespan of this 
particular group. Hence, in terms of ideology, this appeared to be an advocacy 
coalition, but in practice was more an issue network.  
 
In a similar vein, urban regime theory is of only partial utility in helping to 
analyse the decisions made in Glasgow. The temporary stewardship of personnel 
within the bid team and the changes in ideology of national government mid-bid 
(from Labour to Scottish Nationalist) had very little impact in the dynamic of the 
bid team, thus ruling out the presence of a more permanent, ideologically united 
regime. It is more likely that in Glasgow the bid was the result of a process 
embarked upon in the 1980s by a regime-like entity, or perhaps an event-based 
regeneration policy community.  
 
Similarly to both Sheffield and Manchester, Glasgow experienced the effects of 
deindustrialisation in the 1980s, which resulted in a more entrepreneurial style of 
politics, whilst still within the socialist (New) Labour paradigm. This 
entrepreneurialism and the resultant ‘playing of the capitalist game’ (Harvey, 
1989: 5) by the municipal socialists within the city could provide the starting 
point for regime analysis. However, unlike Manchester, regime theory is of less 
relevance in Glasgow because, while the policies became more focussed on 
capital, the emergence of a political elite in the city only afforded the private 
sector a supporting role within the policy process, hence not applying to a 
prerequisite of Stone’s (1989) urban regimes. Instead, in Glasgow, the state has 
remained firmly in control of urban policy (Boyle, 1994), firstly this was limited 
to the local state and upon devolution this has also applied to the national Scottish 
state. Progress was certainly made in terms of engaging the private sector in the 
process of bidding for the Commonwealth Games, which could possibly represent 
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the early stages of a regime, but city’s socialist heritage effectively rules out the 
usefulness of this theory in this case study.   
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Chapter Eight:  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is organised in four sections. The first collates the information from 
the three case studies to address the research objectives previously outlined. 
Hence, it commences with a consideration of how and why the role of government 
(central and local) has changed over the three bids and how, in turn, changing 
government policy has affected the contributions of various actors in the bidding 
process. The second section uses cross-case analysis to consider the relative 
merits of the analytical frameworks discussed in Chapter Three. While it has 
consistently been maintained that the purpose of the thesis was not to test 
particular theory, considerable attention is given to the usefulness (or not) of each 
theoretical lens in explaining the policy-making process with regards to large 
scale sports events. The third section explores the implications of the findings in 
relation to the broader study of sports event policy while the fourth section 
provides a reflective account of the methodological issues encountered throughout 
the research project.  
 
 
8.2 Patterns of change in decision making 
 
There are three broad findings in terms of how decision-making occurred across 
the three cases. Firstly, while agency was evident, its significance varied 
considerably across the three cases. For instance, as is summarised below, while 
actors within Sheffield were able to demonstrate considerable freedom in their 
pursuit of the Universiade, those in Glasgow were much more constrained by the 
establishment of national policy frameworks (both in Edinburgh and 
Westminster). Secondly, while agency was present in all cases, the context within 
which it was operationalized changed over time. For example, FISU, which is 
typical of major global event organisers, expects governments to have event 
strategies. Thirdly, the institutionalisation of bidding policy has meant that the 
freedom to exercise agency and be opportunistic is more limited. Current UK 
Sport and DCMS strategies offer support to bids, but require ‘champions’ to come 
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forward, which clearly encourages entrepreneurial behaviour and also some scope 
for agency.    
 
8.2.1 How decisions were made 
 
Across the three case studies, one of the most striking similarities was the absence 
of any rigorous democratic discourse prior to the submission of the bids. The local 
councils were the official figureheads of each bid and there was evidence that all 
decisions to bid went to full council votes, but these processes were managed so 
efficiently that they became formalities. In both Sheffield and Glasgow, which 
have subsequently experienced vocal anti-Games protests, the council votes were 
won by a strong majority due to careful planning and the ‘soothing’ of any 
concerns prior to the vote. The means by which the quelling of initial opposition 
could partially be explained by what Coalter (2007) referred to as the mythopoeic 
status of sport. On several occasions, interviewees implied that their initial 
support for the bids was due to their perception of the power of sport to do ‘good’ 
in their communities although few mentioned any empirical evidence on which 
they based their opinion.  
 
Aside from the apparent fast-tracking of wider democratic processes, a feature of 
decision-making across all three case studies was the scope for agency or apparent 
opportunism, although the opportunism has been often consistent with (emergent) 
strategic objectives related to regeneration or nationalism. In Sheffield, the 
window of opportunity was created by the urgent need for regeneration in the city 
and resultant receptiveness to ‘new’ regeneration strategies, which included sport. 
Additional fortuitous circumstances included the existence of efforts to bring the 
Universiade to the UK by individuals within the BSSF and the presence within the 
city of influential individuals with a predisposition towards sport. The exploitation 
of ‘windows of opportunity’ was also evident in the second and third case studies, 
with previously documented examples of ad-hoc hotel conversations between key 
decision-makers and a convenient automotive failure (Bob Scott) in the wake of 
Los Angeles’ success in 1984 being perhaps the most unusual examples.  
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However, as stated above, the degree of freedom enjoyed by the various policy 
entrepreneurs within each city, and thus their ability to be truly opportunistic, 
evolved over the course of the three case studies. In Sheffield opportunism was 
facilitated by the urgent concern to identify regeneration policies and the virtual 
absence of a national strategy towards hosting large scale sports events. The 
factors that enabled city level opportunism were mirrored by Chris Lundy’s work 
in the BSSF which was also opportunistic and facilitated agency due to the lack of 
national strategy. The legacies of Sheffield’s bid success were important in 
shaping the opportunity structure in which other cities, including Glasgow and 
Manchester, could operate. That Sheffield was able to reinvent itself as a ‘sport’ 
city had a demonstration effect on other cities that subsequently pursued sport and 
leisure based regeneration policies. While Sheffield’s successful bid had the effect 
of inspiring other cities to bid for events in the long term, it meant that Sheffield 
lost its key selling point, that is a weakening of the city’s prominence in sport. At 
the time of writing (early 2013), the city is faced with the closure of its Don 
Valley Stadium, which was the centrepiece of the Universiade, due to high costs 
and lack of use. Sheffield’s experience is perhaps an illustration of the short-lived 
nature of some elements of legacy such as relative competitive advantage. An 
inadvertent consequence of the Sheffield bid was that the freedom experienced by 
entrepreneurs such as Price and Montgomery would be curtailed in future bids due 
to the insistence that future bidding cities first obtain the support of the home 
Sports Council and/or UK Sport.  
 
The Manchester case provided evidence of similar levels of opportunism in the 
form of Bob Scott’s initial drawing together of a bid and the bid team. Apparent 
opportunism in Manchester is amply illustrated in his account of deciding to bid 
before he had any awareness of the existence of the British Olympic Association 
(BOA). However, by the time of the final bid  for the 2000 Olympic Games, there 
was a more prominent and institutionalised role for central government and sports 
organisations. Manchester’s failure in 2000 and the subsequent hiatus in UK bids 
until that for London in 2012 indicated the changing bid landscape in which the 
most significant change was the central decision-making role for the DCMS. Over 
the course of the Manchester’s bids, the national strategy for sports events evolved 
rapidly from one of non-intervention to a highly interventionist strategy reflected 
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in the cancellation of bids and the insistence that future bids are central 
government-led and strategically managed to increase their chances of success.  
 
In Glasgow the evidence that points to the significance of agency and 
opportunism existed in the form of another apparently coincidental occurrence: 
the meeting between Louise Martin and Jack McConnell at the Manchester 2002 
Commonwealth Games. However, unlike previous case studies, this opportunism 
was clearly within a supportive institutionalised context. Unlike Bob Scott, both 
of the central Glasgow actors were already influential in sport and event 
strategies. Their prior policy preferences and expertise meant that while the 
decision to bid appeared casual, it was not as they already knew the nature of the 
political landscape in which they were operating. There was some opportunism in 
Glasgow in its efforts to beat Edinburgh in the domestic competition, but the close 
alignment of the Scottish bid for the Commonwealth Games with existing bidding 
strategies at (Scottish) national and city level certainly curtailed the opportunity 
for actors in the process to operate freely. Further evidence to support the 
restriction of opportunism was that, unlike in the previous case studies, the 
timescale within which a bid team could be drawn together was much longer, 
allowing decision-makers in Glasgow to be well aware of the timelines involved 
in the process. While the Glasgow case study indicated that contemporary bids are 
more strategically managed and the potential for opportunism is diminished, it 
also indicated that the sophistication and centralisation of event policy in the UK 
is not yet complete, especially outside of England. Several respondents referred to 
a supportive yet confused role of UK Sport in supporting the bid as it was seen as 
a ‘Scottish’ initiative and not a ‘UK’ one. It seems that further research could 
address UK Sport’s mandate within Scotland, as the research collected here 
certainly raised issues over whether the organisation did, or even should, be 
involved in Scottish events on a large scale.   
 
8.2.2 The changing role of policy actors.  
 
The changing role of actors within both central and local government has been 
considered in the preceding case study chapters, hence attention here is given 
more towards the changing role of sports organisations across the three bids. That 
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said, a summary of the changing political landscapes in which the bids emerged is 
provided.  
 
When Sheffield and Manchester instigated their bidding policies in the 1980s, 
there was in each city a clear demarcation between the roles of the private sector 
and local and central government. However, by the time of the Glasgow bid, the 
respective remits of the private and public sectors were less overt, especially 
within bidding committees which had traditionally been council-led. Over the 
course of the three bids there was a steady sophistication of the mechanics of 
bidding, largely due to the presence of key individuals across all three cases which 
resulted in a great deal of policy learning. As a result of the steady evolution of 
bidding practices bids became more akin to partnerships, as opposed to 
representing a narrow range of often local administration-based interests, which 
often led to resentment from and towards the private sector. 
 
Over the course of these three case studies, the organisations that have 
experienced the most significant changes in their roles are domestic sports 
organisations and the most relevant to this study, given its event remit, is UK 
Sport. While broader Sports Council (before it was separated into elite and 
participatory focussed bodies) support was not sought in the early phases of the 
Sheffield bid, it was required for Manchester’s bids and the organisation’s role 
had been consolidated by the time of Glasgow’s bid for the 2014 Commonwealth 
Games. In response to Manchester’s failed bid, and also the failed English bid for 
the 2006 Football World Cup, the three cycles (again, this is explored in detail in 
Chapter Two) were embarked upon which resulted in UK Sport evolving from  
the role of a supportive ‘friend’ to the strategic lead on most bidding issues. The 
changing role of UK Sport has facilitated a departure from the approach seen in 
Sheffield, which could best be described as a ‘bid first’ approach, to one which 
involves a far greater role for UK Sport in the early stages. According to one 
senior figure in the organisation, the increasing prominence of UK Sport in 
bidding policy has resulted in the front-loading of support to bids to ‘flush out’ 
those that could be deficit making (Interview #15, 2010). In addition, the current 
approach involves a great deal of collaboration between UK Sport and NGBs in 
order to identify potential hosting opportunities which, once identified, are 
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‘pitched’ to possible host cities much in the same way the BSSF presented its 
proposals to Sheffield.  While not part of a national strategy, it is interesting that 
the approach taken by Chris Lundy and the BSSF in the early 1980s is now UK 
Sport’s favoured method of identifying hosting opportunities. 
 
As a result of the time period, which elapsed over the course of three studies the 
role of national sports organisations certainly increased, but, as mentioned above, 
there remains a tension with regards to the role of the organisation in Scottish (and 
therefore and prospective Welsh and Northern Irish) bids. In Glasgow’s case, 
senior Scottish sports administrators were largely against of any role for UK Sport 
in the Commonwealth Games bid and their opposition was for two reasons. 
Firstly, given the devolutionary tone to the bidding rhetoric and because 
Manchester’s hosting of the Commonwealth Games in 2002 was a relatively 
recent experience, it was felt that the bid needed to be identified as ‘Scottish’ and 
not ‘British’. Secondly, the remit of UK Sport in Scotland has long been unclear, 
partially due to UK Sport supporting ‘major’ events with DCMS remaining 
responsible for ‘mega’ events, despite no precise definition being offered from 
either organisation for either category. As indicated in Chapter One, the 
Commonwealth Games appear to straddle any definite line between those events 
that are deemed ‘major’ and ‘mega’, thus confusing matters further.    
 
Aside from the evolving role of domestic sports organisations, the thesis 
concludes that the changing demands of IFs have led to a significant change in the 
style and volume of decisions to host. As indicated in Chapter Two, an 
international ‘pull’ to host events emerges from a proliferation of hosting 
opportunities and a much more strategic approach from the bodies that award the 
events. In this study the increasingly strategic approach is illustrated by the clearly 
supportive role of the BSSF and BOA towards bids in the 1980s compared to the 
far more proactive role of the CGF in recruiting contemporary bids for the 
Commonwealth Games. One respondent, a senior figure in the CGF organisation, 
talked at length about the current preparatory work that is being carried out in 
developing Commonwealth nations, work that aims to culminate in bids for the 
event. However, it should be noted that while the tendency of IFs to target 
potential host cities to encourage bids is occurring, this pull is only successful 
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when policy-makers within the relevant cities come forward to develop the bid. A 
bid emerging at the city level was exemplified in Glasgow, where instead of a de 
facto bid committee being drawn up in the early stages, instead the three main 
protagonists in the bid’s development: Glasgow City Council, the Scottish 
Government and the CGCS formed a triumvirate around which the bid director 
‘floated’ (Interview #15, 2010). The formation of the partnership removed the 
potential for one sector to dominate bid discussions and also inhibited the 
opportunism available to policy entrepreneurs.  
 
 
 
8.3 The utility of analytical concepts 
 
8.3.1 Power Theories  
 
This discussion has been informed by meso-level analyses that utilise theories of 
power. In some meso-level frameworks the theory of power is explicit, while in 
others it is implicit, and these theories are considered useful for a number of 
reasons. That the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) and various aspects of 
regime theory have provided useful analytical lenses through which to understand 
decision-making in all three cases suggests that neo-pluralism offers a pertinent 
explanation of power in bidding decisions.  
 
At a rudimentary level, the presence of commercial sector organisations in the 
early stages of bid decisions and the general economic rationale behind bidding 
strategy points towards the  effective wielding of power by certain individuals, 
which resulted in the almost total absence of any overt opposition to all the bids in 
the early stages.  Using Dahl’s (1961) pluralist model, power can said to have 
been held by the ‘victorious’ actors, in these cases the labour-led local authorities, 
advocates of sport and some private sector groups. However, as Lukes (2005) 
indicated in his three dimensional view of power, the lack of visible opposition 
did not necessarily equate to an absence of opposition.  
 
That there was limited opposition to the bids in the early stages could suggest a 
general consensus, but Lukes (2005) specifically claimed that consensus often 
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disguised the nature of power in that it is possible to achieve false consensuses 
through the exercise of power in ways that shape actors’ behaviour. The 
somewhat vocal opposition to the events, in Sheffield and Glasgow’s case, 
following the awarding of the Games, would provide a strong supporting point to 
Lukes’ view, as would the various efforts by policy entrepreneurs to quell any 
fears before they could become organised into formal opposition groups. Indeed, 
Bachrach and Baratz (1970) argue that the careful management of the opposition, 
or the fast-tracking of the bid decisions through the democratic systems does not 
suggest the absence of opposition at all, rather that A (advocates of the bids) made 
it difficult for B (any opposition groups) to engage in the decision-making 
process. 
 
In Sheffield, with its strong majority, the Labour Group within the council was 
able to use the political system to suppress initial opposition, but this presumes 
that the members of the group were united in their support of the bid. It is the 
process by which this support was garnered that provides the most useful 
indication the location and use of power within this case study. Power was 
arguably located within the BSSF at the time Lundy and colleagues convinced the 
leadership of the BSSF that the UK would be able to host the World Student 
Games. The opportunity to exercise power was then created for the individuals 
within the potential host cities, Sheffield and Edinburgh, who saw bidding as an 
opportunity to aid their regeneration strategies. Following the transfer of the 
decision process to the host cities, the bid leaders, in Sheffield’s case, were able to 
use their influence to shape the preferences of their respective council leaders. 
Sheffield’s decision to bid was clearly linked to the coincidence of having ‘right-
minded’ people in prominent positions within the city and the desperate economic 
state which indirectly meant that Sheffield’s leaders were looking for a large scale 
event at exactly the right time. Accompanying this apparent coincidence was the 
respective ability of key individuals, Price, Lundy and Montgomery, to effectively 
wield power and shape the preferences of the BSSF, Council and Chamber of 
Commerce.  
 
The analyses of power undertaken indicate a range of methods used to suppress 
opposition to the events until it was too late to have any detrimental effect. These 
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methods ranged from an almost overt suppression of opposition by local 
government in Sheffield and Manchester, to a more managed public relations 
campaign administered in Glasgow which relied heavily on the nationalistic 
messages surrounding recent devolution.  
 
In essence, the power relations in the local policy settings of the three case studies 
reinforce the epistemological assumptions underpinning this research. The 
discussion above about the importance of opportunism, once the timing was right, 
by various actors is reinforced in below when meso-level theory is considered.  In 
accordance with Jessop’s (1990) and Bourdieu’s (1990) considerations, while the 
choices made by the actors, especially those that can be termed ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ were considered to be free, the context in which they were 
operating was a shaping structure which inhibited free choice.  
 
Continuing the theme of the relationship between structure and agency, Foucault 
(1975) contended that agency and structure were constituted discursively in that 
agency was given to some, but denied to others, which appears to fit with the 
discussion of meso-level theory below. If, as Foucault argued, the way in which 
power flows depends on how groups, institutions and discourses interact with 
each other then this helps explain the usefulness of the MSF as an analytical tool. 
While the MSF relies on the apparent opportunism of actors, any opportunism is 
dependent on timing, the availability of a ‘launch window’, which is only 
provided by these contextual processes and not, as it might seem, rely on 
randomness. For example, Bob Scott appears opportunistic and cites the ease with 
which he attracted political and private sector support for Manchester’s bids, but 
he was already in a position of power due to the changing ideological position of 
the Labour-led council and the emergence of a new relationship between the 
public and private sectors. Combined, the renegotiation of how the private and 
public sectors worked together initially created a void in which Scott, and the 
remainder of the ‘Manchester Mafia’ were able to exert influence over local 
policy making.  
 
Foucault’s discourse analysis is also relevant in explaining power in all three 
cases. While discourse analysis represents a distinct methodological approach that 
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was not employed in this study, the notion that changing discourses contributed to 
decision-making cannot be overlooked. Again, there is evidence in all three cases 
of changing ideological discourses, which resulted in shifts in power relations in 
local government. In Manchester and Sheffield, the ideological discourse of the 
Labour councils shifted to support non-traditional solutions to deindustrialisation 
and specifically sport was seen as one strategy with the potential to relieve not 
only economic, but also social problems. In Glasgow, the nationalistic discourse 
resulting from devolution was also clearly relevant in creating conditions that 
were receptive and appreciative of sport. These changing discourses surrounding 
the role of sports events can be seen in the composition of bid teams across the 
three case studies. In Manchester and Sheffield, the bid team comprised several 
officers from Housing and Transport departments, while the national tourist board 
and Event Scotland were heavily involved in the early stages of Glasgow’s bid.   
 
In addition to their relevance to the decision making at the local level, power 
theories can also help to explain the influence of central government on the three 
bids. It is suggested that power was exercised both overtly and covertly in all three 
case studies, thus broadly in adherence to Lukes’ (2005) three dimensional model. 
Conscious and deliberate influence was exerted by the various policy 
entrepreneurs and to some extent power was exerted upon the three Council 
leaderships by central and national governments. At the national level, Hay (2002) 
would contend that the indifference, or even hostility, towards the Sheffield and 
Manchester bids from successive Conservative Governments represented an 
exercise of power as the ‘non-decision’ to support the bid was in itself a decision 
and one made to demonstrate the government’s opposition to the ideology of the 
two city councils. However, with regards to these particular case studies, while the 
lack of central government support (for Sheffield and initially in Manchester) was 
important in explaining power within the bidding process, it should not be 
overstated as the non-decision in this case was not a marked departure from 
government policy or precedents. If there had existed a lengthy list of bids with 
government support, then the non-decision in these cases would be more 
pertinent.  
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8.3.2 Meso level theory 
 
Overtly, at least, the broad utility of the MSF is indicated in the unexpected 
degree of opportunism and agency in more recent bids for large scale sports 
events. However, while opportunism and ‘coincidences’ do seem to exist, the 
opportunism is not the same across local and national contexts.  Where it does 
appear, the context in which it has operationalized has changed domestically and 
internationally. In the international context, these changes were in the 
expectations of international sports federations (IFs), which increasingly expected 
governments to have strategies for such events.  Domestically, these changes refer 
to both DCMS and UK Sport strategy which offered only ‘support’ and first 
required champions to come forward. In essence, the system is set up to encourage 
‘entrepreneurs’. 
 
The encouraging of entrepreneurial behaviour is key. In Glasgow the MSF is 
convincing, despite the increasing centralisation of bidding policy. The politics 
stream was represented by the supportive national mood, the policy stream was 
the putting together of the bid and the problem stream was the challenge of 
demonstrating a new identity for Scotland. There was a clear window of 
opportunity and a symbol was required. The bid was at the right time to take 
advantage of the launch window. Similarly, although less convincingly, the MSF 
also applied in the Sheffield and Manchester cases. 
 
The findings of the study tentatively suggest that, despite its predominant focus on 
the agenda setting phase of policy decisions, the MSF is a convincing analytical 
framework to understand the emergence of the all three bids onto the relevant 
national and local political agendas. There is little doubt that in each case there 
was a significant influence achieved by individuals acting in manners akin to 
policy entrepreneurs. In addition, there was also some evidence that these actors 
were able to couple the three ‘streams.’ For instance, in Glasgow’s case there 
existed a clear link between the regeneration already taking place in the city 
(problem stream) and the quest by the newly devolved Scottish Government for a 
project through which Scottish identity could be harnessed (politics stream). At 
the same time as these were occurring, the two key policy entrepreneurs in the 
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Glasgow bid attended the 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester and were 
inspired to develop a Scottish bid (policy stream). All interviewees referred to this 
moment as the starting point of the Glasgow bid, with the two protagonists stating 
the bid commenced ‘over breakfast in a hotel in Manchester’ (Interview #16, 
2011; Interview #23, 2011). 
 
The apparent ad-hoc commencement of the bids was less surprising in Sheffield, 
where the concept of the bid was driven in the early stages by one individual’s 
‘lifetime’s work to bring the World Student Games to the UK’ (Interview #3, 
2009). The freedom with which individuals could operate in the 1980s was not 
unexpected due to the absence of any central government bidding policy, but it 
was not expected in the latter two cases where firstly the GB Sports Council and 
secondly the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) had taken specific 
policy stances on bidding. Yet, the chief policy entrepreneur in Manchester 
earmarked the moment ‘I was sitting in my car listening to the radio when I 
thought “wouldn’t it be good to bring the [Olympic] Games to Manchester?” So I 
phoned my friends in the Council and the local newspaper and so it began’ 
(Interview #27, 2011).  
 
Indeed, the manner in which these individuals acted fits Zahariadis’ (2007) 
interpretation of the MSF very closely in terms of policy entrepreneurs and its 
usefulness here is furthered by Houlihan’s (2005) claim that the MSF is 
particularly useful in explaining agenda setting when there exists potential for 
opportunism, often created by high levels of organisational fragmentation. Here, 
fragmentation was caused respectively by the collapse of the steel industry 
(Sheffield), the decline of manufacturing (Sheffield and Manchester) and a 
devolved Scottish government which was developing a new national strategy for 
sport and events. While the MSF seems a highly relevant analytical framework for 
understanding the actions of the early bid advocates, it remains limited to 
illuminating the agenda setting phase of the bid and not the decision-making 
process, for which other theoretical perspectives are required.  Once the decision 
to bid is made policy communities, particularly issue networks, help explain the 
next step as the policy entrepreneurs attempt put together a community to deliver 
the bid and then the event. In the three case studies, the issue networks represent a 
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coalition of support, which is then dismantled, often in the face of some 
resistance. 
 
However, similarly to the MSF, issue networks are not wholly sufficient in 
explaining all aspects of the development of the bids. Referring back to Rhodes’ 
(1988) key indicators of an issue network: large number of participants, the lack 
of stable relationships and loose ideological bonds, not all of these were evident 
across the three case studies. For instance, there were certainly a large number of 
participants in network in Glasgow, but many members were selected by the 
entrepreneurs due to their ideological predisposition in favour of hosting a large 
scale sports event. Due to the apparent ideological unity, and the power that the 
policy entrepreneurs were able to wield in selecting like-minded people to 
comprise this network, the theory was more convincing in Sheffield, where the 
loose ideological bonds between the initial bid team were highly evident. 
 
It was tentatively suggested in Chapter Three that of the two main policy network 
theories, policy communities and issue networks, policy communities theory was 
of more potential relevance to this study than issue networks. This assumption 
was made due to the key difference between them, especially being the presence 
(or not) of ideological bonds between members, and also that the few studies in 
the area of sport policy which had attempted similar analysis had found issue 
network theory to be a weak analytical tool (King, 2009). The analytical merits of 
issues network theory are considered below, but as a means of describing the 
pattern of interaction between actors issue networks would appear to have some 
use. Across all three cases, but most obviously in Sheffield and Glasgow, issue 
networks appear to have been assembled after the bids had been successful in the 
domestic bidding competition. However, it was not until after the official 
awarding of the Games (in Sheffield and Glasgow) that it became clear that 
something resembling an issue network, and not a policy community, was present. 
 
According to Rhodes (1988) issue networks are more temporary in nature than 
policy communities and their members are united by loose ideological bonds. The 
temporary nature of the bid teams is highlighted in detail in the previous chapters 
and most obviously represented by the resentment felt by various bid team 
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members once their services were dispensed with after the awarding of the event.  
Several interviewees also resented that ‘outsiders’ were brought in to deliver the 
events at the expense of perceived local expertise. It is clear here that while the 
resistance to outsides does suggest the presence of issue networks, it is 
noteworthy that their temporary characteristics are not necessarily appreciated or 
expected by all members. The issue of ideological bonds between members is the 
key reason why issue networks were doubted in the earlier chapters. It was 
assumed that the support of large scale sports events would demonstrate a strong 
ideological connection among members of bid committees in terms of their 
predisposition towards the value of sport events, thus reflecting the apparent 
national advocacy coalition in the area of hosting. However, on reflection, this 
ideology was not apparent. Instead, all bid committee members appreciated the 
role that sports events could play in regeneration, but their only common belief 
was that regeneration needed to occur, which is more likely a bond based on more 
pragmatic responses to local policy crises than on ideology.  
 
The third approach put forward in Chapter Three for its potential usefulness in 
explaining decisions to host large scale events was the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF). The ACF promotes the identification of policy subsystems as 
the starting point for analysis and these subsystems, according to Sabatier (1999), 
consist of actors from a variety of organisations who display particular concern 
with one or more specific issue, and thus attempt to influence policy in that field. 
At a superficial level, the ACF could explain the rise of events onto the political 
agendas of the three different cities, along with the speed with which the policy 
entrepreneurs were able to put together their bidding committees. However, 
except perhaps in Glasgow, the instability of the political systems and short-term 
reactive nature of support for bids indicates that these were more akin to issue 
networks than advocacy coalitions. The usefulness of issue networks is supported 
by several of the interviews in which respondents cite no previous interest or 
inclination to sports events. In each case there were a few interviewees that 
claimed a lifelong love of sport, but it was not specific nor shared enough to be 
considered a deep core belief.  
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Rather than ACF providing a comprehensive analytic framework, it provides a 
sensitising function in two ways. Firstly, it could be argued that the event 
strategies in Manchester and Sheffield that followed their bids represented the 
successful formation of an advocacy coalition in the years following the event. 
However, further research would be required to determine whether these events 
provided a starting point for a nascent coalition and whether the coalition has 
persisted. In Glasgow, the Commonwealth Games bid emerged from an existing 
event programme in Glasgow and an emerging one at national (Scottish) level, 
which did amount to the statutory status of sports events, despite sport itself 
remaining a marginal policy concern in both Glasgow and Scotland. However, 
analysing Scottish sport policy using the ACF is problematic due to the short-term 
nature of each programme and the apparent lack of stability in political positions. 
That several actors were brought in to the bid team almost seamlessly despite 
demonstrating no overt support for this type of event again suggests a lack of deep 
core beliefs and a pattern of interaction between actors which more closely 
resembles an issue network.  
 
The second example of the potential usefulness of the ACF concerns the increased 
national (UK) appetite for hosting large scale sports events. Green and Houlihan 
(2004) provide a thorough account of the emergence of an advocacy coalition in 
the area of elite sport in the UK and it is useful as the emergence of the coalition 
has triggered what appears to be the foundation of a similar coalition in the area of 
bidding. Green and Houlihan (2004) claim that a coalition of actors and 
organisations with shared core beliefs emerged in the area of elite sport in the 
1990s and 2000s, and identify the advent of the National Lottery and successive 
government policy papers on sport as the supporting evidence for it. Alongside 
the refocusing of national policy towards elite success, it could also be argued that 
a coalition emerged concerning the hosting of events. The sudden empowerment 
of sports organisations by Lottery funding in 1994 along with policy statements 
such as Game Plan (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002) which specifically named 
hosting large scale events as a political priority appear to suggest that hosting was 
perhaps as serious a policy concern as elite success. However, the longevity of 
any such coalition is questioned by an apparent retreat from a dedication to host 
‘mega’ events post London 2012 in favour of ‘major’ events. 
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8.3.3 Regime theory 
 
Regime theory, including urban regimes, elite regimes and symbolic regimes, has 
been used extensively in the concluding sections of the case study chapters in this 
thesis. Hence this discussion will not re-state these observations, but instead will 
consider the utility of regime theory more broadly. Summarising the several 
studies referred to in Chapter Three (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989; Davies, 2001, 
2002, Rhodes, 1989) and drawing on the work of Davies (2003), urban regimes 
can be characterised by the following:  
 
 The coalition includes local public sector and private sector elites 
 Co-operation between these elites occurs through informal networks based 
on trust, diplomacy and shared goals.  
 The coalition enjoys a high level of autonomy from other levels of 
government 
 The network is sustained over a long period 
 It is primarily concerned with the economic development of the city 
 Collaboration generates governing outcomes. 
 
All of these characteristics were reviewed, although to a varying extent in the 
preceding chapters and there is good evidence that the bidding committees in all 
three cities demonstrated at least some regime-like characteristics. However, as 
Davies (2003) continues, while these characteristics have been observed in many 
UK cities which have experienced deindustrialisation, their presence does not 
necessarily constitute evidence of an urban regime. Indeed, he claims that urban 
regimes cannot truly exist in the UK for three reasons. Firstly, unlike in the USA, 
local public and private sector agencies are not interdependent on each other. The 
three case studies all indicate a pivotal role for the private sector in the 
development of bids, but this was more due to pragmatic decisions made by local 
governments, rather than resulting from material interdependence. Second, due to 
businesses often having little influence over local politicians, private sector 
organisations in the UK have often displayed little interest in local collaborative 
working. Again, the initial reluctance to collaborate was borne out in all three 
cases, especially Sheffield, where there had been a longstanding antipathy 
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between private and public sector organisations. In addition, in all three cities, 
even when the private sector was mobilised in the early stages of the bidding 
processes, the local state remained in control and all three city councils were still 
confined by their strongly socialist heritages. Thirdly, UK cities do not have 
similar levels of control over their finances as American cities and without the 
decentralisation of economic power, an urban regime cannot exist.  
 
In addition to the critique offered above, it is noteworthy that the only city in 
which a strong case could be made for the use of urban regime theory as an 
analytical tool was Manchester and it is tentatively suggested that the longevity of 
its regime is partly due to the city’s failure in bidding for the Olympic Games. 
Had it been successful in one of its bids, the other cases indicate that the ‘regime’ 
would have been broken up in order to recruit the exogenous specialists required 
to host the Games. Therefore, it could also be noted that the issue networks, 
apparent in both Glasgow and Sheffield could have also been nascent regimes 
which, provided each city set about a long term objective host their respective 
events, could have emerged into something more regime-like over time.  
 
8.3.4 The usefulness of the analytical concepts 
 
This section revisits the analytical frameworks in order to speculate as to their 
broader utility in analysing policy. Above it is argued that those most pertinent to 
this study were issue networks, but mainly the MSF.  
 
It is claimed in the introduction that the purpose of this thesis was not to provide a 
new theoretical approach for understanding bid decisions and there are three broad 
reasons for this. The first is due to the danger of facilitating a proliferation of 
theories.  Sabatier (2007) indicates that the purpose of policy theory is to simplify 
a complicated process, hence adding further complications to the analysis by 
creating a new theory or adapting an existing one would be contradictory. Indeed, 
a good theory is one that can be applied to a number of issues. Second, offering a 
new theory based on three case studies in a very specific policy domain would be 
premature. Sabatier (2007) and Cairney (2011) both argue that policy cycles, 
hence also policy theories, cannot be fully understood in the short term. Therefore, 
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adapting relatively new theories, such as the MSF, would be inappropriate.  
Linking to this point, the third justification for the absence of any theory building 
in this thesis is that any policy (re)building could only be justified if the same 
weaknesses or gaps in understanding the policy process were identified across a 
range of studies.  
 
In terms of the usefulness of the specific analytical tools used in this study, focus 
now shifts to the broader utility of Issue Networks and the MSF, as these were 
identified as being most relevant in explaining the policy-making process in 
relation to bidding for large scale sporting events.  
 
The Multiple Streams Framework provides a departure from comprehensive and 
rational policy-making theories in that ideas or solutions tend to appear, or be 
formulated, before problems are identified (Cairney, 2011). However, in the cases 
above, the ideas (the bids) were not enough to ‘infect’ the political systems 
involved in the policy area and hence required the exercise of power in key 
institutional areas in order to become accepted as solutions. This exercise of 
power was accompanied by a new national paradigm in terms of event hosting, 
not caused by a crisis, but simply an evolution of sport policy into a new area. In 
addition, while the MSF was initially very much an American concept, it can be 
said to have utility in nations featuring more centralized and parliamentary 
systems. According to Zahariadis (2003) whenever the following five criteria 
apply, the MSF can be useful in determining how policy is made: 
 
 Ambiguity (there are many ways to frame the policy problem) 
 Competition for attention between potential solutions to problems 
 An imperfect selection process 
 Limited timescales 
 General departures from linear policy-making processes.  
 
It has been argued at length above that each of the cases saw considerable 
evidence of all of these features.  
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However, the utility of the MSF should not be overstated and there is considerable 
scope for critiquing or refining it. While the MSF is useful in organising data, 
there is the risk that it oversimplifies the policy process, giving the impression of 
a linear process (which it rejects). In addition, it can imply that issues/problems 
are discrete and self-contained rather than layered, vaguely specific and 
overlapping. For example, in Glasgow the decision to bid overlapped with a 
number of broader issues, including nationalism, devolution, economic 
regeneration, maintaining the visibility of the Commonwealth as an institution and 
the provision of developmental opportunities for elite athletes.  
 
To a lesser extent than the MSF, issue networks were considered to have some 
relevance in explaining the policy process after the decision to bid has been made, 
but they also provide an opportunity for a broader reflection on their utility. 
Essentially, the concept of issue networks tends to be more descriptive rather than 
analytical. They tell us about membership and interaction between members, but 
very little about why policy does or does not change.  
 
8.4 Original Contribution to Knowledge 
 
It is considered that the original contribution to knowledge of this research is 
drawn from the reflections of theoretical perspectives above, but in summary can 
be expressed under two themes. Firstly, in the absence of a vast body of literature 
concerning bidding policies and the further absence of one that was considered 
‘best’, the thesis has helped refine existing theories. There was no intention to 
develop a new theory, but this should not be considered eclecticism. Instead the 
theories utilised offered a basis for refinement and their relative merits are 
discussed above.  
 
Second, the role of central government has indeed become greater, albeit blurred 
in Scotland and thus adheres to the unofficial hypothesis of the thesis. However, 
this new awareness has not manifested itself into significant levels of material 
support. What was found during this study was and increasing concern nationally 
to develop a hosting and bidding strategy, but a relatively weak strategy in terms 
of the capacity to do something about it.  The caveat to this surrounds government 
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support to London’s bid for the 2012 Olympic Games, but the absence of any 
future Olympic bidding strategy and lack of support to other bids, such as 
England’s bids for the 2018 or 2022 Football World Cups supports the point 
made. Indeed, the current position is that Olympic Bids from cities such as 
Manchester and Birmingham are now unlikely to happen and all other events are 
likely to require national or sub-national strategies to support them. Hence, the 
role for Westminster is limited, except perhaps for Olympic bids and cities are 
still important. While the origins of the bids examined in this thesis seemed to 
shift from purely city-led to sub-national government-led in Scotland, this still 
required a willing partner in Glasgow for the idea of the bid to succeed.  
 
8.5 Limitations of the methodological approach. 
 
Some of the limitations of the study have been implied in the previous sections of 
this chapter. One particular limitation is with regards to the case study approach 
adopted. Due to the timescale of the empirical research, the order in which data 
were collected had to be altered. Hence, instead of the bids following a 
chronological order, the data collection for the Glasgow case study were collected 
before data for the Manchester case study. The order of data collection had a 
slight effect on the intended use of Yin’s (2009) iterative model for developing the 
analytical framework and meant that the model could not be followed 
chronologically. In addition, the Manchester case-study proved problematic as 
while the intention was to study the 2000 Olympic Bid in isolation, following the 
data collection, it proved impossible to detach this bid from the two previous 
failed bids. The collection of data for the Manchester case study had a positive 
effect, in that urban regime theory became more useful due to the longer time 
period, but meant that the pre-research intention to locate the three bids in distinct 
bidding ‘eras’ had to be adapted.  
 
A second limitation occurred with the interviews. Firstly, due to the time that had 
lapsed between the earlier case studies and the time of the interviews, some 
important potential interviewees were no longer alive. However, it was noted that 
the interviewees who no longer held important positions within organisations 
appeared more frank in both their opinions and were able to offer some extent of 
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reflection of the bidding processes and their roles within it. Secondly, the 
experience of interviewing elites initially proved problematic. For instance, when 
interviewing a current senior politician, there was some initial confusion as to the 
correct title by which to address this individual, which caused a slight delay in the 
interview. For future interviews, these issues were resolved through prior 
conversations with the personal assistants of these figures.  
 
The most positive aspects of the conducting the research surround the accessing of 
key individuals and the archive research undertaken. As indicated in Chapter 
Four, each case study commenced with a thorough review of archival materials in 
the forms of historical policy minutes from a range of organisations and of local 
and national newspapers. All minutes required were located and provided 
invaluable information regarding the potential interviewees. On three occasions, 
resulting from face-to-face interviews rather than telephone interviews, additional 
private records were accessed, which would have been unobtainable without the 
development of rapport with interviewees. The second consequence of the face-to-
face interviews was the ability to locate further interviewees through existing 
private social networks. For example, one respondent who had long since retired 
was particularly difficult to locate, but through an informal conversation following 
another interview it was disclosed where this individual lived and that he was a 
devout Christian. Hence, a search of local parish and church newsletters resulted 
in the finding of his contact details and a subsequent interview.  
 
Upon reflection, if this research were to be repeated, the following would be 
altered in terms of the methodological approach. Firstly, further attention would 
be given to the rules and regulations of archives. On several occasions, access was 
initially restricted due to having prohibited equipment (pens, cameras, laptops). 
Secondly, while the telephone interviews were practical given the distances 
between the researcher and the interviewees, all of the face-to-face interviews 
yielded additional information.  
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Appendix One: Interview Details 
 
Interview #1 (2010) Telephone interview conducted with former Chair of 
Sheffield’s Chamber of Commerce, 20th October 2010.  
 
Interview #2 (2010) Telephone interview conducted with senior national sports 
administrator, 12
th
 November 2010.  
 
Interview #3 (2010) Telephone interview conducted with Gerry Montgomery, 1
st
 
October 2010.  
 
Interview #4 (2010) Telephone interview conducted with Peter Price, 23
rd
 
September 2010.  
 
Interview #5 (2010) Telephone interview with former Head of Sport at Sheffield 
Polytechnic, 20
th
 October, 2010.  
 
Interview #6 (2010) Telephone interview with former senior member of Sheffield 
City Council, 19
th
 September, 2010.  
 
Interview #7 (2010) Telephone interview with former senior member of BSSF and 
leader of the Sheffield Organising Committee, 24
th
 September, 2010.  
 
Interview #8 (2010) Telephone interview with former member of the Sheffield 
Organising Committee, 1
st
 October, 2010.  
 
Interview #9 (2010) Telephone interview with former senior member of BSSF, 20
th
 
October, 2010.  
 
Interview #10 (2011) Telephone interview with senior Scottish sports 
administrator, 16
th
 December, 2011.  
 
Interview #11 (2011) Telephone interview with Louise Martin, 17
th
 June, 2011.  
 
Interview #12 (2011) Telephone interview with leading administrator in the CGF
 
20
th
  December, 2011.  
 
Interview #13 (2011) Telephone interview with member of Glasgow City Council, 
7
th
 June, 2011.  
 
Interview #14 (2011) Telephone interview with Lord McConnell, 9
th
 June, 2011.  
 
Interview #15 (2010) Telephone interview with senior British sports 
administrator, 20
th
 November, 2010.  
 
Interview #16 (2011) Telephone interview with senior executive at Glasgow City 
Council, 8
th
 June, 2011.  
 
Interview #17 (2011) Telephone interview with former chair of Glasgow Chamber 
of Commerce, 2
nd
 June, 2011. 
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Interview #18 (2011) Telephone interview with Glasgow City Council officer, 11
th
 
June, 2011. 
 
Interview #19 (2011) Personal correspondence with author of opposition website 
to Glasgow 2014, 18
th
 December, 2011.  
 
Interview #20 (2012) Telephone interview with former leader of Glasgow City 
Councill, 6
th
 January, 2012. 
 
Interview #21 (2010) Personal correspondence received from Dr. Chris Lundy, 
24
th
 October, 2010.  
 
Interview #22 (2011) Interview with Sir Robert (Bob) Scott, 17
th
 October, 2011.  
 
Interview # 23 (2012) Telephone interview with former leader of Manchester City 
Council’s Labour Group, 8th August, 2012. 
 
Interview #24 (2012) Telephone interview with former leader of Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce, 25
th
 September, 2012.  
 
Interview #25 (2012) Telephone interview with former leader of Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce, 12
th
 September, 2012.   
 
Interview #26 (2012) Telephone interview with former chief executive of 
Manchester City Council, 10
th
 October, 2012.  
 
Interview #27 (2012) Interview with former leader of the BOA, 1
st
 November 
2012. 
 
 
 
Interview questions 
 
The semi-structured interviews were based around the following questions, which 
were sent to interviewees in advance of each interview.  
 
1) What were the origins of the bid? 
2) In what ways did the bid fit with existing strategies in the city? 
3) Where did the power lie in the very early stages? 
4) What was the role of central government in the early stages/as the bid 
developed? 
5) Was there any opposition, formal or informal, in the early stages? 
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An Example Interview Transcript 
 
 
Opening conversation about relevant people to contact, all of whom have now 
been interviewed.  
 
PS: From your perspective, how did this bid originate? 
 
18: From my perspective, at the Manchester Commonwealth Games, Jack 
McConnell, Bridget McConnell, I think Jack was first minister at the time, 
Bridget was of the culture and sports department at Glasgow City Council, and 
still is, and Louise Martin who was secretary of the Commonwealth Games 
Federation, but chair of the commonwealth games council for Scotland. Those 
three people got together and had a conversation about the success of the 
commonwealth games in Manchester and were excited by what they saw, what 
was going on and by discussions with people in Manchester about how good it 
had been for Manchester. And I don’t know if Lord McConnell mentioned this but 
he was there and they came back from Manchester quite excited by the prospect 
of the games. I know Bridget spoke to me and she spoke to George Black, the 
chief executive of the council, that this is something we should really be 
considering. Louise Martin came back from that event and had some discussion 
about this, I’m sure she’ll tell you who with, about the possibility of bidding for 
2014 and stating some kind of process. So, I think that’s where it all started. It 
was witnessing the success of the Manchester event and discussing the event with 
the key people in Manchester and I think what followed was George Black’s take 
on that which would have been something like how an event like that could help 
accelerate the wider regeneration plans of the city, whether that be social 
regeneration or economic regeneration, or in the development of infrastructure 
especially the transport infrastructure. So, I think George saw the event as being a 
vehicle for wider and greater things that were already planned for to a certain 
degree, but would accelerate these. So that’s where George was coming from. 
 
PS: So how did this link with existing strategies within the city? 
 
18: The other person who would be able to talk to you about that would be Steve 
Inch and Robert Booth. I mean everything we did on the bid linked in to the wider 
strategies of the city. For example, the decision to host the facilities in the East 
End of the city went through a lot of discussion but we decided to go for a new 
build phase for this rather than using student accommodation because of the 
overall regeneration plans for the east end of the city. A gateway regeneration 
agency has subsequently been established to take on, by the dowmarnock (?) area 
where one of the new sports facilities is being built, the area where the motorway 
extension and the games village which is a large piece of housing regeneration 
were all part of a huge strategy to regeneration that part of the city, so the games 
has brought that about and if you out there now it’s like a mini London Olympic 
park so that regeneration is very much underway. So at the very outset the 
opportunity was seen to use the games as a vehicle for some of the key 
regenerations strategies (inaudible). 
 
PS: Was there any opposition you were aware of in the early stages? 
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18: Funnily enough, no. I noticed that was one of your questions and I’ve been 
trying to rack my brains. One of…the whole bid process was a very happy affair, 
very little opposition, we won the vote quite decisively, people have commented 
that it’s probably one the best prepared bids for a major sporting event. It probably 
goes in to more detail than the London Olympic bid document does if you were to 
compare the two, because, and I think this a really really important point, the 
really unusual thing about the bid was that this bid, and most other bids for major 
Olympic games or whatever, World Cups, are pulled together by consultants. 
What we did was get key people in the city who were managing at director level 
who were managing and planning the regeneration of the citym me for example, 
the head of planning, the head of transport, to come together…help provide the 
bid. There were one or two consultants who helped with the technical details…the 
Scottish government put some people in to that as well. The Scottish government 
and the city pulled together and the reason for that is to answer the question 
before. We wanted a bid that was complimentary to what we were trying to 
achieve in the city, so if we brought consultants in who just were thinking about 
winning the games it wouldn’t have the same passion…feeling and understanding 
of what we were trying to achieve for the city and Scotland as well. And it worked 
really well. It did put pressures on the day jo if you like (laughs) but we brought 
people in. We did have a bid coordinator in the end, we brought a full time bid 
coordinator, Derek Casey. He was brought in, but his team was made up of 
officials from either the city council or the Scottish government and a lot of the 
key working groups that were driving the venture, the village were led by senior 
officials either within the city or the Scottish government so the whole thing was 
very much not dominated by consultants but by the city. The benefit of that is the 
people involved have a very real understanding now of why we bid and what 
we’re trying to achieve, which isn’t a sporting event in 2014, we hope that will be 
successful, but it’s something much more tangible. So, that’s some of the rationale 
behind it, Louise Martin came back from Manchester and instigated an internal 
bid process for Scotland, which Edinburgh and Glasgow put their hands up and a 
mini competition where the CGCS decided quite convincingly that they wanted to 
go with Glasgow and not Edinburgh. 
 
PS: Why do you think that was? 
 
18: I think for all the reasons I’ve just said. I don’t think Edinburgh really 
understand and put a fairly weak proposal forward. I think the head of leisure and 
culture that I think was the real person involved and it didn’t involve the planners, 
whereas I think the Glasgow submission at that very early stage was led by 
George Black, the chief exec, and myself, but also planning and regeneration were 
a key part and there was a real buy-in across the city and the CGCS knew that a 
commonwealth games wasn’t just a sporting event, but a planning and 
regeneration issue as well and they had consultants in to assess the bids and I 
think we won fairly convincingly.  
 
PS: It seems fairly obvious the Scottish parliament was fully behind this… 
 
18: we had all party support. At a very early stage we got the leaders of all the 
political parties. I’m not sure how easy that was to secure because I wasn’t 
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involved but it was secured so we never had any political opposition from the 
Scottish parliament, no.  
 
PS: Where you aware of any input at all from Westminster? 
 
18: not particularly significant, no. there was contacts made and there were links 
and some discussions, but I suppose being a commonwealth games Glasgow 
really drove this. I suspect Lord McConnell needed to get some support behind 
the scenes from the Labour Government, but actually the money was coming from 
the Scottish parliament and the city council. I think there were some areas where 
we needed to have discussion, like security but this was very much driven by 
Glasgow city council and the Scottish government.  
 
PS: And what about sports organisations? 
 
18: The CGCS was because Louise Martin was the third key partner, 
tremendously influential securing votes to win the bid. I mean she ever so popular 
with the other 71 countries as she was secretary of the CGF. But she also had 
good relationships with the sports governing bodies so in determining which 17 
sports we were going to go for, yeah, there was a lot of discussion with the 
governing bodies so when we went through the detailed plans we involved the 
sport governing bodies, absolutely. And we had to get sign-off from the Scottish 
sports governing bodies and the international sports governing bodies before we 
submitted our bid, so there was a fair bit of buy in from the sports that made the 
17 that we went with. If there was any opposition, it was probably from one or 
two sports that were disappointed that they were not going to be in the 
programme. I mean, basketball were disappointed because they were probably  on 
the fringe of, you know, next in line, rowing, one or two sports that just missed 
out, so they were disappointed. 
 
PS: Did the universities play a significant role? 
 
18: No, is the short answer (laughs). Manchester used student accommodation, we 
decided to go with a different model which is now the standard model of people a 
new village which would go to the city after. We didn’t need to involve the 
universities int hat way. Also most of the venues were either built or planned to be 
built and none of them were on university sites as they didn’t have to spectator 
accommodation or the scale. We had some discussion with universities about 
training venues and stuff like tha but I wouldn’t say it was core or central. It 
would be wrong to say that there wasn’t any discussion with the universities 
because the bid was very inclusive, lots of partners were involved but they 
weren’t a core partner. 
 
PS: Were you completely satisfied with the input you were able to have in those 
very early discussions? 
 
18: No, no. My role was when Bridget came back from Manchester and had a chat 
with George and handed it to me to take over so I, in terms of the internal process 
against Edinburgh, I brought Derek Casey in as I have a day job as director of 
major projects and various other things and as we got in to a serious bid we 
 273 
 
appointed Derek to pull it all together. My main role was to pull the whole venues 
side together, the training venues and the accommodation. No, I was very much 
involved in the technical side and the politics side as well. 
 
PS: Is there anything else you would like to add? 
 
18: One thing, a couple of things… There was obviously a discussion about 
winnability. Clearly, we felt that we had to have an early view that this was 
winnable, so that was important. Secondly we were lucky enough to get in a pre-
emptive strike, after we had the Edinburgh-Glasgow and Glasgow came out on 
top, about a year before, a year and a half before or event two years before a 
formal submission was required, we had an opportunity to go out to Melbourne in 
2005 for the CGF assembly, prior to the games in 2006 and that was largely 
through Louise’s offices and me and a few other took the opportunity to promote 
our potential bid at time, it hadn’t even been signed off by the government at that 
stage and the CGCS had selected Glasgow in front of Edinburgh but we needed 
sign off from the Scottish government and they were about to. But, that was really 
influential in helping to win the bid, was talking to people before the whole 
process had even started. That gave us the confidence to think this thing was 
winnable. It’s one thing to say how great it would be for the city and the country 
in terms of legacy and regeneration, but unless you think you’ve got a chance of 
winning it, it’s not worth it for us in terms of money and everything, You’ve got 
to understand the politics of the sport and that’s where Louise and Derek were 
very very good. They understood the politics of sport which gave us a ‘heads up’ 
that this was winnable and this is how you about winning it and Louise will be 
able to absolutely, the huge role that she played, visiting voters and countries and 
securing the majority votes. The other thing I would say is the other legacy of the 
bid is that it introduced a level of partnership working, the bid itself, that I have 
never seen before in either Glasgow or Scotland. You have partners working 
together hand in hand at national or even city level, different agencies, the health 
agencies, the government agencies, a range of partners, everyone wanted to be a 
part of the bid. Strathclyde police were involved, once you start this process of 
partnerships, people being seconded in to teams, it continues in to other themes. 
There’s a real spin off benefit in the way the bid brought people together, which is 
another reason why its much better than using consultants, to actually use people 
who were responsible for these areas within the city because it’s had an enduring 
impact in terms of networking and partnership working.  
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Appendix Two: Notes from the BSSF Selection Committee for the 
1991 World Student Games Bid (including one member’s hand-
written notes taken during the bid presentations) 
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Appendix Three: The circumstances leading to the dismissal of 
the leader of Universiade (GB) Ltd. 
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Appendix Four: Correspondence between central government and 
the Sheffield bid team  
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